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ABSTRACT
Frictions in Financial Intermediation
by
Sahil Raina
Chair: Sugato Bhattacharyya
This dissertation comprises essays examining frictions in three types of financial in-
termediaries: venture capital firms, investment banks, and commercial banks. The
first two essays consider the decision-making of agents within these intermediaries
while the third examines the structure of the commercial bank sector. The first essay
explores the e↵ect of gender on VC-financed entrepreneurship. I find that women’s
participation in venture capital-financed entrepreneurship is lower than in other sec-
tors of the economy. Further, the women that do participate lead startups that
perform worse than startups led by men. Does interaction with venture capitalists
(VCs) contribute to the low participation and performance gap? To answer these
questions, I compare the gender gap in successful exits from VC financing between
two sets of startups: those initially financed by VCs with only male general partners
(GPs) and those initially financed by VCs that include female GPs. Constructing a
novel dataset to perform this analysis, I find a large performance gender gap among
startups financed by VCs with only male GPs but no such gap among startups fi-
nanced by VCs that include female GPs. The disparity is solely due to improved
performance among female-led startups. This suggests that VC gender composition
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has contributed strongly to the performance gap between female- and male-led star-
tups, which could deter women from leading VC-financed projects and lower their
participation.
The second essay analyzes whether mid-level managers in securitized finance were
aware of a large-scale housing bubble and a looming crisis in 2004-2006 using their
personal home transaction data. We find that the average person in our sample neither
timed the market nor were cautious in their home transactions, and did not exhibit
awareness of problems in overall housing markets. Certain groups of securitization
agents were particularly aggressive in increasing their exposure to housing during
this period, suggesting the need to expand the incentives-based view of the crisis to
incorporate a role for beliefs.
The third essay uses a uniquely extensive branch-level dataset on deposit account
interest rates, maintenance fees, and fee thresholds, and document substantial time-
series and cross-sectional variation in these prices. We then examine whether variation
in bank concentration helps explain the variation in prices. The standard measure
of concentration, the HHI, is not correlated with any of the outcome variables. We
then construct a generalized HHI (GHHI) that captures both common ownership
(the degree to which banks are commonly owned by the same investors) and cross-
ownership (the extent to which banks own shares in each other). The GHHI is
strongly correlated with all prices. We use the growth of index funds as an arguably
exogenous source of cross-sectional variation of county-level common ownership to
suggest a causal link from the GHHI to higher prices for banking products.
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CHAPTER I
VC financing and the entrepreneurship gender gap
Abstract
Women’s participation in venture capital-financed entrepreneurship is lower than
in other sectors of the economy. And the women that do participate lead startups
that perform worse than startups led by men. Does interaction with venture capital-
ists (VCs) contribute to the low participation and performance gap? To answer these
questions, I compare the gender gap in successful exits from VC financing between
two sets of startups: those initially financed by VCs with only male general partners
(GPs) and those initially financed by VCs that include female GPs. Constructing a
novel dataset to perform this analysis, I find a large performance gender gap among
startups financed by VCs with only male GPs but no such gap among startups fi-
nanced by VCs that include female GPs. The disparity is solely due to improved
performance among female-led startups. This suggests that VC gender composition
has contributed strongly to the performance gap between female- and male-led star-
tups, which could deter women from leading VC-financed projects and lower their
participation.
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1.1 Introduction
Anecdotally, Silicon Valley is a di cult environment for female entrepreneurs. In
an article published in The New York Times in April 2014, the author notes that
“sexism exists in many places, but start-up companies have particular qualities that
can allow problems to go unchecked.” A January 2015 Newsweek article describes the
venture capital (VC) industry in northern California as a “boys’ club” and implies
that the industry’s actions create “a particularly toxic atmosphere for women in
Silicon Valley.” Does this translate into worse performance for VC-financed startup
led by female entrepreneurs? In this paper, I measure performance using exits from
VC financing via IPO or acquisition1 and find that startups led by one or more
female entrepreneurs (hereafter referred to as female-led startups) have a 37% lower
rate of exit than startups led by male entrepreneurs (male-led startups), a sizeable
performance gap.
What might be the underlying reasons for this gap? Is it that female-led star-
tups are intrinsically less valuable than male-led startups?2 Or are VC financiers
responsible for the performance gap? It could be that some VC financiers are poor at
evaluating female-led startups and some may also be poor at advising them. In this
paper, I explore whether VC financing contributes to the performance gap among
startups. Addressing this question is important both from the perspective of the VC
financier and the startup. From the VC perspective, reducing financed startups’ po-
tential success means that some VCs are wasting resources invested by their limited
partners (LPs). For the startup, financing by the right VC may be the di↵erence
1Successful exit from VC financing via IPO or acquisition is a standard measure of performance
in the VC literature (for example, Hochberg et al., 2007; Cockburn and MacGarvie, 2009; Puri and
Zarutskie, 2012).
2Given the nature of VC-financed projects, gender di↵erences in risk aversion, competitiveness,
and ability that are described in the literature may contribute to this gap. Risk aversion di↵erences
between men and women are documented in Powell and Ansic (1997) as well as Barber and Odean
(2001). Croson and Gneezy (2009) shows evidence that women are more averse to competition than
men. And Tierney (2010) presents the argument made by Larry Summers that the far right tail of
the ability distribution may be more populated by men than women.
2
between success and failure. If women entrepreneurs believe VC financing may hurt
their startups’ likelihood of success, they may be less likely to pursue VC-financed
entrepreneurial projects.
Reduced female participation would imply that some intrinsically valuable projects
in the economy are not undertaken because of the possibility of VC-induced failure.
This may be part of the reason for markedly lower female participation in VC-financed
entrepreneurship than in other segments of the economy. In 2012, women comprised
47% of the labor force while 36% of small businesses were majority-owned by women
(Sewell, 2013; Lichtenstein, 2014). In stark contrast, 15% of VC-financed firms had
a woman on the executive team in 2011-2013 and only 2.7% of them had a female
CEO, according to a survey by The Diana Project.3
To explore the potential role of gender in VC-financed entrepreneurship, I compare
the performance gap among startups financed by VC syndicates with and without
female partners (hereafter, female VCs and male VCs, respectively), and find that,
although the two VC groups finance similar startups, the performance gap is large
among startups financed by male VCs but nonexistent among startups financed by
female VCs. My findings provide strong initial evidence that VC financing has con-
tributed to the performance gap among startups.
To run my analyses, I construct a novel dataset using CrunchBase, a large, crowd-
sourced database on the activities of high-tech startups. I use CrunchBase not only
because it includes data on a large number of startups and financing rounds, but also
because it includes biographical information on entrepreneurs and financing VCs’ gen-
eral partners (GPs), which is crucial for this study and not available in most public
databases on VC financing. While CrunchBase limits the dataset to high-tech star-
tups, the percentage of female-led startups within this dataset is comparable to that
reported for all VC-financed firms (14.8% in my sample versus 15% in The Diana
3The Diana Project is a non-profit organization focused on female entrepreneurship which releases
periodic statistics on female participation in entrepreneurship.
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Project data).
My dataset provides a number of interesting insights into VC financing of startups.
For instance, 9% of all founders and GPs are female in my dataset, and one-sixth of
the startups initially financed by female and male VCs are female-led. The equal
representation suggests that the two VC groups do not su↵er di↵erentially from any
possible evaluation biases against female entrepreneurs. Of course, equal represen-
tation could also arise from di↵erences in the intrinsic value of female-led startups
seeking initial financing from two (di↵erently biased) VC groups. However, this ex-
planation is inconsistent with another fact revealed by the data: the proportion of
portfolio firms that successfully exit VC financing from the two VC groups is the
same, approximately 29%.4 If the intrinsic value of financed startups di↵ered across
the two VC groups, it would likely be reflected in their overall exit rates.
Comparing other features of the data across the two syndicate groups, I find that
startups that were initially financed by the two VC groups also have similar exit rates
via IPO (5%) and acquisition (24%). The duration of VC financing for successful
portfolio firms also does not di↵er substantially across the two groups (3.5 years), nor
the number of financing rounds (2.4 rounds). The number of entrepreneurs in each
portfolio firm is similar across the two groups as well (2.0 entrepreneurs). As there is
a general dearth of female GPs, syndicates with female GPs tend to be larger, have
more GPs per syndicate, have more VC firms per syndicate, and have more prior
financing experience across all firms in the syndicate.
To explore whether VC financing plays a role in the performance gap between
female- and male-led startups, I conduct a logistic regression analysis of startup per-
formance on female presence as a founder and in the financing VCs. In particular,
I compare di↵erences in exit rates between female- and male-led startups initially
4This exit rate is higher than the exit rates reported earlier for both female- and male-led star-
tups (17% and 27%, respectively) because the two sets of exit rates are calculated using di↵erent
subsamples based on data availability.
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financed by female VCs and male VCs. If inherent di↵erences between female- and
male-led startups explain the performance gap, then the gap in exit rates should be
the same across startups financed by the two VC groups. If the gap di↵ers, then
VC financing has an impact on the performance gap. I find a 30 percentage point
gender gap in exit rates among startups initially financed by male VCs, whereas this
gap disappears among startups financed by female VCs. This di↵erence arises from
female-led startups’ exit rates being significantly higher when financed by female
VCs. In contrast, male-led startups’ exit rates are the same regardless of the gender
composition of the initial financing syndicate.
Could the observed di↵erence in the performance gap be driven by di↵erences in
entrepreneurial preference for female versus male VCs? For instance, could the gap
be explained by female-led startups of high intrinsic value preferring financing from
female VCs? If this were true, female VCs would have greater proportions of female-
led startups in their portfolios. However, the representation of female-led startups in
the portfolios of the two VC groups is the same.5 Alternatively, could the di↵erence in
the performance gap arise due to female-led startups of all types preferentially seeking
financing from female VCs? This conjecture is not consistent with the observed
di↵erence across the VC groups in the performance gap. Finally, could it be that all
high intrinsic value startups preferentially seek financing from female VCs? In such
a case, the overall exit rate would be higher for all startups financed by female VCs.
However, as mentioned earlier, the overall exit rate of portfolio startups in the two VC
groups is approximately the same. Given my empirical setting, I cannot entirely rule
out the possibility that entrepreneur financing choice drives the observed di↵erence in
the gap. However, by eliminating these most commonly-posed scenarios, I alleviate
much of the concern revolving around this alternative explanation of my findings.
5My argument against this entrepreneur choice explanation depends on the assumption that VCs
are evaluating startups in terms of expected future performance. If VCs provide financing to all
startups or evaluate startups on some other characteristics, my argument does not rule out this
explanation.
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The findings above jointly paint a picture in which VC financing contributes to
the performance gap among startups based on founder gender. But how do VCs
contribute to the gap? Is it due to poor evaluation or poor advising? My extensive
data allow me to compare initial financing rounds to subsequent rounds to shed some
light on this question. Comparing the di↵erence in the gap across the two VC groups
in initial rounds versus later rounds shows that it is much larger in initial rounds,
suggesting that female VCs are better at evaluating female-led startups, which helps
drive VC contribution to the performance gap.
Can the observed di↵erence in female-led startups’ exit rates be attributed to
matching female entrepreneurs and GPs or does it arise from some cultural charac-
teristic of VC syndicates that have female GPs? I compare the gap in exit rates
between female- and male-led startups initially financed by a single VC to those fi-
nanced by multiple VCs. Among single-VC financing rounds, each GP is more likely
to be directly involved with the financed startup. I find a larger di↵erence in the
gap for single VC financing rounds, which suggests that female GP involvement has
a direct impact on the performance gap.
This paper has two principal findings. First, it establishes the existence of a
gender gap in performance among VC-financed startups. Second, it presents per-
suasive evidence that the structure of the VC financing industry has contributed to
this performance gap. This latter result has three important implications. First, it
suggests that some intrinsically valuable firms do not succeed despite getting access
to VC financing. Second, VC-induced reduction in success rates means that some
VCs waste LP-invested resources. Finally, if women are thus ine ciently dissuaded
from entrepreneurship, it implies that some intrinsically valuable projects are not
undertaken because of the possibility of VC-induced failure.
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1.2 Related literature
This paper adds to a growing body of literature on the interaction between financ-
ing and gender among entrepreneurial firms. Alesina et al. (2013) finds that female
entrepreneurs seeking bank loans pay more for credit than do male entrepreneurs.
Bellucci et al. (2010) finds that female entrepreneurs face tighter credit availability
than male entrepreneurs when seeking bank loans. Bellucci et al. (2010) also finds
that female loan o cers require lower collateral from female entrepreneurs for loans
than from male entrepreneurs. These papers look at the impact of entrepreneur gen-
der on specific financing outcomes, whereas I examine impact on firm performance.
In the context of crowdfunding, Marom et al. (2015) discovers a preference among
female investors for female-led projects. Bengtsson and Hsu (2010) finds a preference
for shared identity along ethnicity and educational background in VC financing pair-
ings between entrepreneurs and GPs. My paper adds to these papers by examining
the impact of such pairings across entrepreneurs and financiers on firm performance.
Like my paper, Gompers et al. (2014) looks at performance impacts of gender, but
within VC firms. It finds that, while female GPs’ investments perform worse than
male GPs’ investments, this di↵erence goes away if the VC firm has multiple female
GPs.
This paper also adds to the literature on entrepreneur and VC characteristics that
a↵ect entrepreneurial firm performance. Hochberg et al. (2007) shows that greater VC
firm connectedness is associated with better exit outcomes for financed entrepreneurial
firms. Lerner (1994) presents evidence that VC firms’ experience helps them better
time the exit of financed firms via IPO. Gompers et al. (2010) documents that pre-
vious entrepreneur success also predicts entrepreneurial firm success. There is also
a large subliterature interested in whether the project or the management team is
more important for entrepreneurial firm success (see Kaplan et al., 2009; Gompers
and Lerner, 2001; Gladstone and Gladstone, 2002). Another branch of this litera-
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ture considers the role of VC firms’ bargaining power in fund performance (see Hsu,
2004; Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Hochberg et al., 2010). This paper o↵ers evidence
that matching between VC firms and entrepreneurs also impacts the performance of
entrepreneurial firms.
Outside of entrepreneurial finance, this paper also relates to a wider literature
examining the role of gender pairings on various outcomes. Within finance, Huang
and Kisgen (2013) provides evidence that male executives exhibit overconfidence in
corporate decision-making relative to female executives, which suggests that the im-
pact of female GPs may come from actions of the female GP herself. Ahern and
Dittmar (2012) finds that constraints on the gender composition of corporate boards
has an impact on firm value. In a labor setting, Tate and Yang (2014) shows that
female workers lose more in wages than male workers when they lose a job but that
this di↵erence is narrower if the workers are rehired by a firm with female leadership.
In management, Tsui et al. (1989) finds that superior-subordinate dissimilarity is as-
sociated with lower e↵ectiveness in corporate settings. In education, Lim and Meer
(2015) and Paredes (2014) show that female students paired with female teachers
perform better in testing whereas male students do not exhibit any change in per-
formance due to teacher gender. My findings suggest that similar e↵ects of gender
pairings may exist in VC financing as well.
This paper draws some techniques and insights from the economics literature on
discrimination. In labor economics, there is a great deal of research on discrimination
based on gender, ethnic, and racial identities. Goldin and Rouse (2000), for instance,
provides evidence of discrimination against females in symphony orchestra auditions.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) presents evidence of discrimination by race in
employment interview callbacks. While such discrimination is not the principal focus
of my study, the underlying frameworks of discrimination pioneered by Becker (1971)
and Arrow (1973) help motivate some of the empirical analyses in this paper as well.
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1.3 Empirical setting
Because most publicly-available databases on VC financing lack biographical in-
formation, I construct a novel dataset that includes information for both the en-
trepreneurs leading startups and the financiers financing them. In this section, I
(briefly) discuss the structure of the VC financing industry, present basic statistics
detailing my dataset and outline the new sources I use for it. For information on how
I constructed the dataset, see Appendix A.
1.3.1 VC financing process
VC financing is a private form of financing for startups whose businesses exclude
financing via debt. VCs form a bridge between three parties: startups, early investors,
and later investors. They evaluate potential startups and advise the startups they
choose to finance. They interact with large investors (limited parters or LPs) who
provide the bulk of the capital for the early-stage financing of the startups. These
investors tend to be institutions such as pension funds but can also be wealthy indi-
viduals. Finally, VCs also manage the exits from VC financing of successful startups.
In this role, they deal with the public equity markets and potential acquirers who
provide subsequent financing for the now-matured, successful startups.
The two-sided matching between VCs and startups is highly informal.6 As this
paper focuses on the interaction between VCs and startups, it is important to under-
stand this fact. First, information about startups seeking financing can come from
a number of sources: GPs’ personal connections, the VC’s network of lawyers, in-
vestment bankers, accountants, et cetera, and, sometimes, even through the formal
channels provided by the VC. Once contact with the startup is made, analysts at
the VC study the startup and provide recommendations to the VC’s leadership. The
GPs then jointly decide on whether to finance the startup. While this is not always
6This insight arises from discussions I had with VCs about how they source their portfolios.
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the case, the decision to finance a startup often needs to be unanimous. Additionally,
while the analysts provide quantitative analysis of the startups, there is no “cuto↵”
above which a startup is certain to receive financing or below which is it certain to
be rejected.
The startups that secure VC financing are provided with capital by its financiers
in a series of rounds. At each round, the financiers reassess the performance of the
startup.7 The periodic reassessment of startups is one characteristic of VC financing
that helps mitigate some of the problems associated with financing high uncertainty,
early-stage businesses (Gompers and Lerner, 2004).
1.3.2 Data description
My dataset contains information on 3,660 entrepreneurial firms (startups). To
the extent possible, it includes data on each startup’s financing rounds, founders,
and whether and how the startup eventually exits VC financing. For the financing
rounds, of which there are 10,015, I know the date on which the financing round
was announced, which VCs were involved in the round, and the GPs of the involved
VCs. For founders and GPs, the dataset includes full name and gender information.
And, for exits, I know the type of exit (IPO or acquisition) and the date of exit
announcement.
All of the startups I observe are in the high-tech sector, with the vast majority in
the computing high-tech sector. As can be observed in Figure 1.1, 89% of my startups
are computing high-tech firms, 9% are biotech firms, and the rest are manufacturing
high-tech firms. This is reflective of the VC-financed sector as a whole. VCs, with
their equity-like contracts and intensive monitoring and advising of startups, are
better equipped than other forms of private financing for high tech, high information
7This does not imply that VCs do not monitoring and advising startups between disbursements.
As Gorman and Sahlman (1989) shows, VCs spend a significant amount of time monitoring and
advising their investments between financing rounds.
10
asymmetry sectors.
While my data include 10,015 financing rounds, many of them lack the information
required for my analyses.8 For instance, in Table 1.1, we see that 70% of financing
rounds (65% of initial rounds) have gender data for founders, 57% (61%) have gender
data for GPs involved in the financing, and 39% (37%) have gender data for both
founders and GPs. While less than 40% of the data are usable in some of the analyses
I run, the overall sample sizes are still large, with well over a thousand initial financing
rounds with gender data for both founders and financing GPs.
While I have data for financing rounds as far back as 1995, I limit my analyses
to startups with initial financing rounds in 2005 or later. I do this because, although
it has data for rounds prior to 2005, CrunchBase was established in 2005. As a
result, the startups with financings before 2005 reported in CrunchBase are markedly
di↵erent from the rest of the startups in the data. In particular, they are much more
likely to be successful in exiting VC financing. This brings up concerns of backfill
bias for the pre-2005 financing startups. To avoid problems associated with this bias,
I exclude these startups from my analyses. This does not limit my sample severely
as there are far fewer firms in the years before 2005 than following it, as can be seen
in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2 also shows that the number of financing rounds reported in CrunchBase
generally increases over time. This is reflective of the nature of VC financing. With
more firms being added through initial financings each year, more startups are likely
to have subsequent financings in each year than in the previous one. Unlike all rounds,
we see that the number of initial financing rounds reported each year after 2005 stays
between 250 and 500, suggesting a steady flow of information to the database. This
suggests that, at some point, the number of financing rounds per year should level o↵,
unless duration of financing is increasing or CrunchBase starts increasing its coverage
8As I discuss in Section 1.3.3.1 below, this is one of the shortcomings of using crowdsourced data.
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further.
In Figure 1.2, we also see a dip in initial financings between 2006 and 2011, which
coincides neatly with the economic downturn. There is no similar dip in all financing
rounds, but the rate at which all rounds increase falls for that period as well. These
features suggest that CrunchBase has a good representation of the overall startup
economy in each year after its inception.
1.3.3 Sources
I combine data from multiple sources to generate my dataset. These sources in-
clude TechCrunch’s CrunchBase, Namepedia, SEC’s EDGAR data, Thomson One
SDC’s M&A database, and Thomson One’s VentureXpert. I use VentureXpert pri-
marily to define my sample, as I explain in Appendix ??. SEC’s EDGAR and Thom-
son One SDC’s M&A databases are used to identify VC financing exit events (IPOs
and acquisitions) for the startups in my data. In this section, I describe Crunch-
Base and Namepedia, as these two sources are less familiar to general finance and
economics audiences.
1.3.3.1 CrunchBase
The CrunchBase database provides data on high-tech startup activity. In fact,
they claim to be the “most comprehensive information source” for such activity
(CrunchBase, 2014). A key feature of the database is that it is crowdsourced. This
a↵ords CrunchBase three substantial benefits. The greatest benefit is its extensive
coverage of VC financing of startups. In my sample of CrunchBase startups financed
at least once by top VCs, I have information on 3,660 entrepreneurial firms and 10,015
financing rounds from 3,318 investors. For comparison, the Burgiss database has data
on 775 VC funds, which means their data are, at most, based on 775 VCs’ data (Har-
ris et al., 2014). Similarly, the Venture Economics database has data on 1,114 VC
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funds.
Crowdsourcing also limits concerns of bias arising from a limited number of con-
tributors. Most VC databases arise from data provided by a few or even one source. In
2013 alone, over 53,000 sources contributed to CrunchBase (Kaufman, 2013). Having
a wider base of contributors reduces the likelihood of a bias tied to single perspective
or few perspectives.
Crowdsourcing also mitigates issues tied to voluntary disclosure. Most of the
data we have on the industry come from voluntarily disclosed information. These
data are more likely to be biased in a manner that favors the data provider than
data coming from involuntary disclosure. For instance, in Kaplan and Stro¨mberg
(2003), the authors point out that their sample of 119 portfolio companies may be
“biased towards more successful investments,” given that they find a 25% IPO rate.
While this bias does not impact their findings, it highlights the potential issues with
voluntary disclosure. CrunchBase data, while voluntarily provided, are not sourced
solely from VCs, LPs, or portfolio firms. Rather, the CrunchBase data are sourced
from the general public. This sharply mitigates concerns about biases stemming from
voluntary disclosure.
Being crowdsourced is also responsible for CrunchBase’s primary weakness: a
plurality of observations with incomplete information. For instance, I have founder
gender data for 65% of initial financing rounds and GP gender data for 61% of initial
financing rounds. This incompleteness of my dataset arises primarily because, for
a significant number of startups and VCs, personnel information is not available on
CrunchBase.9
CrunchBase has a number of mechanisms in place to ensure data quality: news
article citation for any database alteration, authentication of a data provider’s iden-
tity, and algorithmic and manual verification of all database changes (CrunchBase,
9A much smaller issue that contributes to the high missings rate is that I am unable to match
all personnel to their genders.
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2014).10
There are three ways to access the CrunchBase data: full subscription, monthly
tabulation, and API access. I use the API (Application Program Interface) access
provided by CrunchBase. I detail this procedure in Appendix A, where I describe
the construction of my dataset. This API access allows the user to download all
information associated with a single object. As there is no way to use the API access
to download information on the entire universe of objects in CrunchBase at once, I
serially download all information on each object of interest.
1.3.3.2 Namepedia
Namepedia is the largest information portal for personal names in the world
(Namepedia, 2015). I use it to classify by gender those personnel that I cannot catego-
rize myself. Namepedia is partially crowdsourced, much like CrunchBase. Therefore,
it possesses many of the same strengths and weaknesses. To improve data quality,
Namepedia sta↵ verify crowd-sourced name data. The database also uses national
census data and birth statistics to build up its database of name information.
I access Namepedia gender data using a “webscraping” procedure. Webscraping
is a method wherein you access a webpage and extract data from the HTML code of
that webpage. For my purposes, I request the Namepedia webpage for a first name
and then, from the provided webpage, extract the field with the name’s associated
gender. In Figure 1.8, I show the data that I webscrape from each webpage, using one
gender-neutral name and one gender-specific name as examples. Namepedia provides
many di↵erent gender categories: “Female,” “Male,” “Neutral,” “Unknown,” “More
female, also male” and “More male, also female.” I only use the “Female” and “Male”
categorizations to avoid miscategorization problems.
10Additionally, recent evidence based on a comparison of Wikipedia to other encyclopedias sug-
gests that the error rate in crowdsourced data may be lower than data gathered otherwise (Giles,
2005; Casebourne et al., 2012).
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1.4 Participation
In this section, I explore whether there is any systematic di↵erence in participation
within VC-financed entrepreneurship based on gender. First, I examine female and
male VC-financed entrepreneurs’ participation levels. Next, I consider VC general
partners’ participation by gender. I find clear evidence of di↵erences in participation
by gender in both domains, with a trend towards equality among entrepreneurs which
is absent among GPs.
1.4.1 Entrepreneurs
As presented in Table 1.2A, I have founder gender data for 2,372 startups, out
of which, 352 (14.8%) are led by one or more female founders. The 352 female-led
startups are led by 402 female founders in my data, which comprise 8.8% of the 4,568
entrepreneurs in the data with gender information. The 14.8% female participation
figure confirms the results of the Diana Project survey in 2011-2013, which found that
15% of VC-financed firms had a female executive (Brush et al., 2014).
While there are a total of 4,859 entrepreneurs, I have gender information for
4,568 entrepreneurs (94%). Similarly, out of 3,660 startups, I have some entrepreneur
gender information for 2,372 (64.8%) of them. As explained in Section 1.3.3.1, the
primary reason for 35% of startups having no data on founders is that, for a significant
number of startups, founders are not listed in CrunchBase. A secondary reason is
that I am unable to categorize an entrepreneur’s gender, but, as the 94% match rate
implies, this is a much smaller part of the issue than the missing data in CrunchBase.
How do female participation rates in VC-financed entrepreneurship compare to
other sectors of the economy? Compared to overall female participation in the US
workforce, it is substantially lower. In 2012, 47% of the workforce in the US was
female (Sewell, 2013). This is perhaps unsurprising, given that women’s participation
in STEM fields is known to be lower than in the overall economy and VC-financed
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startups operate largely in STEM fields. For instance, only 27% of computer science
and math positions and only 24% of STEM positions overall were filled by women
in 2009 (Beede et al., 2011). But, even compared to females’ STEM participation,
female participation in VC-financed entrepreneurship is lower, being slightly more
than one-third the rate of female STEM workforce participation.
And compared to general entrepreneurship, female participation in VC-financed
entrepreneurship is also considerably lower. In 2012, 36% of small businesses in the
US were majority-owned by women, according to the Small Business Administration
(Lichtenstein, 2014). Of course, the typical firm financed by VCs di↵ers from the typ-
ical firm financed by bank loans and other early-stage financiers. But, taken together
with the di↵erences between female participation in VC-financed entrepreneurship
and in other sectors of the economy, these findings suggest that there is something
peculiar about VC-financed entrepreneurship that leads to female participation being
lower than in all other comparable settings.
Over time, the di↵erence between female and male participation is declining. As
reflected in Figure 1.3A, approximately 8.5% of startups initially financed in 2005
had a female founder, whereas nearly 17% had a female partner in 2014. We find
a similar trend for the percent of entrepreneurs that are female. Figure 1.3B shows
that approximately 5% of entrepreneurs in initial financing rounds were female in
2005 and nearly 10% were female in 2014. This is a dramatic change over the course
of a decade. A possible reason for this trend is the emphasis placed on encouraging
women’s participation in STEM entrepreneurship in the last decade or so through the
InnovateHERWomen’s Business Challenge run by the Small Business Administration
and other such programs (see Council of Economic Advisers, 2015).
There is a greater increase over time in female participation in initial financing
rounds than in all rounds. As Figure 1.3A shows, the growth in female-led star-
tups’ financing rounds overall has been somewhat lower, increasing from 9% to 14.5%
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between 2005 and 2014. This could arise for two reasons: (a) female-led startups
succeed more quickly than male-led startups (needing fewer financing rounds in the
interim) or (b) they fail more quickly than male-led startups. Given the performance
results I present in Section 1.5, it seems likely that the latter is driving the di↵erence
in female participation between the two sets of financing rounds.
1.4.2 General partners
Much like the startups they finance, VCs tend to have low female participation
rates. As presented in Table 1.2B, out of 5,970 GPs, I have gender information for
5,672, 514 (9.1%) of whom are female. As many GPs in VCs are successful former
entrepreneurs themselves, it is not surprising that the rate of female participation is
similar in the two groups.
Table 1.2B also shows that, out of the 10,015 financing rounds, I have some GP
gender data for 5,682 rounds (56.7%)11 and about 63% of these rounds are financed by
a VC syndicate with one or more female GPs. The percentage of VC syndicates with
female GPs is so high because there are multiple VCs in each syndicate, which dra-
matically increases the proportion of financing rounds where the financing syndicate
has at least one VC with a female GP.
Unlike entrepreneurs, GPs do not exhibit a secular increase over time in female
participation. As shown in Figure 1.3C, approximately 60% of VC syndicates involved
in initial financing rounds had VCs with one or more female GPs in 2005 and 45%
had female GPs in 2005, which suggests that female participation actually fell among
VCs over time. However, as Figure 1.3D shows, this trend is unique to syndicate-
level aggregation; overall female GP participation in initial financing rounds is around
7.5% in 2005 and 2014. But, it seems clear that there is no upward trend in female
participation among VCs.
11The main reason that 43% of the rounds do not have GP gender information is, as on the
entrepreneur side, that the data are missing in CrunchBase.
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Also unlike entrepreneurial participation, initial and all round participation rates
are similar. Around 60% of syndicates involved in all financing rounds had one or
more female GPs and 7.5% of GPs were female across all financing rounds in 2005
and 2014.
1.5 Performance
In this section, I explore the interaction of gender with performance of VC-financed
startups. I use VC financing exit, either via IPO or acquisition, as an indicator of good
performance. In the first part of this section, I present the overall exit information
for the startups in my sample and discuss other measures related to performance.
Next, I explore whether founder or GP gender a↵ects performance. I find that there
is a large performance gap between female- and male-led startups but no evidence of
a di↵erence in the overall performance of the portfolios of female versus all-male VC
syndicates.
1.5.1 Exit as performance
I measure VC-financed startups’ performance using exit from VC financing via
initial public o↵ering (IPO) or acquisition. Table 1.3 presents the exit counts and
rates for four subsets of my startups. The second set of columns in the table shows
exit statistics for startups initially financed in 2005 or later. These startups have an
overall exit rate of 17.1%, with slightly under one-fifth exiting via IPO (3.3%) and the
rest exiting via acquisition (13.8%). This four-to-one ratio of acquisition-to-IPO exits
is roughly consistent with overall sector exits, as reported by the National Venture
Capital Association (NVCA). In its 2016 Yearbook, NVCA reported that there were
2,010 IPOs and 7,515 acquisitions of VC-financed startups between 1995 and 2015
(Haque, 2016), which is quite similar to the ratio I observe.
The first column of Table 1.3 shows the exit statistics for startups initially financed
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prior to 2005. As can be seen, the rates of exit are higher than in the second column,
both overall (38.1%) and via IPO (14.8%) and acquisition (23.3%). The IPO rate is
nearly four times higher than in the second column. The higher rates for this sample
are evidence of the backfill bias that exists among startups in CrunchBase prior to its
establishment in 2005. The pre-2005 rounds filled in later are more likely to be tied
to startups that had financial activity after 2005, otherwise they would be unlikely to
be reported. This backfill bias is even observable in the ratio of IPOs to acquisitions,
which, in the pre-2005 sample, is far higher (two-fifth are IPO exits) than among
startups in the rest of the data and as reported by NVCA for the sector as a whole.
To avoid issues tied to this backfill bias, I exclude the pre-2005 startups from analyses.
Looking at trends in exits over time, I find evidence that acquisitions are more
prevalent than IPOs in the early part of the sample, which coincides with the recession
of 2006-2009. Figure 1.4 shows the number of exits, overall and via IPO or acquisition,
for each year of exit. It shows that acquisitions make up a much larger portion of
overall exits in 2005-2009. However, the greater prevalence of acquisition exits in the
early years of the sample is also consistent with acquisition exits generally occurring
earlier than IPO exits. This fact is confirmed in Table 1.4, which shows that IPO
exits take almost one-and-a-half times longer than acquisitions, which, on average,
occur just under 4 years after the initial financing round. The shorter time-to-exit
for acquisitions may be exacerbated by the recession in the first half of the sample
period. Alternatively, startups may have a greater preference for quicker, acquisition
exits during recessions.
I exclude startups initially financed after 2010 from my performance analyses
because of the noisiness of exit as a measure of performance. This noisiness can be
observed in the di↵erence between the third and fourth columns of firms in Table 1.3,
where we clearly observe that the rate of exit for late entrants (startups with initial
financing rounds after 2010) is five times lower than that for the other startups. The
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late entrants have an IPO rate of just 1% and an acquisition rate of 4.4%. As both
exits are relatively rare in the late entrant sample, exit is a coarse and noisy measure
of performance, as it may not pick up “good” startups that simply require more time
to exit VC financing. Anecdotally, we know that both Facebook and Google took
six years from their initial financing round to their IPO. Three years out from their
initial financing, neither Facebook nor Google would be considered “good” startups.
The noisiness of exit for late entrants can also be confirmed visually in Figure 1.5.
The figure depicts the percentage of all startups that have successfully exited VC
financing after a given number of years since their initial financing round. Looking
at the figure, it is apparent that, even after two years, less than 5% of startups have
successfully exited VC financing, whereas, given ten years, over 15% are able to exit.
While exit from VC financing is often used as a measure of performance in the
VC literature12, it cannot distinguish between exits that provide large versus small
returns on VC investment. Returns cannot be calculated for startups in the data
because of a lack of information about the VC contracts o↵ered to startups in ex-
change for funding.13 However, Hochberg et al. (2007) provide some assurance that,
at the fund level, exit rates are positively correlated with returns: based on Freedom
of Information Act suits, they find a correlation of 0.42 between exit rates (via IPO
or acquisition) and funds’ IRRs. Given the lack of data necessary to calculate re-
turns at the startup level, exits are the best, albeit an imperfect, measure of startup
performance available.
12For instance, Hochberg et al. (2007) use portfolio firm exits via IPO or acquisition to measure
fund performance. Gompers et al. (2010) use exits via IPO to measure entrepreneur success (and
find that results are similar if they include acquisition as a success).
13In order to calculate returns for the initial financiers’ investment, the empiricist needs to know
not only the contract details for the initial financing but also for all intermediate investments in the
startup, as each of those investments may dilute the stake of the initial financier in the company.
This makes it even harder to calculate returns on investment for the VC financiers of these startups.
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1.5.2 Gender e↵ects on performance
Does the gender of a startup’s founders play a role in its performance? To examine
startup performance by founder gender, I separate the data into two groups: startups
with all male founders (“male-led startups”) and startups with one or more female
founders (“female-led startups”). Comparing the exit rates for these two groups in Ta-
ble 1.5A, I find that male-led startups have a 27.4% overall rate of exit and female-led
startups have a 17.3% rate, a di↵erence of 10.1% which is statistically highly signif-
icant. The di↵erence is also economically large, being slightly more than one-third
of the exit rate for male-led startups. Acquisitions and IPOs reveal an economically
similar di↵erence between the two groups: female-led startups tend to exit one-third
less often than male-led startups for both types of exits. The IPO exits di↵erence
is not statistically significant primarily because IPOs occur infrequently, making it
more di cult to establish statistical significance. On the other hand, acquisitions are
more common and we see that the di↵erence between the two groups is statistically
significant.
Unlike founder gender, GP gender does not matter for startup performance. As
with the founder gender comparison, I split the data into two groups for this analysis:
startups initially financed by VC syndicates with all male GPs (“male VCs”) and
those initially financed by syndicates with one or more female GPs (“female VCs”).
As shown in Table 1.5B, I find there to be almost no di↵erence at all between the two
groups in terms of exits, overall or via IPO or acquisition.
How should we interpret these starkly di↵erent impacts of founder and GP gen-
der on performance? The worse performance of female-led startups is interesting in
that it is inconsistent with screening discrimination predictions. If VCs engage in
taste-based discrimination against female-led startups, as defined in Becker (1971),
the female-led startups they do finance should be of higher quality and, consequently,
perform better. In the data, we see the reverse. Assuming that the quality distribu-
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tion of female- and male-led startups is similar, this finding suggests that taste-based
screening discrimination is not the sole contributor to gender di↵erences in partici-
pation rates. The lack of di↵erence in exit rates based on GP gender suggests that
startups financed and advised by female VCs and male VCs are similar in terms of
performance. Following up on this no-di↵erence finding, in the following sections,
I explore whether, rather than having an overall e↵ect, VC gender has any e↵ect
on di↵erences between the participation of female and male entrepreneurs and the
performance of female- and male-led startups.
1.6 VC e↵ect on participation gap
In Section 1.4, we observed that females participate far less than males on both
sides of the VC financing table. Could this jointly low participation arise from same-
gender matching among founders and GPs? That is, could female GPs’ preference
for female-led startups and female-led startups’ preference for female GPs lead to
low female participation in VC-financed entrepreneurship, as there are relatively few
female entrepreneurs and GPs? As reported in Table 1.6, for female VCs, 15.6%
of initially financed startups are female-led and, for male VCs, 17.4% of financed
startups are female-led. The 1.7% di↵erence in female-led startup representation is
not statistically significant. This suggests that there is no same-gender preference
among founders and GPs (or an opposite-gender preference) in terms of financing.
As shown in Figure 1.6, the proportions of female-led startups’ initial round fi-
nanced by female and male VCs remains similar over time. While male VCs have a
larger female-led startup representation in 2009 and female VCs have a larger repre-
sentation in 2013, in general, the percentages of initial financings rise in tandem for
the two VC groups, from under 5% in 2005 to just over 10% in 2014. The rise in the
interim period of female-led startups’ initial financings is consistent with the increase
in female participation as entrepreneurs discussed in Section 1.4.
22
Both the overall similarity and the persistence of the similarity of female-led
startup initial financings over time add to the evidence against taste-based discrim-
ination playing a role in the lower participation of female entrepreneurs. Assuming
that the VC groups have di↵ering tastes for discriminating against women, we should
expect the group with the lesser taste to finance a greater proportion of female-led
startups, which we do not observe in Table 1.6. Additionally, given that taste-based
discrimination may reduce profits, the VC group with less of a taste for discrimina-
tion should “crowd out” the other VC group over time with respect to female-led
startup financing.14 Again, we do not see such a crowding out of either VC group
in Figure 1.6. Under the assumption that these VC groups have di↵ering tastes for
discrimination, these findings suggest that taste-based discrimination does not drive
the lower female participation that we observe.
1.7 VC e↵ect on performance gap
Does the performance gap between female- and male-led startups di↵er based
on who finances them? In Figure 1.7, I present overall exit rates that highlight a
stark di↵erence in the performance gap observed for startups financed by the two
VC groups. We see that the exit rates for female- and male-led startups are approx-
imately the same for startups financed by female VCs, whereas male-led startups
financed by male VCs have an exit rate approximately 25 percentage points higher
than their female-led counterparts. Additionally, the di↵erence in the performance
gap between the two VC groups is due to better performance of female-led startups
initially financed by female VCs. This finding suggests that female VCs are better
able to evaluate and/or advise female-led startups. In the following subsections, I
examine this hypothesis more rigorously using regression analysis and attempt to
separate the above hypothesis from other conjectures consistent with these findings.
14This is another implication of Becker (1971).
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1.7.1 Regression design
To rigorously examine whether the findings presented in Figure 1.7 imply that fe-
male VCs are better at evaluating and/or advising female-led startups, I test whether
startups initially financed by female VCs exhibit a di↵erent gap in exit rates based
on founder gender than startups initially financed by male VCs. The null hypothesis
for this test is that there is no di↵erence in the exit rate gender gap between startups
financed by the two sets of VC syndicates. If there is a di↵erence in the exit rate
gender gap, I reject the null hypothesis.
The null hypothesis, that the performance gap between female- and male-led star-
tups is the same in both VC groups, implies that any di↵erence in exit rates between
female- and male-led startups stems from di↵erences between female and male en-
trepreneurs. There are a number of gender di↵erences that could drive these di↵er-
ences in exit rates between female- and male-led startups. For instance, a number of
papers discuss lower risk tolerance among females (see Powell and Ansic, 1997; Bar-
ber and Odean, 2001), which could drive female entrepreneurs to lead startups that
have a lower likelihood of extreme right tail outcomes.15 Larry Summers forwards an-
other theory that the far right tail of the ability distribution may be more populated
by males than females (see Tierney, 2010). Finally, there is evidence that females
are more averse to competition than men (see Croson and Gneezy, 2009), which
could explain worse performance in an environment as competitive as VC-financed
entrepreneurship.
If the exit rate gender gap is di↵erent across the two VC groups, I reject the null
hypothesis. There is empirical evidence supporting both a narrowing and a widening
of the founder gender-based gap with financing from female VCs. On the narrowing
side, the aforementioned Tate and Yang (2014) and Gompers et al. (2014) show that
15Note that there is still debate as to whether there truly exists a di↵erence in risk aversion between
men and women. For instance, Nelson (2015) states that contextual influences may be driving some
of the risk aversion findings in the literature.
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female leadership within a group improves the outcomes of other females in the group
as well. On the widening side, Gompers et al. (2012) shows that a shared identity
among GPs based on ethnic background reduces the likelihood of investment success.
The specification for the above-detailed regression is
Pr(exiti = 1) = F (↵ +  1fem
e
i +  2fem
v
i +  (fem
e
i ⇥ femvi )) , (1.1)
where F (z) = ez/(1 + ez) is the cumulative logistic distribution and exiti indicates
whether firm i exits venture financing successfully, femvi indicates whether firm i has
at least one female GP in its initial financing syndicate, and femei indicates whether
firm i has at least one female entrepreneur. As exiti is a binary outcome variable, I
perform a logistic regression analysis. If the marginal e↵ect of the interaction of femei
and femvi is non-zero, I reject the null hypothesis, as the non-zero e↵ect implies that
the performance gap is di↵erent between female and male VCs.
1.7.2 Regression results
While Equation 1.1 does not list any covariates, I include the following indepen-
dent variables as controls: (a) initial financing year fixed e↵ects, (b) sector fixed
e↵ects, (c) number of GPs in the initial financing VC syndicate, (d) total number
of startups financed by syndicate members in the past, (e) interaction of number of
GPs with a female-led startup indicator, and (f) interaction of number of past deals
with a female-led startup indicator. Initial financing year fixed e↵ects are included
to account for di↵erences between startups due to macroeconomic changes over time.
Sector fixed e↵ects are included to account for di↵erences in startups due to their
operating sectors. Number of GPs in the syndicate is included to account for the
e↵ect of VC syndicate size on startup performance. Number of past deals is included
to account for the e↵ect of VC experience on startup performance.
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I include VC size and experience as controls because I find that they di↵er sig-
nificantly between female and male VCs. As Table 1.7 shows, the main di↵erences
between the two VC groups are in the average size of the VC syndicate and the ag-
gregate experience of the syndicate.16 While these di↵erences arise because of how I
define the two VC groups17, I include controls for the level of VC size and experience
as well as their interactions with the female-led startup indicator. As I explain below,
the findings remain statistically significant and economically meaningful even with
inclusion of these controls.
Table 1.8, column (1), presents results for the basic specification from Equa-
tion 1.1, showing that the gender gap in exit rates among startups initially financed
by female VCs is nearly 31% narrower than among startups financed by male VCs.18
Including initial financing year fixed e↵ects and operating sector fixed e↵ects does
little to alter either the magnitude or statistical significance of the impact, as seen
in columns (2) and (3), respectively. In column (4), we see that including the level
e↵ects of VC syndicate size and experience also does not greatly alter the impact of
female GP presence on the gender gap in exit rates.
In the second-to-last row of Table 1.8, I present the likelihood that exit rates of
female- and male-led startups financed by female VCs are the same. This likelihood
is high across all specifications in the table, meaning that there is no performance
gap among startups financed by female VCs. It also implies that the di↵erence in the
gap between startups financed by the two VC groups is comparable in magnitude to
the performance gap itself.
The last row of Table 1.8 shows the likelihood that female-led startups financed
16There is also a significant di↵erence in the total number of financing rounds for financed startups,
it is not economically large.
17Assuming that female GPs arrive randomly, the likelihood of a larger VC having a female GP
is higher than that of a smaller VC. Therefore, the average size of syndicates with female GPs is
mechanically larger than that of syndicates with all male GPs.
18Point estimates presented in all regression tables have been transformed to be directly inter-
pretable as average marginal e↵ects (in percentage points) on dependent variables. The marginal
e↵ects of interactions are calculated as in Ai and Norton (2003).
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by female VCs have the same exit rates as female-led startups financed by male VCs.
For columns (1) through (4), this likelihood is below 10%. For the two specifications
discussed next, the likelihood is just above 10%. This is fairly strong evidence that
female-led startups financed by female VCs have significantly higher exit rates than
female-led startups financed by male VCs. On the other hand, based on the second
row of results in the table, we see that, across all regressions, male-led startups’ exit
rates are the same, regardless of female GP presence in the initial financing syndicate.
Together, these two findings imply that the narrower gender gap for startups financed
by female VCs comes from higher exit rates for female-led startups and not from lower
exit rates for male-led startups.
Interestingly, including the interaction between VC syndicate size and the female-
led startup indicator in column (5) of Table 1.8 reduces the impact to 26.3%. Sim-
ilarly, including the interaction of VC experience and female-led firm indicator in
column (6) drops the impact to 24.6%. While both of these estimates are somewhat
smaller and less statistically significant than the 31% reported for the “raw regres-
sion” from column (1), they are statistically significant at the 10% level and a 25%
impact on exit rates is a sizeable impact of female GP presence on the performance
gap between female- and male-led startups.
1.7.3 Interpretations
I interpret the reduced performance gap among startups financed by female VCs
as evidence that female VCs are better able to evaluate and/or advise female-led
startups than male VCs. When female-led startups seek VC financing, female VCs
are either better able to judge the startup’s future performance or better able to advise
the female-led startups that they choose to finance. In Section 1.8, I explore, among
other questions, whether the di↵erence arises due to better evaluation or advising. In
this subsection, I consider alternative interpretations of the finding.
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Besides my preferred interpretation, there are other possible interpretations of the
main finding. Prime among these is one that posits that male VCs may finance a
larger proportion of the female-led startups that approach them for financing, which
results in their female-led startups having lower intrinsic quality and performance than
those financed by female VCs. This would result in a greater performance gap among
startups financed by male VCs. However, it would also result in a greater proportion
of female-led startups in the portfolios of male VCs. As discussed previously, Table 1.7
shows that male VCs do not have a greater proportion of female-led startups than
female VCs. This means the male VC overfinancing conjecture is inconsistent with
the data.
1.7.3.1 Entrepreneur financing choice
There are also a number of alternative interpretations tied to entrepreneurs’ choice
of financing. I cannot rule out all entrepreneur financing choice conjectures. However,
in this section, I rule out the three most commonly-suggested ones. Ruling out
these alternatives greatly improves the likelihood that the observed di↵erence in the
performance gap arises from female VCs’ ability to evaluate or advise female-led
startups better.
For each argument in this section, I make two assumptions. First, I assume that
my preferred interpretation of the findings is not true and VC abilities and actions
are the same across female and male VCs. Second, I assume that the overall supply of
male-led startups is weakly greater than that of female-led startups. This assumption
is empirically supported in the data, as Table 1.2A shows that only 14.8% of startups
are female-led.
High value startups seek financing from female VCs. One conjecture about
entrepreneur financing choice is that entrepreneurs with high intrinsic value startups
preferentially seek financing from female VCs and, therefore, startups financed by
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such VCs have better exit rates. However, if all high intrinsic value startups prefer
financing from female VCs and everything else is the same across the two VC groups,
the exits of female- and male-led startups should be the same within each VC group
and we should observe the same performance gap in both groups. As we see a larger
performance gap in startups financed by male VCs, this conjecture is inconsistent
with the data.
Building on the simple conjecture above, if the distribution of intrinsic value is
more right-skewed for male-led startups, a greater proportion of male-led startups
are likely to exit VC financing generally. As a result, the di↵erence in exit rates
among male-led startups financed by the two VC groups is narrower than the di↵er-
ence among female-led startups financed by the two VC groups. This generates the
observed narrower performance gap among startups financed by female VCs.
This, more nuanced, conjecture also has implications that are inconsistent with the
data. If high value startups preferentially seek financing from female VCs, startups
financed by them should have higher overall exit rates than startups financed by male
VCs. However, Table 1.7 shows no di↵erences in the exit rates of startups initially
financed by the two VC groups. This leads me to rule out this entrepreneur financing
choice explanation for the performance gap di↵erence across the VC groups.
Female-led startups seek financing from female VCs. Another conjecture
related to entrepreneur financing choice posits that female-led startups preferentially
seek financing from female VCs and, therefore, female-led startups financed by female
VCs have better exit rates. Unlike the previous conjecture, regardless of the underly-
ing distributions of intrinsic value for female- and male-led startups, this conjecture
is inconsistent with the findings of this paper. Such a financing preference among
all female entrepreneurs has no impact on the performance gap, assuming that the
two VC groups are alike in their treatment of startups. As a result, I rule out this
explanation of my findings as well.
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High value female-led startups seek financing from female VCs. The
third entrepreneur financing choice conjecture is a combination of the first two. It
posits that high intrinsic value female-led startups preferentially seek financing from
female VCs and, therefore, female-led startups financed by female VCs have better
exit rates. This conjecture is consistent with the performance gap findings of this
paper.
Assuming that VCs carefully scrutinize startups on expected future performance
when evaluating them, this conjecture further implies that female VCs have greater
proportions of female-led startups in their portfolios.19 If more high value female-led
startups seek financing from female VCs, given the same screening rules across the
two VC groups, more female-led startups should pass screening for female VCs and, as
a result, female VCs should have a higher proportion of financed female-led startups.
This is not what we observe in the data. As Table 1.6 shows, the two VC groups
finance equal proportions of female-led startups. This finding leads me to rule out
this conjecture as an explanation of my findings.
1.8 Further exploration
In this section, I explore some questions that, while not directly related to the
gender and VC financing focus of this paper, arose as a result of the investigation. For
instance, I consider whether the di↵erence in the performance gap between startups
financed by the two VC groups arises because of better evaluation or better advising
by female VCs. I also explore whether the di↵erence is due to the female GPs within
female VCs or the culture of female VCs. Finally, I consider whether the performance
gender gap I observe is limited to only IPO or only acquisition exits. In general, I
find that the di↵erence likely arises because of the better ability of female GPs within
19If this assumption does not hold and VCs are passively financing all startups that seek financing
from them or evaluating them on some other characteristics, then my counterargument here does
not rule out this conjecture.
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female VCs to evaluate female-led startups and that the di↵erence is not limited to
either form of exit from VC financing.
1.8.1 Evaluation and advising
Which of the two VC roles contributes more to the founder gender-based per-
formance gap? VCs may contribute to VC-financed startups’ performance through
their evaluation of startups seeking VC financing and their advising of startups they
choose to finance.20 To shed light on which role matters more for the di↵erence in the
performance gap, I compare the di↵erence in the gap across initial and subsequent
financing rounds. To the extent that evaluation is more important in initial financing
rounds than in subsequent rounds, a greater di↵erence in the gap in initial rounds
suggests better evaluation by female VCs of female-led startups plays a role in the
di↵erent performance gaps for startups financed by the two VC groups.
There are di↵erences between initial and subsequent financing rounds that we need
to consider. Foremost is that startups in subsequent financing rounds have already
interacted with VCs at least once before. Therefore, it is di cult to disentangle
(previous round) VC e↵ect on performance from inherent startup quality. Table 1.9
shows that the two sets of rounds are also di↵erent in observable ways. Startups in
later rounds are financed by larger VCs with more experience.21 Female-led startups
also represent a smaller proportion of later financing rounds, which is consistent with
female-led startups’ earlier exits documented in Figure 1.3. Their performance is
also somewhat di↵erent, with initial round startups ultimately getting acquired more
often and later round startups going public more often. This is consistent with IPOs
requiring more time and financing rounds to occur.
20The performance of VC-financed startups is better if VCs are better able to evaluate and screen
out the bad startups from receiving VC financing. Startups’ performance is also better if VCs are
better able to advise them during their VC financing stage towards a successful exit.
21While not directly connected to this research, this is an interesting finding in itself, as it suggests
that larger and more experienced firms are less likely to interact with higher risk, earlier financing
rounds.
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Table 1.10 presents the results of the regression specified in Equation 1.1 run
on subsequent financing rounds. Because each startup may have more than one
financing round in the analysis, I cluster standard errors at the startup level. In all
specifications, we see, based on the interaction marginal e↵ects shown in the third
row, that there is no di↵erence in the performance gap between VC groups among
startups financed in subsequent rounds. From Table 1.8, we know that the analogous
estimate for initial financing rounds is 25-30 percentage points. This comparison of
the di↵erence for subsequent versus initial financing rounds suggests that female VCs
are better at evaluating female-led startups and this better evaluation ability plays a
role in the performance gap between female- and male-led startups.22
1.8.2 Matching or culture
Is female-led startups’ better performance with female VCs due to the female GPs
themselves or because of the general culture of VCs that have females in leadership
positions? To help distinguish between these alternatives, I compare the di↵erence
in the performance gap between the two VC groups for initial financing rounds with
only one VC versus rounds with multiple VCs. A single VC financing round has fewer
GPs involved, which means that each GP is more likely to be directly involved in the
financed startup. If female GPs are directly responsible for the better performance,
the e↵ect of female VCs on performance should be greater in the single VC financing
rounds, as female GPs in those syndicates are more likely to be directly involved in
those rounds.
Before presenting the findings for single VC financing rounds, let us compare
the two initial financing round subsamples. Table 1.11 presents the di↵erences in
22Given the di↵erences between the initial and subsequent financing rounds discussed above, I
hesitate to treat this di↵erence between financing rounds as unequivocal evidence of di↵erential
impact of VC firms in initial and subsequent rounds. However, in unreported tests, I find that
the di↵erence between initial and subsequent financing rounds are highly statistically significant
(p = 0.004).
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characteristics of single VC and multiple VC financing rounds. The di↵erences in
number of VCs, GPs, female GPs, and previous financings are mechanically driven
by the definition of the two groups. However, the di↵erences in exits are likely due to
lower inherent quality of startups initially financed by just one VC. We see that single
VC rounds have significantly lower exit rates (20% of startups initially financed by
single VCs exit, as compared to 32% of startups initially financed by multiple VCs).
This di↵erence holds for IPO exits and acquisition exits separately as well. This is
consistent with an intuition that, if a startup is observably of high quality, a lot of
VCs will be interested in backing it financially.23
Comparing Table 1.12 to Table 1.8, we see that female-led startups perform even
better when initially financed by female VCs in the single VC subsample. The
marginal e↵ect of the interaction is nearly twice as large as in the overall sample. This
regression is performed on 156 firms, only a quarter of the sample available for the
main analysis. Even with the smaller sample, the di↵erence in the performance gap
among startups financed by single VCs is large and statistically significant. Keeping
in mind the intrinsic di↵erences between the financed startups, these findings suggest
that female GPs directly influence the better performance of female-led startups and
that the di↵erence in the performance gap between startups financed by female and
male VCs is a direct impact of female GPs.24
1.8.3 IPO versus acquisition
Do female-led startups perform better with financing from female VCs overall or
is the e↵ect limited to IPO exits or acquisitions? In Table 1.13, we observe results of
regressions run exclusively on IPO exits and acquisition exits in columns (1) and (2),
23VCs face something analogous to the “winner’s curse” found in the IPOs of high quality firms.
24In unreported tests, I show that the di↵erences in the performance gap between single and
multi-VC initial financing rounds are economically large although they are (barely) not statistically
significant (p = 0.109).
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respectively.25 The first thing we observe is the general lack of statistical significance
for the IPO exits regression. This is because thet est in column (1) has less power
than the test in column (2). Note that the absolute magnitudes of the regression
coe cient estimates is much smaller in the IPO exits regression. Because IPO exits
are approximately four times rarer than acquisition exits, exit is a rarer and, there-
fore, noisier measure of performance in the IPO regression than in the acquisition
regression.
However, in both columns of Table 1.13, we observe that the gap among startups
financed by male VCs (7.8% and 27.4% for IPO and acquisition exits, respectively)
is almost entirely erased among startups financed by female VCs (8.6% and 27.4%).
For both IPOs and acquisitions, female-led startups have worse performance with
male VCs and being initially financed by female VCs is associated with a sharp
improvement in their performance. The similar overall pattern of e↵ects across the
two forms of exit suggests that female-led startup performance improves with female
VC financing overall, rather than only in terms of IPO or acquisition exits.
1.9 Conclusion
In this paper, I explore the e↵ect of gender on VC-financed entrepreneurship. I
find that women’s participation in the sector is low both as entrepreneurs and GPs.
I also show that there is a large di↵erence by gender in terms of performance: only
17% of female-led startups successfully exit VC financing whereas 27% of male-led
firms do so, which is a 37% performance di↵erence between them. To explore the
underlying reasons for the performance gap, I delve into whether VC financiers may
be responsble for it. To that end, I examine whether the performance gap among
female- and male-led startups varies based on whether they are financed by female
25To cleanly test IPO and acquisition exits, I exclude the other form of exit from the regression
sample in each regression. For example, for the IPO exits regression in column (1), I exclude all
firms that exit via acquisition.
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VCs or male VCs. I find that startups initially financed by male VCs have a 25 to
30 percentage point performance gap whereas startups financed by female VCs have
no performance gap at all. This finding suggests that female VCs are better able
to evaluate and advise female-led startups and the di↵erence in VCs’ abilities may
contribute to the overall performance gap.
There are, of course, alternative interpretations of the VC e↵ect findings. First,
it may be that male VCs finance female-led startups in greater proportions, which
lowers the average quality of female-led startups in their portfolios and leads to the ob-
served di↵erence in the gap. However, I provide empirical evidence that runs counter
to this interpretation. A second set of alternative interpretations revolves around
entrepreneur financing choice. While I cannot rule out all conjectures relating to
entrepreneur financing choice, I eliminate three commonly-posed such conjectures as
their other implications are inconsistent with the data. Ruling out these alternatives
improves the likelihood that my performance gap findings are due to di↵erences in
VC ability.
To shed light on whether the di↵erence in performance gap between female and
male VCs’ portfolio startups is due to evaluation or advising, I compare the di↵er-
ence in the gap between initial and non-initial financing rounds. This relies on the
reasoning that evaluation is much more important for initial financing rounds than
for subsequent ones. I find that female VCs’ e↵ect on the performance gap is much
smaller in subsequent financing rounds. This suggests that better ability to evalu-
ate female-led startups contributes to the di↵erence in the performance gap between
female and male VCs.
By comparing single VC and multiple VC financing rounds, I provide evidence on
the interesting question of whether female GPs are directly responsible for improved
female-led startup performance. My test relies on the reasoning that a female GP
in a single VC round is much more likely to be directly involved with the financed
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startup. I find evidence that suggests female GPs are directly responsible for improved
female-led startup performance.
What do my findings ultimately tell us? First, they confirm that females are
underrepresented in VC-financed entrepreneurship, which was already documented
to some extent. My performance results show that VC-financed female-led startups
perform worse than their male-led counterparts. Additionally, my findings show that
this worse performance arises primarily among female-led startups financed and ad-
vised by male VCs, suggesting VCs may play a role in the performance gap. While
the precise mechanism is hard to pin down, I find some evidence that the performance
gap di↵erence between startups backed by female VCs versus male VCs comes from
the direct involvement of female VCs in the evaluation of female-led startups.
1.9.1 Implications
My findings and interpretations have a number of important and interesting im-
plications. First, VC contribution to the performance gap means that some intrin-
sically valuable female-led startups do not succeed because of VC financing, which
is important in its own right. Second, VC contribution suggests that the actions of
male VCs worsens the performance of their portfolio startups. This is a waste of
LP-invested resources by male VCs and implies private ine ciency. If LPs choose
to reduce investment in venture capital as a result, this ine ciency may have large
negative externalities for the VC financing sector.
The di↵erent performance of startups backed by female and male VCs also suggests
that GP characteristics impact portfolio firm performance. This is consistent with
recent work by Gompers et al. that shows startups advised by female GPs perform
worse than startups advised by male GPs but that the performance di↵erence is
attenuated by the presence of other female GPs. Both these findings imply that GP
composition of a VC impacts the performance of its portfolio firms.
36
Given that VC contribution to the performance gap is privately ine cient, do we
find any evidence of it dissipating or is it an immutable characteristic of VC financing?
Figure 1.6 shows that female VCs may be financing more female-led startups after
2011. With female-led startups’ better performance with female VCs, this trend
suggests that the VC e↵ect on female-led startups’ performance, and the associated
private ine ciency, may start falling in the near future.
In the broader economic context, given the role of VC financing for launching
large and economically important firms, the missing successes of potentially important
female-led startups may dampen economic growth, as suggested in Robb et al. (2014).
Recent work by Hsieh et al. calculates that the improved allocation of talent in
the labor market between 1960 and 2008 for innately talented minorities may have
been responsible for 15 to 20% of the growth in aggregate output per worker in that
period. Assuming that the observed di↵erence in the gap can be eradicated, a similar
improvement in allocation of resources within VC financing may increase success
(as measured by exits) by nearly 12%. Given the growth prospects of VC-financed
startups, a 12% overall improvement in performance may lead to similar (or even
greater) economic gains.
Finally, if some VCs hurt female-led startups’ performance, women may be less
likely to lead VC-financed projects. This feedback from performance into participa-
tion suggests that some intrinsically valuable projects are never undertaken due to the
possibility of VC-induced failure. This reduced participation is currently the focus of
a serious debate in policy circles. Much of the policy focus is on increasing the appeal
of entrepreneurship for women. For instance, the Small Business Administration set
up a number of “InnovateHER Women’s Business Challenge” events to incentivize
greater female entrepreneurship (Council of Economic Advisers, 2015). This paper’s
findings suggest a complementary strategy to increase female entrepreneurship: focus-
ing on increasing female participation in the VC industry. This strategy may improve
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not only female participation in entrepreneurship, but also their performance.
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Tables and Figures
All rounds Initial rounds
N % N %
Total rounds 10,015 3,660
Rounds w/ gender data on
founders 7,040 70.3% 2,372 64.8%
GPs 5,682 56.7% 2,223 60.7%
founders & GPs 3,944 39.4% 1,348 36.8%
Table 1.1. Gender information availability for entrepreneurs and GPs by financing
round. This table reports the number and percent of rounds in the data that have gender
information for entrepreneurs, GPs, and both.
Table 1.2. Female participation in VC-financed entrepreneurship.
N %
Startups 3,660
with founder info 2,372
with female founder(s) 352 14.8%
Founders 4,859
with gender info 4,568
female 402 8.8%
(A) Female entrepreneurial participation. This table reports the number of startups in
total, with founder gender information, and with female founder(s). It also reports the overall
number of entrepreneurs, those with gender information, and those categorized as female.
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N %
Financing rounds 10,015
with GP info 5,682
with female GP(s) 3,583 63.1%
General partners 5,970
with gender info 5,672
female 514 9.1%
(B) Female GP participation. This table reports the number of financing rounds in total,
with GP gender information, and with female GP(s). It also reports the overall number of GPs,
those with gender information, and those categorized as female.
Initial financing round
Pre-2005 2005-2014 2005-2010 2011-2014
Successful exits N % N % N % N %
All 80 38.1 590 17.1 513 25.4 77 5.4
IPOs 31 14.8 114 3.3 100 4.9 14 1.0
Acquisitions 49 23.3 476 13.8 413 20.4 63 4.4
Table 1.3. Successful startup exits from VC financing. This table provides the number
and percent of startups that exit generally, exit via IPO, or exit via acquisition from VC financing.
These statistics are provided for four samples. The pre-2005 sample is comprised of startups with
initial financing rounds before 2005. The 2005-2014 sample is comprised of all startups initially
financed in 2005 or later, which coincides with the establishment of CrunchBase. The 2005-
2010 sample removes all startups initially financed after 2010. The 2011-2014 sample includes all
startups with initial financings after 2010.
Duration (in years)
Mean Median
All exits 3.85 3.52
IPOs 5.27 5.71
Acquisitions 3.51 3.16
Table 1.4. VC financing duration for successful startups. This table provides mean
and median VC financing durations, in years, for startups initially financed in 2005 or later that
successfully exit VC financing via IPO or acquisition. Financing duration is measured from date
of initial financing round to date of exit.
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Table 1.5. Performance by gender.
Female-led Male-led Di↵.
startups startups [t-stat]
Overall exits 17.3% 27.4% -10.1% ***
150 1,080 [2.976]
IPOs 4.0% 6.1% -2.1%
150 1,080 [1.197]
Acquisitions 13.3% 21.3% -8.0% ***
150 1,080 [2.610]
(A) Performance of female- and male-led startups. This table presents performance
measured by overall exit, IPO exit, and acquisition exit for startups led by one or more female
founders (“female-led startups”) and startups led by all male founders (“male-led startups”) as
well as the di↵erence in performance between the two groups. All the startups in this sample
have initial financing rounds between 2005 and 2010, inclusive.
Female VC Male VC Di↵.
syndicates syndicates [t-stat]
Overall exits 29.5% 29.4% 0.1%
689 480 [0.032]
IPOs 5.4% 5.0% 0.4%
689 480 [0.281]
Acquisitions 24.1% 24.4% -0.3%
689 480 [0.111]
(B) Performance of startups initially financed by female and male VC syndicates.
This table presents performance measured by overall exit, IPO exit, and acquisition exit for star-
tups initially financed by VC syndicates with one or more female GPs (“female VC syndicates”)
and startups initially financed by VC syndicates with all male GPs (“male VC syndicates”) as
well as the di↵erence in performance between the two groups. All the startups in this sample
have initial financing rounds between 2005 and 2010, inclusive.
Female VCs Male VCs Di↵.
Female-led startups 118 103
Male-led startups 637 490
% female-led startups 15.6% 17.4% -1.7%
N 755 593 [0.852]
Table 1.6. Female and male VCs’ financing of startups by founder gender. This table
presents a cross-tabulation of the number of female- and male-led startups initially financed by
female and male VCs (VC syndicates with and without one or more female GPs, respectively).
It also presents the percent of portfolio firms that are female-led startups for the two VC groups
as well as the di↵erence in that percentage across the VC groups (and the t-statistic for that
di↵erence). The startups in this sample are all initially financed in 2005 or later.
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Female VCs Male VCs Di↵erence
Startups
Number of entrepreneurs 1.973 1.957 0.015
731 563 [0.263]
VC financing duration, years 3.462 3.643 -0.181
235 155 [0.779]
Number of financing rounds, all firms 2.204 2.018 0.186***
1,179 954 [2.890]
successful firms 2.343 2.406 -0.063
239 160 [0.370]
Years between rounds 1.331 1.266 0.065*
2,143 993 [1.830]
VC syndicates
Number of VCs in syndicate 3.390 2.245 1.145***
1,179 954 [14.062]
Number of GPs 18.088 7.939 10.149***
1,179 954 [24.244]
Number of female GPs 1.773 0.000 1.773***
1,179 954 [51.823]
Total number of past financings 271.285 253.116 18.169*
1,179 953 [1.949]
% of financed startups exited 29.463% 29.375% 0.088%
689 480 [0.032]
% of financed startups exited via IPO 7.075% 6.612% 0.463%
523 363 [0.269]
% of financed startups exited via acquisition 25.460% 25.658% -0.198%
652 456 [0.074]
Table 1.7. Di↵erences between female and male VC syndicates. The first panel of this
table presents di↵erences between startups initially financed by VC syndicates with one or more
female GPs (“female VCs”) and syndicates with all male GPs (“male VCs”). It includes all star-
tups initially financed in 2005 or later. The second panel presents di↵erences in the characteristics
of VC syndicates in the female and male VC groups. It includes all VC syndicates involved in
initial financing rounds in 2005 or later. For the rows on exits (the last three rows of the panel),
the data are further restricted to financings of startups initially financed before 2011. For each
statistic, the table provides the mean for startups financed by the two VC groups in the top row
and the sample size for the statistic in the bottom row. The last column shows the di↵erence in
the statistic between startups financed by female and male VCs in the top row and the t-statistic
for that di↵erence in the bottom row, based on a t-test of means with unequal variances.
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Successful exits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fem-led startup -0.326⇤⇤⇤ -0.285⇤⇤ -0.284⇤⇤ -0.282⇤⇤ -0.323⇤⇤ -0.496
[-2.83] [-2.52] [-2.51] [-2.50] [-2.43] [-1.33]
Fem VC -0.0509 -0.0469 -0.0454 -0.0505 -0.0486 -0.0478
[-1.28] [-1.18] [-1.15] [-1.23] [-1.18] [-1.16]
Fem-led startup ⇥ fem VC 0.309⇤⇤ 0.299⇤⇤ 0.290⇤⇤ 0.288⇤⇤ 0.263⇤ 0.246⇤
[2.24] [2.21] [2.14] [2.13] [1.85] [1.69]
Num GPs 0.00212 0.00176 0.00175
[1.12] [0.89] [0.88]
Fem-led startup ⇥ num GPs 0.00385 0.00396
[0.60] [0.62]
Log past deals -0.0265 -0.0264 -0.0305
[-0.75] [-0.75] [-0.84]
Fem-led startup ⇥ log past deals 0.0387
[0.50]
Observations 621 621 621 621 621 621
Funding year FEs N Y Y Y Y Y
Sector FEs N N Y Y Y Y
R2 0.0139 0.0390 0.0463 0.0484 0.0488 0.0492
Pr(No gap in fem VCs) 0.818 0.854 0.934 0.936 0.654 0.538
Pr(No di↵ in fem-led startups) 0.0511 0.0520 0.0593 0.0686 0.119 0.158
t statistics in brackets
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 1.8. Female GP presence impact on female- and male-led startups’ exit rates.
This table presents the results of the logistic regression analysis detailed in Equation 1.1. The
dependent variable in all columns is an indicator of successful exit from VC financing for startups
initially financed in 2005-2010. The explanatory variables, in order, are an indicator for a startup
with one or more female founders (“female-led startup”), an indicator for initial financing of the
startup by a VC syndicate with one or more female GPs (“female VC”), the interaction of the
female-led startup and female VC indicators, the number of GPs in the initial syndicate, the
interaction of the female-led startup indicator and number of GPs, log of the aggregate number of
deals financed by syndicate members prior to this financing round, and the interaction of female-
led startup indicator and log of prior deals financed by the syndicate. In column (1), results of
the basic regression specification are presented. In columns (2) and (3), initial financing year
fixed e↵ects and sector fixed e↵ects are introduced, respectively. In column (4), controls for the
level e↵ects of number of GPs in the initial financing syndicate and log of prior deals financed
are introduced. In columns (5) and (6), the interactions of the female-led startup indicator with
number of GPs in the syndicate and log of prior deals financed are introduced, respectively. The
second-to-last row of the table presents the likelihood that there is no gender gap in exit rates
between female- and male-led startups initially financed by female VCs. The last row presents
the likelihood that there is no di↵erence in the exit rates of female-led startups initially financed
by male VCs and those financed by female VCs.
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Initial round Subsequent rounds Di↵erence
Number of VCs in syndicate 2.2 2.5 -0.4***
3,450 5,708 [8.782]
Number of GPs 8.4 9.7 -1.3***
3,450 5,708 [5.239]
Number of female GPs 0.6 0.7 -0.1***
3,450 5,708 [5.177]
Aggregate number of previous financings 200.7 289.2 -88.5***
3,078 4,650 [15.980]
% female-led startups 15.2% 13.2% 2.0% **
2,246 4,249 [2.228]
% of financed firms exited 25.4% 22.4% 3.0% ***
2,021 4,336 [2.604]
% of financed firms exited via IPO 6.2% 9.4% -3.2% ***
1,608 3,717 [4.187]
% of financed firms exited via acquisition 21.5% 15.5% 6.0% ***
1,921 3,985 [5.427]
Table 1.9. Di↵erences between initial and subsequent financing rounds. This table
presents di↵erences between initial and subsequent financing rounds. It includes all startups
initially financed in 2005 or later. For the rows on exits (the last three rows of the table), the data
are further restricted to financings of startups initially financed before 2011. For each statistic,
the table provides the mean for initial and subsequent financing rounds in the top row and the
sample size for the statistic in the bottom row. The last column shows the di↵erence in the
statistic between startups financed by female and male VCs in the top row and the t-statistic for
that di↵erence in the bottom row, based on a t-test of means with unequal variances.
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Successful exits, non-initial financing rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fem-led startup -0.0630 -0.0544 -0.0450 0.0431
[-0.82] [-0.76] [-0.62] [0.14]
Fem VC 0.00424 0.0282 -0.00740 -0.0127
[0.14] [0.96] [-0.24] [-0.40]
Fem-led startup ⇥ fem VC -0.0540 -0.0513 -0.0578 0.0155
[-0.56] [-0.57] [-0.63] [0.14]
Num GPs 0.00272⇤⇤ 0.00317⇤⇤⇤
[2.33] [2.69]
Fem-led startup ⇥ num GPs -0.00590
[-0.92]
Log past deals 0.0267 0.0276
[0.98] [0.94]
Fem-led startup ⇥ log past deals -0.00698
[-0.11]
Observations 1726 1726 1724 1724
Funding year FEs N Y Y Y
Sector FEs N Y Y Y
SE cluster startup startup startup startup
R2 0.00494 0.0865 0.0940 0.0957
t statistics in brackets
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 1.10. Female GP presence impact on female- and male-led startups’ exit rates,
subsequent financing rounds only. This table presents the results of the logistic regression
analysis detailed in Equation 1.1 for non-initial financing rounds. The dependent variable in all
columns is an indicator of successful exit from VC financing for startups initially financed in 2005-
2010. The explanatory variables, in order, are an indicator for a startup with one or more female
founders (“female-led startup”), an indicator for initial financing of the startup by a VC syndicate
with one or more female GPs (“female VC”), the interaction of the female-led startup and female
VC indicators, the number of GPs in the initial syndicate, the interaction of the female-led startup
indicator and number of GPs, log of the aggregate number of deals financed by syndicate members
prior to this financing round, and the interaction of female-led startup indicator and log of prior
deals financed by the syndicate. In column (1), results from the basic regression specification are
presented. In column (2), initial financing year fixed e↵ects and sector fixed e↵ects are introduced.
In column (3), controls for the level e↵ect of number of GPs in the initial financing syndicate and
log of prior deals financed are introduced. In column (4), the interactions of the female-led startup
indicator with number of GPs in the syndicate and log of prior deals financed are introduced. For
all regressions presented, errors are clustered at the startup level.
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Financing round with
One VC Mult. VCs Di↵erence
Number of VCs in syndicate 1.0 3.6 -2.6***
1,916 1,534 [54.497]
Number of GPs 1.8 16.6 -14.8***
1,916 1,534 [48.667]
Number of female GPs 0.1 1.2 -1.1***
1,916 1,534 [30.667]
Aggregate number of previous financings 143.6 258.1 -114.5***
1,544 1,534 [15.307]
% female-led startups 15.2% 15.3% -0.2%
1,313 933 [0.111]
% of financed firms exited 19.7% 32.3% -12.6%***
1,104 917 [6.460]
% of financed firms exited via IPO 5.0% 7.9% -2.8%**
934 674 [2.246]
% of financed firms exited via acquisition 16.1% 28.1% -12.0%***
1,057 864 [6.329]
Table 1.11. Di↵erences between single and multiple VC syndicates. This table presents
di↵erences between initial financing rounds with one VC and multiple VC syndicates. It includes
all startups initially financed in 2005 or later. For the rows on exits (the last three rows of the
table), the data are further restricted to financings of startups initially financed before 2011. For
each statistic, the table provides the mean for initial and subsequent financing rounds in the top
row and the sample size for the statistic in the bottom row. The last column shows the di↵erence
in the statistic between startups financed by female and male VCs in the top row and the t-statistic
for that di↵erence in the bottom row, based on a t-test of means with unequal variances.
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Successful exits, single VC rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fem-led startup -0.353⇤ -0.329⇤ -0.313⇤ -0.751
[-1.87] [-1.77] [-1.69] [-0.81]
Fem VC -0.122⇤ -0.102 -0.102 -0.0985
[-1.65] [-1.32] [-1.32] [-1.26]
Fem-led startup ⇥ fem VC 0.578⇤⇤⇤ 0.535⇤⇤ 0.509⇤⇤ 0.466⇤⇤
[2.65] [2.47] [2.35] [2.01]
Num GPs 0.00526 0.00470
[0.97] [0.82]
Fem-led startup ⇥ num GPs 0.00427
[0.25]
Log past deals 0.00330 -0.00120
[0.06] [-0.02]
Fem-led startup ⇥ log past deals 0.0870
[0.46]
Observations 156 156 156 156
Funding year FEs N Y Y Y
Sector FEs N Y Y Y
R2 0.0498 0.0754 0.0805 0.0822
t statistics in brackets
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 1.12. Female GP presence impact on female- and male-led startups’ exit rates,
single VC syndicates only. This table presents the results of the logistic regression analysis
detailed in Equation 1.1 on startups initially financed by single VC syndicates only. The dependent
variable in all columns is an indicator of successful exit from VC financing for startups initially
financed in 2005-2010. The explanatory variables, in order, are an indicator for a startup with one
or more female founders (“female-led startup”), an indicator for initial financing of the startup
by a VC syndicate with one or more female GPs (“female VC”), the interaction of the female-led
startup and female VC indicators, the number of GPs in the initial syndicate, the interaction
of the female-led startup indicator and number of GPs, log of the aggregate number of deals
financed by syndicate members prior to this financing round, and the interaction of female-led
startup indicator and log of prior deals financed by the syndicate. In column (1), results from the
basic regression specification are presented. In column (2), initial financing year fixed e↵ects and
sector fixed e↵ects are introduced. In column (3), controls for the level e↵ect of number of GPs
in the initial financing syndicate and log of prior deals financed are introduced. In column (4),
the interactions of the female-led startup indicator with number of GPs in the syndicate and log
of prior deals financed are introduced.
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IPO Acquired
(1) (2)
Fem-led startup -0.0781 -0.274⇤⇤
[-1.01] [-2.33]
Fem VC -0.0143 -0.0427
[-0.54] [-1.04]
Fem-led startup ⇥ fem VC 0.0857 0.274⇤⇤
[0.94] [1.97]
Num GPs 0.00192⇤ 0.000838
[1.69] [0.43]
Log past deals -0.000922 -0.0270
[-0.04] [-0.78]
Observations 465 580
Funding year FEs Y Y
Sector FEs Y Y
R2 0.194 0.0371
t statistics in brackets
⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 1.13. Female GP presence impact on female- and male-led startups’ exit rates
via IPO and acquisition. This table presents the results of the logistic regression analysis
detailed in Equation 1.1. The dependent variable in column (1) is an indicator of successful exit
via IPO and in column (2) is an indicator of successful exit via acquisition from VC financing for
startups initially financed in 2005-2010. The explanatory variables, in order, are an indicator for a
startup with one or more female founders (“female-led startup”), an indicator for initial financing
of the startup by a VC syndicate with one or more female GPs (“female VC”), the interaction of
the female-led startup and female VC indicators, the number of GPs in the initial syndicate, the
interaction of the female-led startup indicator and number of GPs, log of the aggregate number of
deals financed by syndicate members prior to this financing round, and the interaction of female-
led startup indicator and log of prior deals financed by the syndicate. For each dependent indicator
variable, observations for which the values of the other dependent variable are true are omitted
from the regression.
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89.33%
8.84%
1.83%
Computing Health Manufacturing
Figure 1.1. Operating sectors of startups. This figure provides a breakdown of the pro-
portion of startups operating in each high-tech subsector. The categorization is based on textual
descriptions of operating fields provided by the startups to CrunchBase.
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Figure 1.2. Financing rounds by year. This figure presents the annual number of financing
rounds in the data from 1999 to 2014. The two plots depict initial financing rounds and all financ-
ing rounds (including initial rounds). The vertical red dashed line indicates the establishment of
the CrunchBase database in 2005.
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Figure 1.3. Female participation by year.
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(A) Female-led startups. This figure shows the percent of financed startups with one or
more female founders in each year. The plots represent female-led startup participation in
initial rounds and all rounds. The vertical red dashed line indicates the establishment of the
CrunchBase database in 2005.
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(B) Female entrepreneurs. This figure shows the percent of financed entrepreneurs in each
year that are female. The plots represent female participation in initial rounds and all rounds.
The vertical red dashed line indicates the establishment of the CrunchBase database in 2005.
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(C) Female VCs. This figure shows the percent of VC syndicates with VCs led by one or
more female general partners in each year. The plots represent female VC participation in
initial rounds and all rounds. The vertical red dashed line indicates the establishment of the
CrunchBase database in 2005.
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(D) Female general partners. This figure shows the percent of general partners financing
projects in each year that are female. The plots represent female participation in initial rounds
and all rounds. The vertical red dashed line indicates the establishment of the CrunchBase
database in 2005.
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Figure 1.4. Annual number of exits, overall and via IPO and acquisition. This figure
depicts the annual number of startups that have exited VC financing, overall and via IPO or
acquisition. The vertical red dashed line indicates the establishment of the CrunchBase database
in 2005.
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Figure 1.5. Percent of startups exited, by financing duration. This figure depicts the
percentage of startups that have successfully exited VC financing (overall and via IPO or acqui-
sition) after a given number of years, from 0 to 10. Only startups initially financed after 2005 are
included in this figure. The vertical red dashed line indicates the establishment of the CrunchBase
database in 2005.
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Figure 1.6. Portfolio representation of female-led startups for female and male VCs,
by year. This figures plots the percentage of initial financings that are of female-led startups in
each year for female and male VCs. Only startups initially financed in 2005 or later are included
in the sample.
%
ex
it
ed
10
20
30
40
Female VCsMale VCs
F-led startups
M-led startups
Figure 1.7. Overall exit rates, by founder-GP gender interaction. This figure depicts
the overall exit rates for four groups of startups: female- and male-led startups initially financed
either by female and male VCs. Only startups initially financed between 2005 and 2010, inclusive,
are included in the sample.
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Figure 1.8. Namepedia name-gender webscraping examples. This figure provides two
example of Namepedia’s web response to first name queries. The top response is for a gender-
neutral name and the bottom response is for a name classified as “Male.” The webscraping method
is used to extract the data highlighted in the top right corner of the webpage.
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Abstract 
 
We analyze whether mid-level managers in securitized finance were aware of a large-scale 
housing bubble and a looming crisis in 2004-2006 using their personal home transaction data. 
We find that the average person in our sample neither timed the market nor were cautious in their 
home transactions, and did not exhibit awareness of problems in overall housing markets. 
Certain groups of securitization agents were particularly aggressive in increasing their exposure 
to housing during this period, suggesting the need to expand the incentives-based view of the 
crisis to incorporate a role for beliefs. 
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Did Wall Street foresee the recent crash of the U.S. housing bubble? Given the role played by 
Wall Street in facilitating the credit expansion that precipitated the housing market boom, 
understanding this question is important for systematically understanding the causes of the worst 
financial crisis since the Great Depression. With the benefit of hindsight, many find it hard to 
imagine that Wall Street missed seeing large-scale problems in housing markets before others. 
For example, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission wrote in its report that, in the years 
preceding the collapse, “Alarm bells were clanging inside financial institutions” (FCIC, 2011).  
If Wall Street was aware that the process of securitization was generating a national housing 
bubble that would lead to a deep financial crisis, yet proceeded to securitize mortgage loans of 
dubious quality, this would reveal far more severe incentive problems on Wall Street than many 
have recognized and confirm many of the worst fears underlying outrage from the public and 
policy-makers. On the other hand, if Wall Street employees involved in securitization 
systematically missed seeing the housing bubble, despite having better information than others, 
this raises fundamental questions regarding how Wall Street employees process information and 
form their beliefs.    
In this paper, we examine this issue by studying personal home transactions of Wall Street 
employees.  We test the simple hypothesis that they were fully aware during the boom that a 
large-scale housing market crisis was likely and imminent, which we term the “full awareness” 
hypothesis, by examining whether they avoided losses in their own homes. We focus on mid-
level employees in the mortgage securitization business, such as traders, as they are a natural 
focal point for potential awareness of problems in the mortgage market.1   
Because a home typically exposes its owner to substantial house price risk, mid-level 
employees in the financial industry, even with relatively high incomes, should have maximum 
incentives to make informed home-transaction decisions on their own accounts.  Individual home 
transactions thus reveal beliefs regarding their own housing markets in isolation of any 
distortions arising from job incentives. Although our hypothesis concerns whether these 
employees were fully aware of an imminent crisis because of their superior information set, our 
                                                
1 E-mails unearthed during civil lawsuits deriding securitized mortgage instruments as garbage are rarely from C-
suite-level executives, but rather are from those involved in the issuance of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), 
whose job is to understand the pricing of these instruments at the center of the crisis (Coval, Jurek and Stafford, 
2009). See, for example, e-mails and instant messages documented in China Development Industrial Bank v. 
Morgan Stanley (2013), Dexia v. Deutsche Bank (2013), Federal Housing Finance Agency v. J.P. Morgan Chase 
(2011), and People of the State of New York v. J.P. Morgan Chase (2012). 
 57 
methodology allows us to ask broad questions about their beliefs.  Were those involved with 
mortgage securitization pessimistic about housing markets?  Or were they as optimistic, or even 
more optimistic, than other groups?  
Indeed, a growing theoretical literature emphasizes that distortions in beliefs about house 
prices may have affected the development of the crisis.  An environment where households 
neglect risk and yet demand safe assets may have endogenously fostered the very financial 
innovation that enabled house prices to rise with credit expansion, subsequently sparking the 
crisis (Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny, 2011, 2012).  Once prices started rising, wishful thinking 
among agents in the financial sector may have led to contagious over-optimism, collective 
willful blindness, and groupthink (Benabou, 2011), an effect which may be exacerbated by 
cognitive dissonance (Barberis, 2012). To enhance liquidity, widely-used near riskless debt 
securities may have been designed to reduce any agent’s incentive to acquire information about 
risk, thus disarming the financial system’s self-correction mechanisms (Dang, Gorton and 
Holmstrom, 2012). During the prime years of the housing boom, the empirical literature 
surveying the housing market had emphasized the possibility of distorted beliefs influencing 
house prices (Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai, 2005; Mayer, 2006; Shiller, 2006, 2007; Smith and 
Smith, 2006), potentially arising out of contagious social dynamics (Burnside, Eichenbaum, and 
Rebelo, 2011) or biases such as money illusion (Brunnermeier and Julliard, 2008; Piazzesi and 
Schneider, 2008). While anecdotal evidence of biased beliefs has surfaced after the crisis,2 
relatively few studies since the crisis have studied beliefs, with a few exceptions (Chinco and 
Mayer, 2012; Foote, Gerardi, and Willen, 2012; Gerardi, et al. 2008; Glaeser, 2013; Soo, 2013).  
In particular, there is scant empirical evidence regarding the role played by the beliefs of Wall 
Street employees. 
We sample a group of securitization investors and issuers from a publicly available list of 
conference attendees of the 2006 American Securitization Forum, the largest industry conference.  
These investors and issuers, whom we refer to collectively as securitization agents, comprise 
vice presidents, senior vice presidents, managing directors, and other non-executives who work 
at major investment houses and boutique firms.  Using the Lexis-Nexis Public Records database, 
                                                
2 For example, Lewis (2011, p.89) suggests via anecdotes that prominent Wall Street traders did not believe house 
prices could fall everywhere in the country at once.  In the August 2007 earnings call for American International 
Group (AIG), Joseph Cassano, who was involved with AIG Financial Products, says “it is hard for us with [sic], and 
without being flippant, to even see a scenario within any kind of realm of reason that would see us losing $1 in any 
of those [residential mortgage CDO] transactions.” (Seeking Alpha AIG Conference Call Transcript, 2007). 
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which aggregates information available from public records, such as deed transfers, property tax 
assessment records, and other public address records, we are able to collect the personal home 
transaction history of these securitization agents.   
We compare how securitization agents fared in housing against control groups who arguably 
had no private information about housing and securitization markets.  We test for two forms of 
full awareness.  First, securitization agents may have attempted to time their own housing market.  
A necessary condition for this strong form of “market timing” awareness is to observe home-
owning securitization agents divest homes before the bust in 2007-2009.  Given the difficulties 
of timing the market, however, awareness of a housing bubble might appear in a weaker, 
“cautious” form, whereby securitization agents knew enough to avoid increasing their housing 
exposure during the bubble period of 2004-2006. 
We construct two uninformed control groups.  The first control group consists of S&P 500 
equity analysts who do not cover homebuilding companies.  Due to their work outside 
securitization and housing markets, they were less likely to be informed about the housing 
bubble than securitization agents, yet are nonetheless a self-selected group of agents who work 
for a similar set of finance firms.  A nuanced issue for our analysis is that securitization agents 
received large bonuses during the bubble years, which may motivate them to buy houses despite 
any potential awareness of the housing bubble.  By working for similar finance firms, equity 
analysts arguably also experienced income shocks.  Our second control group consists of a 
random sample of lawyers who did not specialize in real estate law.  This control group serves as 
a benchmark for a wealthy segment of the general population and helps us understand the 
broader question of whether securitization agents exhibited awareness relative to the public. 
Our analysis shows little evidence of securitization agents’ awareness of a housing bubble 
and impending crash in their own home transactions.  Securitization agents neither managed to 
time the market nor exhibited cautiousness in their home transactions.  They increased, rather 
than decreased, their housing exposure during the boom period, particularly through second 
home purchases and swaps of existing homes into more expensive homes.  This difference is not 
explained by differences in financing terms such as interest rates or financing, and is more 
pronounced in the relatively bubblier Southern California region compared to the New York 
metro region.  Our securitization agents’ overall home portfolio performance was significantly 
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worse than that of control groups.  Agents working on the sell-side and for firms which had poor 
stock price performance through the crisis did particularly poorly themselves. 
Housing provides a consumption stream for which there may be poor substitutes in the rental 
market.  Much of our analysis focuses on second home purchases and swaps into more expensive 
homes on the premise that the timing of their purchases may better capture beliefs about housing 
markets than the timing of first-home purchases, which may be driven by the life-cycle.  Even 
second home purchases, however, may contain a consumption motive, as homes in general may 
be “status,” or Veblen, goods.  We test whether securitization agents perceived their high current 
income during the housing boom was transitory by examining whether the value of their 
purchases was conservative relative to their current income, a test premised on the idea that 
home transactions trace out beliefs about expected permanent income jointly with beliefs about 
future home prices.  Using stated incomes from mortgage application data, we find little 
evidence that their purchases were more conservative than that of control groups, although this 
data is noisy.  We also find that homes purchased in 2004-2006 were aggressively sold in 2007-
2009, relative to both control groups, suggesting that securitization agents overestimated the 
persistence of their incomes. 
Our analysis complements the large literature in the aftermath of the crisis studying whether 
poorly designed incentives led Wall Street to take excessive risks in the housing market, leading 
to disastrous consequences.3  The literature has accumulated ample evidence that the practice of 
securitizing mortgages in the originate-to-distribute model contributed towards lax screening of 
subprime borrowers (Agarwal and Ben-David, 2012; Berndt and Gupta, 2009; Demyanyk and 
Van Hemert, 2011; Jiang, Nelson and Vytlacil, 2011; Keys et al., 2009, 2010, 2012; Mian and 
Sufi, 2009; Piskorski, Seru and Witkin, 2013; Purnanandam, 2011; Rajan, Seru and Vig, 2012).  
It is important to note that the roles played by beliefs and incentives are not mutually exclusive 
(Cole, Kanz, and Klapper, 2012), and in fact are very much related in that distorted beliefs about 
overall housing markets and bad incentives to lend to unqualified borrowers are two forces 
which may interact and reinforce each other. For example, any weakened incentives to screen 
subprime borrowers and securitize mortgage loans pooled across the country would be 
                                                
3 The key friction in this narrative is that agents on Wall Street did not have incentives appropriately aligned with 
outside stakeholders such as shareholders (see, e.g., the debate in Bebchuk, Cohen, and Spamann, 2010; Bhagat and 
Bolton, 2011; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011), or other stakeholders such as creditors, taxpayers, and society at large 
(Acharya, et al. 2010; Bolton, Mehran and Shapiro, 2011; Edmans and Liu, 2011; Rajan, 2006, 2010). 
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exacerbated if lenders and security originators were buoyed by expectations that prices in overall 
house markets would never fall. 
We caution that our analysis does not isolate the beliefs of securitization agents about 
subprime housing markets, as they are not subprime borrowers themselves.  Furthermore, 
although we employ indirect tests to examine whether securitization agents’ home purchases 
were hedged, we do not observe the entire household balance sheet and thus cannot rule out that 
they mitigated their overall housing exposure through other means such as shorting housing 
stocks.  Overall, however, our analysis presents evidence that is inconsistent with systematic 
awareness of broad-based problems in housing among mid-level managers in securitized finance.  
Our analysis does leave open the possibility that even by rationally processing all available 
information to securitization agents, one might not have been able to identify the housing bubble. 
Nevertheless, the aggressiveness of certain groups in increasing their home exposure suggests a 
role for belief distortions.  
2.1  Empirical Hypothesis 
The aim of our analysis is to examine whether Wall Street employees anticipated a broad-
based housing bubble and crash.  Figure 2.1 depicts the Case-Shiller house price indices for the 
composite-20 metropolitan areas as well as New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles from 2000-
2011.  Of these areas, Los Angeles had the most dramatic boom and bust cycle, with house 
prices increasing by over 170% from 2000 to a peak in 2006 and then crashing down by over 40% 
from the end of 2006 through the end of 2011.  New York also experienced a boom/bust cycle, 
with prices increasing by over 110% from 2000-2006 and then dropping by over 20% through 
2011. Over the composite 20 metropolitan areas, prices rose by 100% from 2000-2006 and fell 
by over 30% through 2011.  Despite the differences in magnitudes, the cycles across different 
regions experienced rapid price expansions in 2004-2006, which we define as a bubble period in 
our analysis, the beginning of a decline in 2007, followed by steep falls in 2008.   
The practice of securitizing mortgages has been widely recognized as one of the important 
enablers in the development of the housing bubble.  As such, we focus on understanding the 
beliefs of mid-level managers in the securitization business across these boom and bust periods, 
whom we collectively refer to as securitization agents.  In practice, our mid-level managers are 
mostly Vice Presidents, Senior Vice Presidents, and Managing Directors at investment banks, 
commercial banks, hedge funds, mortgage lenders, and other financial companies.  These 
 61 
managers buy and sell tranches of securitized mortgages and are largely responsible for 
understanding the pricing of these instruments and the correlation of the underlying securities. 
There are several reasons to analyze the beliefs of mid-level managers rather than C-level 
executives.  First, they made many important business decisions for their firms.  The 2012 
“London Whale” risk-management failure of JP Morgan Chase illustrates that, if anything, CEO 
Jamie Dimon realized relatively late that traders had accumulated significant exposure to specific 
CDS positions which subsequently resulted in outsized losses.  Second, mid-level managers were 
very close to the housing markets.  There is a growing notion that perhaps those outside of the 
top-level C-suite – for example, Joseph Cassano of AIG Financial Products, or Fabrice Tourre of 
Goldman Sachs – knew about the problems in the housing markets even if C-level executives did 
not. 
We use a revealed belief approach based on people’s personal home transactions.4  A home 
is typically a significant portion of a household’s balance sheet.  As our data will confirm later, 
this is likely true even for the mid-level securitization agents in our sample.  To the extent that 
homeowners have thick skin in their homes, they have maximum incentives to acquire 
information and make informed buying and selling decisions.  This is a key feature that allows us 
to isolate their beliefs, separately from any distortionary effects related to job incentives.5 
Our general strategy focuses on testing whether securitization agents were more aware of the 
imminent housing market crash compared to plausibly unaware counterfactual control groups. 
This strategy relies on the cross-sectional variation in home purchase and sale behavior across 
these groups during the boom and bust periods.  We have four primary tests.  We first test for 
awareness in a strong “market timing” form.  Under this strong form, securitization agents knew 
about the bubble so well that they were able to time the housing markets better than others.  This 
implies that securitization agents who were homeowners anticipated the house price crash in 
2007-2009 and reduced their exposures to housing markets by either divesting homes or 
downsizing homes in the bubble period of 2004-2006.   
                                                
4 Home transactions are more informative of individuals’ beliefs than buying and selling of their companies’ stocks, 
which is contaminated by potential effects from loyalty (Cohen, 2009). 
5 A subtle issue for our analysis is that poorly designed incentives can distort beliefs among agents (Cole, Kanz, and 
Klapper, 2012).  Our analysis is informative about this hypothesis in the following way.  If agents exhibited beliefs 
consistent with awareness of the bubble, this would be inconsistent with the hypothesis of this interaction, as their 
beliefs would be aligned with their presumably bad incentives.  Evidence of unawareness would be consistent with 
this interaction, with the cause of unawareness being poorly designed incentives.  However, our tests do not 
distinguish between specific reasons for unawareness. 
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Market timing is a strong form of awareness for two reasons. First, the cost of moving out of 
one’s home, especially the primary residence, is high, and may prevent securitization agents 
from actively timing the house price crash.  Second, even if securitization agents knew about the 
presence of a housing bubble, they might not be able to precisely time the crash of house prices.  
While these caveats reduce the power of using the securitization agents’ home divestiture 
behavior to detect their awareness of the bubble, it is useful to note that the cost of moving out of 
second homes is relatively low and should not prevent the securitization agents from divesting 
their second homes. 
More importantly, the cost of moving and inability to time the crash should not prevent 
securitization agents from avoiding home purchases if they were indeed aware of problems in 
housing.  This consideration motivates our second empirical test for a weaker, “cautious” form of 
awareness, which posits that securitization agents knew enough to avoid increasing their housing 
exposure during the bubble period of 2004-2006.  We focus on purchases of second homes and 
swaps of existing homes into more expensive homes instead of first home purchases, since the 
timing of first home purchases is arguably motivated by necessary consumption related to the 
life-cycle rather than beliefs about housing. 
Our third test focuses on the net trading performance to see whether securitization agents’ 
observed transactions as a whole improved or hurt their financial performance.  We benchmark 
their observed strategy against a static buy-and-hold strategy and compare whether securitization 
agents’ portfolios did better against their benchmark than control groups’ portfolios during the 
2000-2010 period.  This test sheds light on whether agents exhibited awareness through more 
complex strategies.  For example, agents could have tried to “ride the bubble” by buying as 
prices rose and selling near the peak (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004).  Although our test only 
spans one boom and bust, the substantial cross-sectional heterogeneity in securitization agents 
allows us to test whether the group, on average, anticipated this particular housing crash. 
Although our analysis of cautiousness removes first home purchases, even purchases of 
second homes and swaps into expensive homes are plausibly related to a consumption motive, 
particularly as homes in general may be “status,” or Veblen, goods.  This motivates our fourth 
test, which is based on the idea that securitization agents’ home transactions jointly trace out 
beliefs about permanent income and house prices, as their human capital is tied to housing.  
Awareness of an impending large-scale housing crash would have led either to reduced 
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expectations of permanent income or awareness that bonuses during the boom were transitory, 
and thus to less expensive purchases relative to their current incomes.  We test whether the 
value-to-income ratio of securitization agents’ purchases during the boom fell, relative to 
unaware control groups, where current income is in the denominator.6  We also test whether 
homes purchased by securitization agents during the boom were held for significant periods of 
time.  If fully-aware securitization agents purchased homes during the boom for consumption, 
these homes should be held for significant periods of time (Sinai and Souleles, 2005), or else a 
significant discount rate would be required to justify these purchases. 
Economic determinants of home transaction behavior other than beliefs could drive cross-
sectional differences between securitization agents and potential control groups.  First, the level 
of risk aversion may vary, particularly if the age profile varies across career groups.  Second, 
there may be career selection and life cycle effects.  Different careers may have different optimal 
points of purchasing housing not obtainable in the rental market due to career risk and different 
life cycle patterns in when to have children.  Third, heterogeneity in wealth levels and income 
shocks may drive home purchase behavior.  Less wealthy people may be less likely to purchase a 
home due to credit constraints, and credit constrained agents may be more likely to purchase a 
home after a positive income shock. 
To address these issues, we construct two uninformed control groups.  The first group is a 
sample of equity analysts covering S&P 500 companies in 2006, excluding major homebuilders.  
The assumption is that, being a self-selected group of agents who work for similar finance 
companies, they face similar ex ante career risks and have similar risk aversion and life cycle 
profiles.  They also received some forms of income shocks during the housing boom, as finance 
companies generally performed very well over this period.  We also construct a second control 
group comprised of lawyers practicing outside of real estate law.  Although differences or 
similarities between these two groups may be less ascribable to beliefs due to heterogeneity, this 
exercise tests for awareness among securitization agents relative to a benchmark group of 
wealthy, high-income people in the general population.  
                                                
6 For example, large bonuses during the boom may have led securitization agents to purchase homes, particularly if 
they were previously credit constrained (Yao and Zhang, 2005; Cocco, 2005; Ortalo-Magne and Rady, 2006), 
although awareness that bonuses were transitory would lead to more conservative purchases relative to their current 
income. 
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Another worry is that awareness of problems in housing markets may not have manifested 
itself as cautious or market-timing behavior if securitization agents were more pessimistic about 
tail risk probabilities (rather than the conditional expectation of prices) and had laid off most of 
the tail risk on lenders. This narrative is particularly relevant for the public debate as many 
CDOs were constructed and priced as if there was little tail risk (Coval, Jurek and Stafford, 
2009).  We investigate this issue by further examining the loan-to-value of purchases of 
securitization agents versus those of control groups, as well as whether they purchased with more 
intensity in non-recourse states to minimize the consequences of any potential defaults.  We also 
examine whether sell-side securitization agents’ housing portfolios outperformed that of buy-side 
agents’ to address the role of this narrative in the public debate. 
Taken together, we test the following hypothesis regarding whether securitization agents 
were aware of the housing bubble: 
Hypothesis (Full Awareness):  Securitization agents exhibited more awareness of a broad-based 
housing bubble relative to equity analysts and lawyers in four possible forms: 
A. (market timing form) Securitization agents were more likely to divest homes and down-
size homes in 2004-2006. 
B. (cautious form) Securitization agents were less likely to acquire second homes or move 
into more expensive homes in 2004-2006.  
C. (performance) Overall, securitization agents had better performance after controlling for 
their initial holdings of homes at the beginning of 2000. 
D. (conservative consumption) Relative to their current income, any purchases made by 
securitization agents during the boom were more conservative. 
We emphasize that securitization agents are likely not subprime borrowers themselves, and 
thus our analysis does not isolate the beliefs of securitization agents about subprime mortgage 
markets.  A limitation of our analysis is that we do not observe the entire household balance 
sheet, and thus do not see whether they took other steps to short the housing market.  Several 
considerations are reassuring. First, directly shorting the housing market is notoriously difficult.  
Shiller (2008) documents that repeated attempts to create markets to hedge house price risk have 
failed to attract liquidity, pointing out that the “near absence of derivatives markets for real 
estate…is a striking anomaly.” Second, shorting homebuilding stocks and real estate investment 
trusts also leaves substantial basis risk with any home investments. Third, shorting stocks 
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requires borrowing stocks, which is costly, and exposes short sellers to recall risk (D’Avolio, 
2002) and the risk of running out of capital if prices appreciate (Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford, 
2002). 
2.2  Data and Empirical Framework 
2.2.1 Data collection 
We begin by collecting names of people working in the securitization business as of 2006.  
To do so, we obtain the list of registrants at the 2006 American Securitization Forum’s (ASF) 
securitization industry conference, hosted that year in Las Vegas, Nevada, from January 29, 2006 
through February 1, 2006.  This list is publicly available via the ASF website.7  The ASF is the 
major industry trade group focusing on securitization.  It published an industry journal and has 
hosted the “ASF 20XX” conference every year since 2004.  The conference in 2006 featured 
1760 registered attendees and over 30 lead sponsors, ranging from every major US investment 
bank (e.g., Goldman Sachs) to large commercial banks such as Wells Fargo, to international 
investment banks such as UBS, to monoline insurance companies such as MBIA. 
We construct a sample of 400 securitization agents by randomly sampling names from the 
conference registration list and collecting their information from our data sources until we have 
400 agents with data.  We make sure to oversample people at the most prominent institutions 
associated with the financial crisis by attempting to collect information for all people associated 
with those firms.8  We screen out people who work for credit card, student loan, auto, and other 
finance companies primarily involved in the non-mortgage securitization business, and also use 
any available information in LinkedIn to screen out people working in non-mortgage 
securitization segments of diversified financial firms.  We also use LinkedIn to collect any 
background information about each person that will be helpful in locating them within the 
Lexis/Nexis database.  Lexis/Nexis aggregates information available from public records, such 
as deed transfers, property tax assessment records, and other public address records to person-
level reports and provides detailed information about property transactions for each person. 
There are a number of reasons that a person we selected from the registration list may not 
appear in our final sample, as described in Table 2.1, Panel A and also Appendix A in more 
                                                
7 As of this writing, this list is no longer available on the web.  The authors have copies of the webpages available. 
8 The companies we oversample are AIG, Bank of America, Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Countrywide, JP Morgan 
Chase, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, Barclays, Deutsche 
Bank, HSBC, UBS, Credit Suisse, and Mellon Bank. 
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detail.  Chief among these are that they worked in the securitization business but in a non-
housing segment such as credit card loans, or that they have a very common name that cannot be 
uniquely identified in Lexis-Nexis.  All told, we sample 613 names to obtain 400 securitization 
agents in sample. 
For each person in our sample, we collect data for all properties ever owned, including the 
location, the date the property was bought and sold, the transaction price, and mortgage terms, 
when available.9  Lexis/Nexis contains records for individuals who never own property, since it 
also tracks other public records, and we record these individuals as not having ever owned 
property.  We also collect data about any refinances undertaken during the sample period.  Our 
data collection began in May 2011 and we thus have all transactions for all people we collect 
through this date.  Our analysis focuses on the period 2000-2010, the last full year we have 
data.10 
Our sample of equity analysts consists of analysts who covered companies during 2006 that 
were members of the S&P 500 anytime in 2006, excluding homebuilding companies.  These 
people worked in the finance industry but were less directly exposed to housing, where the 
securitization market was most active.  We download the names of analysts covering any 
company in the S&P 500 during 2006 outside of SIC codes 152, 153 and 154 from I/B/E/S.  
These SIC codes correspond to homebuilding companies such as Toll Brothers, DR Horton, and 
Pulte Homes.11  There are 2,978 analysts, from which we randomly sample 469 names to obtain 
400 equity analysts with information in our sample. 
To construct our sample of lawyers, we select a set of lawyers for each person in our 
securitization sample from the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, an annual national directory 
of lawyers which has been published since 1868, matched on age and the work location of the 
lawyer.  We provide details in Appendix A.  This matching is not available for equity analysts 
given the information we have available ex ante in our sampling.  We have 406 total names that 
                                                
9 If we do not find a record of a person selling a given property, we verify that the person still owns the property 
through the property tax assessment records.  In cases where the property tax assessment indicates the house has 
been sold to a new owner, or if the deed record does not contain a transaction price, we use the sale date and sale 
price from the property tax assessment, when available. 
10 We collect data for all transactions we observe, even if they are after 2010.  This mitigates any bias associated 
with misclassifying the purpose of transactions, as we discuss below.  To ease data collection requirements, we skip 
properties sold well before 2000, as they are never owned during the 2000-2010 period and are thus immaterial for 
our analysis. 
11 Our references for SIC codes is CRSP, so a company needs to have a valid CRSP-I/B/E/S link. 
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we search for within Lexis/Nexis to obtain 400 lawyers matched on age and location to our 
securitization sample.12 
2.2.2 Classifying home purchases and sales 
Our starting point for understanding home purchase behavior is a broad framework to 
categorize the purpose of a transaction for a given person.  We think of person i at any time t as 
either being a current homeowner, or not.  If she is not a current homeowner, she may purchase a 
house and become a homeowner (which we refer to generically as “buying a first home”).  Note 
that one may have been a homeowner at some point in history and still “buy a first home” if one 
is currently not a homeowner.  If a person is currently a homeowner, she may do one of the 
following: 
A) Purchase an additional house (“buy a second home”), 
B) Sell a house and buy a more expensive house (“swap up”), 
C) Sell a house and buy a less expensive house (“swap down”), 
D) Divest a home but remain a homeowner (“divest a second home”), 
E) Divest a home and not remain a homeowner (“divest last home”). 
 
To operationalize this classification of transactions, we define a pair of purchase and sale 
transactions by the same person within a six month period as a swap, either a swap up or a swap 
down based on the purchase and sale prices of the properties.  If either the purchase or sale price 
is missing, we classify the swap generically as a “swap with no price information.” 
The purchases that are not swaps are either non-homeowners buying first homes, or 
homeowners buying second homes.13 We use the term “second” to mean any home in addition to 
the person’s existing home(s).  Divestitures are classified similarly: among sales that are not 
involved in swaps, if a person sells a home and still owns at least one home, we say she is 
divesting a second home; if she has no home remaining, we say the person is divesting her last 
home.14 
2.2.3 Transaction intensities 
                                                
12 The success rate for collecting information about lawyers is much higher because the Martindale-Hubbell Law 
Directory provides detailed information about each lawyer, allowing us to pinpoint the name in Lexis-Nexis more 
easily than other groups. 
13 If a home is on record for an individual, but the home does not have a purchase date, we assume the owner had the 
home at the beginning of our sample, January 2000.  We provide more details of our classification in Appendix A. 
14 When classifying transactions in 2010, we use information collected on purchases and sales in 2011 to avoid over-
classifying divestitures and first-home/second-home purchases and underclassifying swaps in the final year of data. 
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Our main analysis centers on the annual intensity of each transaction type – that is, the 
number of transactions per person per time period.15  We focus on an annual frequency to avoid 
time periods with no transactions.  Formally, the intensity of one type of transaction in year ! in a 
sample group is defined as the number of transactions of that type in year t divided by the 
number of people eligible to make that type of transaction at the beginning of year t: "#!$#%&!'( = #	,-.#%./!&0#%(#	1$012$	$2&3&42$	50-	!ℎ$	!-.#%./!&0#(. 
For example, the intensity of buying a first home is determined by the number of first home 
purchases during the year divided by the number of non-homeowners at the beginning of the 
year.  An important feature of our data is that we observe not only transaction activity but also 
transaction inactivity, due to the comprehensiveness of the public records tracked by 
Lexis/Nexis.  This allows us to test the hypothesis that one group was more cautious (i.e., bought 
less) than other groups, as we can normalize the number of transactions by the total number of 
people who could have made that transaction, instead of the number of people who made the 
transaction.16 
2.2.4 Income data 
We are able to observe income in the purchase year of a home for a subset of people by 
matching information we observe about the year of their purchase, their mortgage amount, and 
property location with the information provided in the 2000-2010 Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act (HMDA) mortgage application data.  The HMDA dataset contains information on the 
income relied on by the originating institution to underwrite the loan.  Although most identifying 
information – such as the borrower’s name, exact date of origination, property address and zip 
code – is not provided, the data provides the mortgage amount (up to the thousands) as well as 
the census tract of the property.  We match purchases with all originated mortgages in HMDA of 
the same amount in the purchase year with the same census tract as the property.  If we 
                                                
15  We focus on the intensity of transactions rather than the probability of an eligible person making a given 
transaction because the latter discards information about a person making multiple transactions of one type in one 
year.  However, focusing instead on probabilities yields nearly identical results. 
16 A complication in this calculation is that, in a given year, a person may make multiple transactions.  As a result, 
the number of non-homeowners at the beginning of the year does not fully represent the number of people eligible 
for buying a first home during the year, because, for instance, a homeowner may sell her home in February and then 
buy another home in September.  To account for such possibilities, we define “adjusted non-homeowners,” who are 
eligible for buying a first home during a year, to be the group of non-homeowners at the beginning of the year plus 
individuals who divest their last homes in the first half of the year. We similarly adjust the number of homeowners 
and multiple homeowners.  Appendix A contains a detailed description of adjustments. 
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successfully find a match, we take the stated income on the HMDA application as the income of 
our person at the time the purchase was made.17 
2.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.1, Panel A presents the number of people in each sample.  Our groups of interest 
each have 400 people by construction.  Panel B presents the age distribution for each group.  The 
median ages in 2011 for the securitization agent, equity analyst, and lawyer samples are 45, 44, 
and 46, respectively.  Chi-square tests of homogeneity fail to reject the hypothesis that the 
distributions presented in Panel B are the same. 
Our sample features people from 176 distinct firms, of which we are able to match 65 as 
publicly traded companies in CRSP.  Our sample is tilted towards people working at major firms 
due to our oversampling of those firms.  The most prominent companies in our sample are Wells 
Fargo (27 people), Washington Mutual (23), Citigroup (16), JP Morgan Chase (14), AIG (12), 
Countrywide, Deutsche Bank, Merrill Lynch, UBS, and Lehman Brothers (9 each).  The most 
common position titles are Vice President (87), Senior or Executive Vice President (58), and 
Managing Director (39).  In addition to the large firms, a number of regional lenders such as 
BB&T, smaller mortgage originators such as Fremont General and Thornburg Mortgage, and 
buy-side investors such as hedge funds and investment firms are present as well.  Additional 
details about the people in our securitization sample are provided in Table B1 in Appendix B.18 
Table 2.2, Panel A breaks down the number of properties owned over 2000-2010.  Our data 
spans 674 properties owned by securitization agents during the 2000-2010 period, 604 by equity 
analysts, and 609 by lawyers.  Of these, the majority were bought during the same period, while 
roughly 40% of total properties were sold during this period.19 
                                                
17 One concern is that, even given an exact mortgage amount (e.g., $300K), census tract, and purchase year, there 
may be multiple matches within HMDA.  The average number of matches per purchase is roughly three, and the 
median match is unique.  Given the economically-motivated construction of census tracts, we average income over 
all matches in HMDA as the income for that purchase.  One can repeat the analysis using only unique matches, 
which reduces our sample by slightly less than half, and obtain qualitatively similar results that are more influenced 
by a small number of observations at the tail ends of the distribution. 
18 Our reading suggests that many of these agents were involved in forecasting, modeling, and pricing cash flows of 
mortgage-backed paper.  As an example, one person in our group lists their job title in LinkedIn as “Mortgage 
Backed Securities Trader, Wells Fargo,” with job responsibilities including “Head of asset-backed trading group for 
nonprime mortgage and home equity mortgage products,” “Built a team of 3 traders with responsibility for all 
aspects of secondary marketing of these products, including setting pricing levels, monthly mark-to-market of 
outstanding pipeline/warehouse, and all asset sales.” 
19 There are a substantial number of properties with either no sale date or a sale date after December 31, 2010; these 
are homes that were still owned as of that date. 
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Appendix B maps the geographical distribution of properties in our sample.  The New York 
combined statistical area (roughly the NJ-NY-CT tri-state metro area plus Pike County, PA) is 
the most prominent metro area, followed by Southern California (Los Angeles plus San Diego).  
Both equity analysts and securitization agents are concentrated in New York, with a slightly 
higher concentration for equity analysts.  Appendix B also contains details about how purchases 
and sales are distributed through time, and how these purchases and sales were classified. 
Table 2.2, Panel B summarizes mortgage information.  For the securitization sample, we 
have mortgage information for 327 purchases out of 437 we observe from 2000-2010.  Of these, 
we are able to match 253 to HMDA, a conditional success rate of 77%; for both the equity 
analyst and lawyer groups, this rate is 79%.  Over the entire 2000-2010 period, the average 
income at purchase was $350K for the securitization sample, $409K for the equity analyst 
sample, and $191K for the lawyers.  All income figures are reported in real December 2006 
dollars adjusted using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) All Items series. 
One concern is that these numbers appear a bit too “small” relative to what is commonly 
perceived as finance industry pay.  The income reported in HMDA represents income used by 
the bank to underwrite the loan, which may often include only taxable income provided by the 
mortgage applicant and is thus likely downward biased.  Forms of compensation not taxable 
during the year, such as employee stock option grants, may not be included.20 
Even if this reporting issue were not present, observed income levels are not unbiased 
representations of the true distribution of underlying income because we only observe income at 
purchase, and not income in other years (nor for non-purchasers).  As a descriptive exercise, 
however, Table 2.3 breaks down average income observed at purchase into three bins, 
corresponding to the pre-housing boom (2000-2003), housing boom (2004-2006), and housing 
bust (2007-2010).21  Our securitization agents received income shocks from the pre-boom to the 
boom period, with average income rising by $92K, over 37% of average pre-boom income.  
Equity analysts also received income shocks, with average income at purchase rising by $57K, 
although this is a smaller fraction of pre-boom income, 16%.  These results are roughly 
                                                
20 If the amount of underreporting varies across time, the bias becomes problematic for our analysis comparing 
average value-to-income ratios at purchase across groups and time.  We discuss this in Section 4.4. 
21 Because we are interested in average income per person, we first average within person over purchases to obtain a 
person-level average income for the period before averaging over people in each period. 
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consistent with our initial hypothesis that the two finance industry groups received positive 
income shocks, although securitization agents received a slightly larger average shock. 
2.4  Empirical Results 
2.4.1 Were securitization agents more aware of the bubble? 
We first examine whether securitization agents divested houses in advance of the housing 
crash.  Figure 2.2, Panel A plots the divestitures per person per year for each group through time.  
The divestiture intensities for the securitization agent sample are, if anything, lower than those of 
equity analysts and lawyers in years before 2007.  Compared to equity analysts, the divestiture 
intensity for securitization agents is lower every year from 2003-2006, and slightly higher during 
the bust period, 2007-2009.22 
To account for heterogeneity in the age and multi-homeownership profiles of each group, 
we compute regression-adjusted differences in intensities.  We do this by constructing a strongly-
balanced person-year panel that tracks the number of divestitures each year for each person, 
including zero if no divestiture was observed.  We then estimate the following equation for each 
pairing of the securitization group with a control group using OLS: 8 #9&:$%!&!;-$%<(|>?<(@A = 1= C( + E(×G$/;-&!&H.!&0#< + IJ	K3$J(&, !)OJPA + Q	R;2!&>?<(@A.		(1) 
The variable #9&:$%!&!;-$%<(  is the number of divestitures for individual i in year t, G$/;-&!&H.!&0#<  is an indicator for whether individual i is part of our securitization agent 
sample, K3$J(&, !) is an indicator for whether individual i is part of age group j in year t (where 
eight age brackets are defined according to Table 2.1, Panel B, and one age group is excluded), R;2!&>?<(@A represents whether individual i was also a multi-homeowner at the end of year t-1, 
and >?<(@A is an indicator for whether individual i  was a homeowner at the end of year t-1.  We 
use indicators for age brackets instead of a polynomial specification for age as it makes 
coefficients easily interpretable as average group effects.  In each year t, we condition the sample 
such that only the adjusted homeowners as of the end of year t-1 (i.e., those who started year t as 
                                                
22 The raw number of divestitures each year may be read off by multiplying the intensity in a given year from Table 
2.4 by the number of homeowners in that year given by Table B5 in Appendix B.  For example, in 2008, there were 
19 divestitures (0.061 times 313) in the securitization sample.  In contrast to our regression-adjusted differences, we 
do not condition on having age information when reporting these raw intensities. 
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homeowners or became a homeowner during year t, so that >?<(@A = 1) are included in the 
estimation.  We cluster standard errors by person.  The effective sample size is the number of 
homeowners during the 2000-2010 period.23 
The coefficients E( are the difference in average annual divestitures per person within the 
homeowner category across samples, adjusted for average group effects captured by age and 
multi-homeownership indicators, and are our coefficients of interest, with E( > 0 during the 
2004-2006 period suggesting evidence of market timing.24  Table 2.4 presents these regression-
adjusted differences.  Consistent with the raw divestiture intensities, these differences are very 
small during the boom period; point estimates are negative compared to equity analysts.  There is 
weak evidence that securitization agents had a slightly higher intensity of divestiture in 2007 and 
2008.  This could be consistent with a form of market timing such as riding the bubble, but also 
consistent with divestitures related to job losses, a point which we return to in Section 4.2.7.  
Overall, however, there is little evidence that suggests people in our securitization agent sample 
sold homes more aggressively prior to the peak of the housing bubble relative to either equity 
analysts or lawyers. 
We next examine whether securitization agents were cautious in purchasing homes in 2004-
2006.  This cautiousness alternative emphasizes that securitization agents knew about the bubble, 
but that the optimal response was to avoid purchasing homes given the difficulty in timing the 
crash.  We focus on second home purchases and swap-ups into more expensive houses by 
homeowners.  Results for first-home purchases by non-homeowners are reported in Appendix B 
                                                
23 The effective sample size (number of people contributing to the variation) of this estimation will be the total 
number of people who we ever observed as adjusted homeowners during the 2000-2010 period for whom we have 
age information across these two groups.  This may be read off from the last row of Table B5, Panel B.  For 
example, when estimating equation (1) for the securitization sample and the equity analyst sample, the number of 
people will be 633 (328 plus 305).  The number of homeowners contributing to the variation each year may 
similarly be read off from the same table, which lists the number of homeowners and non-homeowners each year 
with age information.  For example, when estimating (1) for the securitization agent and equity sample, the number 
of people contributing variation in 2000 is 415 (220 plus 195). 
24 We estimate equation (1) using OLS to maintain the simplest interpretation of E(.  In the absence of covariates, E( 
would be equivalent to average marginal effects estimated from non-linear limited dependent variable models (e.g., 
a Poisson model), because G$/;-&!&H.!&0#< is binary.  One alternative method of estimating equation (1) would be 
to replace the left-hand side variable with an indicator for whether a person divested and interpret E(  as the 
probability of a person divesting, making equation (1) a linear probability model and the corresponding non-linear 
model a logit or probit model.  Appendix B reports results average marginal effects estimated from such a logit 
model, analogous to results in Tables 4 and 5.  Results are nearly identical.  Angrist and Pischke (2009) discuss the 
relative merits of OLS as a robust approximation (in the minimum mean-squared error sense) to the conditional 
expectation function versus these non-linear methods.   
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and do not reveal significant differences; if anything, there are more first home purchases by 
non-homeowning securitization agents than equity analysts.   
Figure 2.2, Panel B plots the raw intensity of second home purchases and swap-ups through 
time, while Table 2.5 presents regression-adjusted differences.  The regression-adjusted 
differences are computed using a specification analogous to equation (1) where we replace the 
left-hand side variable with the number of second home purchases plus swap-up transactions for 
individual i during year t, again conditioning the sample to adjusted homeowners as of the end of 
year t-1.  Contrary to what would be suggested by the full awareness hypothesis, we observe E( > 0 consistently throughout the 2004-2006 period, with statistically significant differences 
with the equity analyst group at the 1% level in the 2005 period.  Pooling intensities every other 
year reveals positive and statistically significant differences in the 2002-2003, 2004-2005, and 
2006-2007 periods (reported in Appendix B).  Economically, the intensity of second home 
purchase and swap-up activity was 0.07 homes per person higher in 2005 for securitization 
agents than equity analysts.  This suggests that securitization agents were aggressively 
increasing, not decreasing, their exposure to housing during this period.  We now explore this 
issue in more detail. 
2.4.2 Second home and swap-up purchases 
2.4.2.1 Firm-specific effects.  We exploit the fact that we observe 78 securitization agents 
and 136 equity analysts working at a common set of 19 firms to remove company-specific 
effects.  For this test and for other subsample tests, we pool together intensities every other year 
(2000-2001, 2002-2003, and so forth) to mitigate the concern that our results are driven by 
spurious differences between a small number of transactions we may observe during a single 
year when we condition the sample tightly.  We estimate the following equation: 8 #U;'G$/0#V?-GW.1X1<(|>?<(@A = 1 																																																																																					(2)= Z[ + C\(() + E\(()×G$/;-&!&H.!&0#< + IJ	K3$J(&, !)OJPA + Q	R;2!&>?<(@A,		 
where Z[  represents company-specific effects and % ! = 0  if t=2000 or 2001, % ! = 1  if 
t=2002 or 2003, and so forth.  The first column of Table 2.6 reports the results and shows that, 
within this subsample, purchase intensities for second homes and swap-ups are higher for 
securitization agents in the 2002-2003 and 2006-2007 periods, even controlling for firm effects. 
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2.4.2.2 Location effects.  Heterogeneity in property locations is a concern, since the 
magnitude of the housing bubble was very heterogeneous across areas, as shown previously in 
Figure 2.1.  Although our sample of lawyers is location matched with our securitization agents, 
equity analysts are relatively more concentrated in the New York metro area.  If securitization 
agents lived in areas where it was cheaper or easier to purchase a second home or swap up, this 
location effect may drive our previous results.  To check whether this is the case, we condition 
the sample of homeowners each year to those who own property in the New York metro region 
at the end of the previous year, and estimate the following model: 8 #U;'G$/0#V?-GW.1X1<(|>?<(@A = 1, ]-01^_ <`(@A = 1= C\(() + E\(()×G$/;-&!&H.!&0#< + IJ	K3$J(&, !)OJPA + Q	R;2!&>?<(@A, (3) 
where ]-01^_ <`(@A  is an indicator for whether person i owns property in the New York 
combined statistical area at the end of year t-1.  Results are reported in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 
2.6.  We find that, even within this smaller subsample, securitization agents were more 
aggressive with purchases of second homes and swap-ups in 2004-2005 relative to equity 
analysts, an effect that is statistically significant at the 5% level.  In Columns 4 and 5, we repeat 
this exercise for people who live in Southern California, our second most represented metro 
region and find similar behavior results, although the sample size is smaller than in the New 
York metro area. 
2.4.2.3 Differences-in-differences across locations.  Comparing columns 2 and 4 of Table 
2.6, the difference in intensities between securitization agents and equity analysts is larger in 
Southern California than New York.  Given that Southern California had a much larger boom-
bust cycle than New York, this suggests that securitization agents were even less aware of the 
bubble in areas where the bubble was very pronounced relative to areas where the bubble was 
less pronounced. 
To further test this insight, we focus on the relative difference between securitization agents 
and equity analysts in Southern California with that in New York by estimating: 8 #U;'G$/0#V?-GW.1X1<(|>?<(@A = 1, ]-01G0`K<(@A = 1	0-	]-01^_ <`(@A = 1= C\ ( + Z\ ( ]-01G0`K<(@A + I\ ( G$/;-&!&H.!&0#<
+ E\(() G$/;-&!&H.!&0#<×]-01G0`K<(@A + IJ	K3$J(&, !)OJPA + Q	R;2!&>?<(@A,			(4) 
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where ]-01G0`K<(@A  is an indicator for whether person i owns property in the Southern 
California region at the end of year t-1.25  We perform this exercise both with the number of 
second home purchases and swap ups on the left hand side (Column 6 of Table 2.6) as well as 
just second home purchases (Column 7).  The thought experiment is the following.  Suppose 
Southern California begins to look bubbly in the 2004-2005 period, relative to New York.  
Allowing for differences between the New York and Southern California regions (through the Z\ (  coefficients) and between securitization agents and equity analysts (through the I\ (  
coefficients), do securitization agents in Southern California react more or less cautiously 
compared to those in New York during that time period?  Evidence of E\(() < 0 during 2004-
2005 would suggest that securitization agents living in areas which experienced larger boom/bust 
cycles were more alerted than their counterparts in regions with more moderate cycles.26 
In fact, the aggressiveness of securitization agents relative to equity analysts is more 
pronounced in Southern California than in New York.  This suggests that securitization agents 
living in areas which experienced larger boom/bust cycles were potentially even more optimistic 
about house prices than otherwise.  To mitigate the concern that there are relatively fewer equity 
analysts in Southern California, and to demonstrate that these results are driven by differences 
across areas, columns 8 and 9 of Table 2.6 estimate only the single-difference between Southern 
California and New York within securitization agents and shows results consistent with the 
difference-in-differences. 
2.4.2.4 Financing. One concern is that differences in purchase behavior are driven by 
differential financing terms.  Figure 2.3, Panel A plots the average interest rate at purchase for 
each year and each group.  On average, the interest rates observed at purchase between the two 
groups are very similar and experienced overall time variation similar to that of national 
benchmark rates. 
A second concern is that securitization agents with knowledge of the bubble and crash may 
have financed the purchase of their homes very differently.  Securitization agents may have been 
aware of tail risks yet laid off these risks to lenders in their purchases.  Figure 2.3, Panel B plots 
                                                
25 To conservatively avoid an ex ante classification bias in either direction, we discard a handful of observations 
where people own property in both New York and Southern California at the end of year t-1. 
26 There were insufficient observations in the Arizona/Nevada/Florida regions to conduct this type of test.  We chose 
New York and Southern California both because New York experienced a much more moderate bubble than 
Southern California, but also because of practical considerations given how many observations we have. 
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the median loan-to-value (LTV) ratio at purchase – including any second lien mortgages 
recorded on or within 14 days of the purchase – and shows that it holds steady near the 
unconditional median of 80% throughout the sample period.  The median LTV ratios of the 
marginal second home and swap-up purchases are also very close to 80% through time.  Overall, 
we see little evidence that securitization agents purchased more homes with different financial 
exposure than equity analysts. 
A third financing-related concern is that securitization agents with knowledge of the bubble 
and crash may have reduced their house price exposure by refinancing and withdrawing equity 
after purchase during the boom period.  Although this would lower the direct financial exposure 
to home prices, it would significantly increase leverage and the expected cost of bankruptcy, as 
second lien mortgages – including home equity lines of credit (HELOCs) – are often loans where 
lenders have recourse to a borrower’s non-home assets and where borrowers face personal 
liability in the event of default.  This can be true even in states which are more generally 
considered non-recourse states due to the protections afforded to mortgages directly connected 
with purchase money.27  Consistent with this, Lee, Mayer and Tracy (2012) find that many 
borrowers continue to pay their second lien mortgages (including HELOCs) even when their first 
mortgage is in default.  An increase in debt through second lien mortgages and HELOCs could 
thus also be consistent with significant optimism about home prices and a belief that default is 
not likely.  In Appendix B, we show that the average change in debt resulting from refinancing is 
similar across groups during our sample period.  
2.4.2.5 Default risk.  To directly examine beliefs about the likelihood of default, we test 
whether second home and swap-up purchases among securitization agents were differentially 
concentrated within non-recourse states rather than recourse states relative to equity analysts in 
Appendix B.  Awareness of tail risks would likely lead agents to purchase in non-recourse states 
as it reduces the expected cost of default.  Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) classify states based on 
lender friendliness and whether it is practical for lenders to obtain deficiency judgments and find 
that borrowers are substantially more likely to default on first mortgages in non-recourse states, 
particularly when equity is negative.  Conditional on whether a person already has a home in a 
non-recourse state, we find little evidence of a higher marginal intensity for securitization agents 
                                                
27 The most notable example is California.  Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) classify California as a non-recourse state.  
However, California courts have held in numerous cases such as Union Bank v Wendland (1976) that only loans 
connected to financing the purchase price of a home are protected from deficiency judgments. 
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to purchase second homes or swap up into more expensive homes in non-recourse states than 
equity analysts. 
2.4.2.6 Type of property. In Appendix B, we provide evidence that, conditional on a 
second home purchase, the type of home (single-family or condominium) is significantly more 
likely to be a condominium for securitization agents relative to equity analysts, even though they 
are no more likely to be farther away.  This suggests that they are potentially condominiums 
purchased to rent rather than for a pure consumption motive. 
2.4.2.7 Job switches.  The higher number of divestitures in 2007 and 2008 may suggest 
market timing, with securitization agents divesting homes earlier than others.  On the one hand, 
this difference is small relative to the difference in intensity of second home and swap-up 
purchases.  For example, between securitization agents and equity analysts, the difference in 
divestiture intensity is 0.026 per homeowner in 2008 while the difference in second home/swap-
up intensity is 0.068 per homeowner in 2005.  We explore this issue further by using Bayes’ rule 
to decompose the divestiture intensity into the intensity among those who experience job losses 
(job-losers), the intensity among those who do not experience job losses (no-job-losers), and the 
rate of job loss.28  In Appendix B, we provide evidence which suggests that securitization agent 
job-losers were more likely than equity analyst job-losers to divest a home, despite significant 
job losses among both groups.  In contrast, there is a smaller difference in divestiture intensities 
between securitization agent no-job-losers and equity analyst no-job-losers.  Since both the 
initial difference in divestiture intensities and the total absolute number of divestitures are small, 
one caveat to this result is that this decomposition is over a small sample, so that this holds only 
qualitatively.  On the other hand, results for total sales yield statistically significant differences 
between the two groups of job-losers, while no differences for no-job-losers.  Under the full 
awareness hypothesis, we should have expected to see differences between securitization agents 
and equity analysts in both job-loser and no-job-loser groups, rather than only in the job-loser 
group. 
2.4.3 Net trading performance 
We next systematically analyze which groups fared better during this episode by comparing 
their trading performance.  Our strategy is to compare their portfolio performance based on the 
                                                
28 We examine the LinkedIn profiles of each of our securitization agents and define years in which a person switches 
jobs as the last year of employment within an employer on a person’s resume.  We provide details in Appendix A. 
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relative differences in the location and timing of their sales and purchases from the beginning of 
our sample onwards to see whether trades subsequent to this date helped or hurt each group on 
average.   
Our thought experiment is the following: if agents follow a self-financing strategy from 
2000 onwards, where the available investments are houses in different zip codes and a risk-free 
asset, how did their observed performance compare with that of a hypothetical buy-and-hold 
strategy?  We sketch the assumptions for this exercise here and provide full details in Appendix 
B.  First, we assume time flows quarterly, and we mark the value of each house up or down 
every quarter from its actual observed purchase price and date in accordance with quarterly zip-
code level home price indices from Case-Shiller when possible.  Second, we assume that agents 
each purchase an initial supply of houses at the beginning of 2000 equal to whichever houses 
they are observed to own at that time.  Third, agents have access to a cash account which earns 
the risk-free rate, and we endow each agent with enough cash to finance the entirety of their 
future purchases to abstract away from differences in leverage.  This last assumption errs on the 
side of conservatism in isolating performance differences arising from the timing of home 
purchases. 
We compute both the return from the observed strategy and the return from a counterfactual 
buy-and-hold strategy, where agents purchase their initial set of houses and then subsequently 
never trade.  We denote the difference between the returns of these two strategies as the 
performance index for each individual, which captures whether trading subsequent to the initial 
date helped or hurt the individual relative to a simple buy-and-hold strategy. 
We test for value-weighted differences in performance by projecting the performance index 
onto an indicator for the securitization group and indicators for the age categorizations using 
ordinary least squares in the cross-section of individuals, with sampling weights equal to their 
initial wealth.  Intuitively, this methodology is a value-weighted “difference-in-difference” 
where the first difference compares observed performance with buy-and-hold performance and 
the second difference compares this first difference for securitization agents with that of the 
control group. 
Table 2.7, Panel A presents summary statistics for our exercise, while Panel B tabulates the 
value-weighted average return, buy-and-hold return, and performance index per person for each 
group, as well as the regression-adjusted differences.  Figure 2.4 illustrates the comparative 
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evolution of the performance indices.  What is apparent is that all groups, including 
securitization agents, were worse off at the end of 2010 relative to a buy-and-hold strategy that 
began in 2000q1. 
In fact, the securitization group’s portfolio experienced significantly worse gross returns 
than the equity analyst group, a difference of 4.5% on a regression-adjusted basis.  Although part 
of this is due to a difference in the buy-and-hold return across the two groups (1.7%), the 
remaining difference of 2.7% quantifies the net trading underperformance of the securitization 
group, a difference which is statistically significant at the 5% level.29  In particular, the gross 
return during the 2007-2010 bust period for the securitization group was particularly poor.  
Differences with the lawyer group were more modest, although still negative.30  In summary, the 
observed trading behavior of securitization agents hurt their portfolio performance. 
We also compare portfolios of groups of agents within our securitization group to further 
isolate the full awareness hypothesis.  One salient view is that those who were selling mortgage-
backed securities and CDOs knew that the asset fundamentals were worse than their ratings 
suggested, which suggests that they may have anticipated problems in the wider housing market 
earlier than others.  Table 2.8, Panel A compares the performance of sell-side agents (issuers) 
with agents from the buy side (investors).  Of the 400 securitization agents, 161 work on the sell 
side and 239 work on the buy side.  Evidently, sell-side analysts’ portfolios performed more 
poorly compared to their buy-side peers, with a performance index 6% lower, a difference that is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Table 2.8, Panel B compares the performance of housing portfolios belonging to people 
working at firms who performed well during the crisis and those who did not.  The idea is to test 
whether people whose firms did poorly anticipated the wider crisis and were able to escape the 
broad-based fall in home prices themselves.  We hand-match our list of companies to CRSP and 
sort them into terciles of buy-and-hold stock performance from July 2007 through December 
                                                
29  In interpreting this magnitude, it is worth recalling that our performance evaluation fully collateralizes all 
purchases and endows agents with large amount of cash, so that this difference likely significantly understates the 
true difference in portfolio performance across the two groups.  For example, housing forms only a 25% portfolio 
weight for securitization agents in the first period of our calibration, rising to 54% in the last period, both of which 
are quite conservative.  In Appendix B, we present an alternative calibration where we halve the amount of cash 
given to each agent, so that the initial portfolio weight on housing is 51%, rising to 111% in the final period.  This 
produces larger magnitudes while not affecting statistical inference. 
30 We have also experimented with different initial dates for the performance evaluation.  For starting dates between 
2000q1 and 2004q4, results are very similar.  Differences between the two groups when using a starting date of 
2005q4 and 2006q4 manifest mostly in the gross return, since the bulk of homes had been purchased by then. 
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2008, the period over which a significant portion of the crisis develops.  Poorly-performing 
companies include Lehman Brothers and Countrywide.  Better-performing firms include BB&T, 
Wells Fargo, and Blackrock.  The results suggest that the housing portfolios of people working at 
poorly-performing firms did worse than those of people working at better-performing firms, 
although the smaller size is smaller.  Overall, if fully aware agents were attempting to “ride the 
bubble,” they missed the peak, leading not only to sharply negative returns, but also worse 
performance relative to other groups. 
2.4.4 Consumption and income shocks 
We examine the consumption component of housing and whether securitization agents 
perceived that their high current income during the housing boom was transitory by testing 
whether the value-to-income (VTI) ratios of their purchases were more conservative than that of 
control groups.  If securitization agents understood that income shocks during the boom were 
transitory, we should observe lower value-to-income ratios at purchase for them relative to 
control groups. 
We compute the value-to-income (VTI) ratio for the subsample of purchases where we have 
both income data from HMDA and an observed purchase price.31  Table 2.9 tabulates the mean 
and median VTI for each group in pre-boom, boom and bust periods.  From pre-boom to boom, 
the average VTI for purchasers in the securitization sample increased from 3.2 to 3.4; the median 
showed a slight decrease from 3.1 to 3.0, suggesting there are some purchasers who purchased 
homes at a very large VTI ratio, even after trimming out those with very low incomes.  The 
average VTI among equity analyst purchasers increased from 2.9 to 3.1, while the median 
increased from 2.7 to 2.8.  Overall, the evidence does not display any strong pattern consistent 
with the hypothesis that the securitization agents were more conservative in their VTI ratios 
when purchasing homes.32 
One caveat to analyzing the value-to-income ratio is that our measures of income are likely 
downward biased, as noted in Section 3.  Because our analysis focuses on comparing the change 
                                                
31 Due to the nature of VTI as a ratio, we require a minimum nominal reported income of $100K in the year of 
purchase to avoid drawing conclusions based on possible extreme tails overly influencing our analysis. 
32 Including the mark-to-market value of other existing homes at the time of purchase, computed using the method 
described in Section 4.3, to form a portfolio value-to-income ratio at purchase yields similar results, which we report 
in Appendix B.  We focus on the purchase value-to-income ratio to ensure any results or non-results are being 
driven by the data rather than the additional assumptions required in computing the mark-to-market value of each 
house. 
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in value-to-income across groups, the change in VTI will be mis-measured if the bias in 
underreporting income itself varies across time.  In Appendix B, we also examine whether there 
were differential patterns of selling during the bust across our groups within the subsample of 
purchases during the 2004-2006 period.  We find that, in the prime crisis years (2007 and 2008), 
sales of 2004-2006 properties per purchaser were much higher for securitization agents than 
equity analysts and lawyers, making any consumption stream short-lived.  As discussed in 
Section 4.2.7, differences in divestiture and sale intensities during this period are related to a 
higher intensity among securitization job-losers relative to equity analyst job-losers.  This 
suggests that securitization agents had based earlier purchase decisions on overoptimistic 
projections of permanent income relative to equity analysts. 
2.5  Conclusion 
We find little systematic evidence that the average securitization agent exhibited awareness 
through their home transactions of problems in overall house markets and anticipated a broad-
based crash earlier than others.  Although we do not observe each household’s entire balance 
sheet, we believe our results provide a useful starting point for understanding the role of beliefs 
leading to the recent crisis. Other consumption and investment patterns of Wall Street traders 
may yield additional useful observations on this role.  Understanding how incentives interact 
with beliefs is also one area which might bear substantial fruit.  Our evidence that some groups 
of agents were particularly aggressive in increasing exposure to housing suggests that job 
environments that foster groupthink, cognitive dissonance, or other sources of over-optimism are 
of particular concern.  Changing the compensation contracts of Wall Street agents alone, for 
example through increased restricted stock holdings or more shareholder say on pay, may be 
insufficient to prevent the next financial market crisis (Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong, 2006; 
Cheng, Hong and Scheinkman, 2013). The whole financial system may benefit from having 
securities that incentivize information acquisition about tail-risk states. Given the crucial role of 
the financial sector in intermediating capital across the economy, systematic analysis of the 
macroeconomic implications of the belief dynamics of Wall Street employees is needed. We 
leave these important questions for future research.   
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Figure 2.1: Home Price Indices 
This figure plots the Case-Shiller non-seasonally-adjusted home price indices from January 2000 through 
July 2012.  Values for January 2000 are normalized to 100. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Transaction Intensities 
Panel A plots the intensity of divestitures through time, defined as the number of divestitures per adjusted 
homeowner each year, for each group.  Panel B plots the intensity of second home purchases and swap-
ups. 
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Figure 2.3: Financing 
Panel A plots the average interest rate at purchase for securitization and equity analyst groups, as well as 
average annual national benchmark 30-year jumbo and conforming interest rates from BankRate.  Panel B 
plots the median loan-to-value observed at purchase. 
 
Panel A Panel B 
  
 
Figure 2.4: Trading Performance Indices 
This figure plots the average performance index, defined as the initial-wealth-weighted average difference 
between the cumulative return on the self-financed trading strategy and the buy-and-hold return of the 
initial stock of houses, where 2000q1 is taken as the initial quarter, for each group. 
 84 
Table 2.1: People 
This table lists the number of people for which we gathered information in each of three samples: 
securitization agents, equity analysts, and lawyers.  Panel A tabulates the number of names we searched 
for and reasons for why a name may not be in our sample.  Panel B shows the age distribution of people 
in our sample. 
    Panel A: Number of People 
Sample Securitization 
Equity 
Analysts Lawyers 
Number of names 613 469 406 
Not mid-level manager 13 N/A N/A 
Not housing 94 N/A N/A 
Not found in public records 29 16 3 
Multiple found in public records 50 27 3 
International 27 25 0 
Deceased 0 1 0 
People in sample 400 400 400 
Person found, but no homes owned 58 82 42 
People who sold all properties before 2000 3 1 0 
People who only own homes beginning after 2010 3 4 3 
People in sample owning at least one home, 2000-2010 336 313 355 
Unconditional rate of homeownership 0.84 0.78 0.89 
    Panel B: 2011 Age Distribution 
Age Securitization 
Equity 
Analysts Lawyers 
30 and under 0.53% 0.26% 0.26% 
31 to 35 6.60% 6.46% 5.37% 
36 to 40 16.09% 21.96% 15.86% 
41 to 45 27.97% 32.56% 24.04% 
46 to 50 23.48% 18.60% 19.69% 
51 to 55 13.72% 10.08% 18.16% 
56 to 60 6.07% 4.13% 10.74% 
Over 60 5.54% 5.94% 5.88% 
Total with age data 379 387 391 
Missing age data 21 13 9 
Chi-Square Test of Homogeneity with Sctzn Sample N/A 10.92 10.67 
Homogeneity Test, p-value N/A 0.14 0.15 
Median age 45 44 46 
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Table 2.2: Properties 
This table provides summary statistics for properties owned anytime over 2000-2010.  Dollar amounts are reported 
in December 2006 CPI-adjusted real thousands.  Panel A presents the fraction of people owning more than one 
address over 2000-2010. Panel B presents summary statistics for our matching process with mortgage applications. 
    Panel A: Total Properties, Purchases and Sales 
  Securitization Equity Analysts Lawyers 
Total properties ever owned, 2000-2010 674 604 609 
Total purchases, 2000-2010 437 368 355 
with purchase price 392 318 306 
average purchase price 761.67 1032.38 485.62 
Number of homes with no purchase date 81 112 101 
Total sales, 2000-2010 266 207 171 
with sale price 238 172 145 
average sale price 633.74 794.76 446.37 
Number of homes with no sale date 408 397 438 
or sold after Dec 31 2010 
   
    Panel B: Mortgage Applications 
 
Securitization Equity Analysts Lawyers 
Purchases, 2000-2010 437 368 355 
with mortgage info 327 247 257 
mean, median LTV 0.72 / 0.79 0.71 / 0.75 0.73 / 0.80 
with income from HMDA match 253 196 203 
income at purchase, property average 350.01 408.74 191.32 
People purchasing, 2000-2010 274 242 243 
with income from any HMDA match 191 153 167 
Average # HMDA mortgage applications per match 2.41 2.62 2.46 
Median # HMDA mortgage applications per match 1 1 1 
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Table 2.3: Income 
This table presents average income in three periods for each group.  We first average income from 
purchases observed within each person-period before averaging across people to obtain an average 
income for each period.  Dollar amounts are in December 2006 CPI-adjusted thousands.  Row A 
tests whether the boom minus pre-boom difference in averages was zero by projecting person-level 
income onto an indicator for the boom period in a two-period unbalanced panel of person-level 
income.  Row B tests whether the difference-in-difference is significant across groups.  Standard 
errors are clustered at the person level.  */**/*** denotes significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
       
   
Income 
 
   
Sctzn. 
Equity 
Analysts Lawyers 
 
 
Pre-Boom period Mean 246.4 360.4 170.4 
 
 
(2000-2003) Median 180.9 224.7 148.7 
 
  
SD 266.8 335.4 114.8 
 
  
People 83 72 70 
 
 
Boom period Mean 338.8 418.0 174.0 
 
 
(2004-2006) Median 210 246.4 131.8 
 
  
SD 513.8 501.9 116.4 
 
  
People 89 58 68 
 
 
Bust period Mean 369.2 476.1 231.9 
 
 
(2007-2010) Median 205.8 308.0 151.4 
 
  
SD 489.2 433.4 258.6 
 
 
  People 68 56 54 
 
 
A) Boom-PreBoom Point Est. 92.36 57.62 3.68 
 
  
t-stat [1.68]* [0.76] [0.19] 
 
  
N 172 130 138 
 
  
R2 0.012 0.005 0.000 
 
 
B) DID Point Est.   34.75 88.68 
 
 
Sctzn. minus t-stat   [0.37] [1.53] 
 
 
Control N   302 310 
 
 
  R2   0.021 0.047 
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Table 2.4: Divesting Houses 
 The first three columns tabulate the number of divestitures per homeowner for each group, by year.  T-
statistics from a two-sample test of differences in means with the securitization sample are reported each 
group-year for the two control groups.  The next two columns report regression-adjusted differences in the 
number of divestitures per person each year, where we control for the eight age groups defined in Table 2.1 
as well as an indicator for whether someone is a multi-homeowner at the start of the year, and the sample 
period is 2000-2010.  The number of people in-sample each year is the number of homeowners at the 
beginning of each year for the two groups that are compared.  T-statistics computed from person-clustered 
standard errors are reported in brackets below each difference.  */**/*** represents statistically significant 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
        
 
  
Divestitures per person Regression-Adjusted 
Difference 
 
 
  Sctzn. minus: 
 
 
Year Securitization 
Equity 
Analysts Lawyers 
Equity 
Analysts Lawyers 
 
 
2000 0.045 0.060 0.018 -0.012 0.026 
 
 
    [-0.67] [1.67]* [-0.50] [1.59] 
 
 
2001 0.038 0.043 0.020 0.003 0.019 
 
 
    [-0.25] [1.16] [0.14] [1.22] 
 
 
2002 0.040 0.062 0.030 -0.011 0.012 
 
 
    [-0.94] [0.62] [-0.48] [0.71] 
 
 
2003 0.045 0.050 0.032 0.001 0.019 
 
 
    [-0.21] [0.78] [0.06] [1.10] 
 
 
2004 0.040 0.050 0.034 -0.006 0.004 
 
 
    [-0.58] [0.39] [-0.36] [0.24] 
 
 
2005 0.024 0.044 0.060 -0.014 -0.033 
 
 
    [-1.26] [-1.80]* [-0.85] [-1.69]* 
 
 
2006 0.030 0.040 0.019 -0.007 0.009 
 
 
    [-0.61] [0.92] [-0.44] [0.75] 
 
 
2007 0.048 0.031 0.021 0.023 0.025 
 
 
    [1.03] [1.89]* [1.40] [1.66]* 
 
 
2008 0.061 0.038 0.030 0.026 0.025 
 
 
    [1.28] [1.88]* [1.44] [1.50] 
 
 
2009 0.045 0.024 0.015 0.029 0.031 
 
 
    [1.45] [2.17]** [1.91]* [2.09]** 
 
 
2010 0.029 0.020 0.027 0.012 0.001 
 
 
    [0.59] [0.13] [0.79] [0.09] 
 
   
Multi-homeowner? 0.063 0.066 
 
    
[7.71]*** [8.14]*** 
 
   
Age Indicators? Y Y 
 
   
N 5739 6149 
 
   
R-Squared 0.022 0.026 
 
   
People 633 675 
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Table 2.5: Buying a Second Home or Swapping Up 
 
The first three columns tabulate the number of second home/swap up purchases per homeowner for each group, 
by year.  T-statistics from a two-sample test of differences in means with the securitization sample are reported 
each group-year other than the securitization group.  The next two columns report regression-adjusted 
differences in the number of second home/swap up purchases per person each year, where we control for the 
eight age groups defined in Table 2.1 as well as an indicator for whether someone is a multi-homeowner at the 
start of the year.  The number of people in-sample each year is the number of homeowners at the beginning of 
each year for the two groups that are compared, and the sample period is 2000-2010.  T-statistics computed from 
person-clustered standard errors are reported in brackets below each difference.  */**/*** represents statistically 
significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
        
 
  
Second home/swap up purchases per person Regression-Adjusted 
Difference 
 
 
  Sctzn. minus: 
 
 
Year Securitization 
Equity 
Analysts Lawyers 
Equity 
Analysts Lawyers 
 
 
2000 0.054 0.055 0.057 0.014 -0.011 
 
 
    [-0.05] [-0.15] [0.66] [-0.56] 
 
 
2001 0.064 0.086 0.057 0.006 0.013 
 
 
    [-0.86] [0.31] [0.27] [0.65] 
 
 
2002 0.113 0.075 0.072 0.065 0.047 
 
 
    [1.38] [1.62] [2.65]*** [2.11]** 
 
 
2003 0.080 0.079 0.093 0.024 -0.008 
 
 
    [0.04] [-0.50] [0.99] [-0.33] 
 
 
2004 0.097 0.081 0.054 0.034 0.035 
 
 
    [0.65] [1.78]* [1.45] [1.54] 
 
 
2005 0.121 0.070 0.082 0.068 0.037 
 
 
    [1.94]* [1.49] [2.96]*** [1.62] 
 
 
2006 0.073 0.065 0.062 0.029 0.002 
 
 
    [0.36] [0.53] [1.37] [0.12] 
 
 
2007 0.087 0.066 0.048 0.037 0.031 
 
 
    [0.86] [1.78]* [1.72]* [1.50] 
 
 
2008 0.045 0.045 0.024 0.017 0.013 
 
 
    [-0.01] [1.44] [1.02] [0.91] 
 
 
2009 0.026 0.037 0.048 0.006 -0.023 
 
 
    [-0.79] [-1.40] [0.41] [-1.48] 
 
 
2010 0.029 0.044 0.030 -0.002 -0.002 
 
 
    [-1.02] [-0.08] [-0.10] [-0.14] 
 
   
Multi-homeowner? 0.246 0.262 
 
    
[19.83]*** [18.04]*** 
 
   
Age Indicators? Y Y 
 
   
N 5739 6149 
 
   
R-Squared 0.183 0.202 
 
   
People 633 675 
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Table 2.6: Robustness 
We report the regression-adjusted differences in the annual intensity of a second home purchase or swap-up, where we pool together intensities every other 
year in our sample, as in equations (2) through (4).  Column 1 compares the intensity of securitization agents versus equity analysts among the sample of 
people who work at common firms, and includes firm effects.  Columns 2-3 report differences where we condition the sample to homeowners in the New 
York City area.  Columns 4-5 report differences where the sample is conditioned to homeowners in the Southern California.  Columns 6 and 7 report 
difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of securitization agents minus equity analysts in Southern California minus New York City.  Columns 8 
and 9 report differences between securitization agents in Southern California and New York.  Standard errors clustered at the person level are reported 
below in brackets. */**/*** represents statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	    
  
Firm Effects NYC Homeowners S.CA Homeowners Diff in Diff, S.CA-NYC Within Securitization 
  
Sctzn. 
Minus Securitization minus: Securitization minus: Sctzn-Eq.Analysts, β(s(t)) S.CA minus NYC 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Year 
Equity 
Analysts 
Equity 
Analysts Lawyers 
Equity 
Analysts Lawyers 
Second 
Home or 
Swap Up 
Second 
Home Only 
Second 
Home or 
Swap Up 
Second 
Home Only 
 
2000-2001 0.006 0.010 -0.016 0.067 0.001 0.017 -0.082 0.055 -0.014 
 
  [0.22] [0.39] [-0.61] [0.73] [0.02] [0.17] [-0.91] [1.13] [-0.49] 
 
2002-2003 0.092 0.051 -0.021 0.043 0.024 -0.160 -0.109 0.059 0.060 
 
  [2.81]*** [1.78]* [-0.64] [0.35] [0.39] [-1.02] [-0.89] [0.88] [0.89] 
 
2004-2005 0.025 0.055 0.019 0.218 0.056 0.113 0.103 0.067 0.084 
 
  [0.76] [2.04]** [0.64] [4.15]*** [1.30] [2.03]** [2.16]** [1.54] [2.09]** 
 
2006-2007 0.086 0.019 -0.004 0.006 -0.039 -0.076 -0.047 -0.008 -0.002 
 
  [2.46]** [0.74] [-0.14] [0.10] [-0.93] [-1.07] [-0.69] [-0.24] [-0.07] 
 
2008-2009 0.034 0.013 -0.017 0.079 -0.103 0.051 0.034 -0.025 -0.016 
 
  [1.47] [0.70] [-0.69] [1.62] [-2.38]** [1.20] [1.04] [-0.79] [-0.59] 
 
2010 0.007 -0.040 -0.049 0.026 -0.044 0.126 0.098 0.041 0.042 
 
  [0.25] [-1.94]* [-1.76]* [0.26] [-0.86] [2.25]** [1.97]* [0.94] [0.94] 
Multi-HO? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Age Indicators? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm Effects? Y N N N N N N N N 
N 1876 1868 1478 373 581 2183 2183 999 999 
R-Squared 0.179 0.122 0.174 0.215 0.280 0.149 0.098 0.191 0.119 
People 214 234 179 52 74 279 279 130 130 
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Table 2.7: Performance Index 
Panel A presents summary statistics for the performance index exercise.  Averages per person are reported while 
standard deviations are reported below in parentheses.  Dollar amounts are in nominal thousands.  Panel B 
reports average performance and regression-adjusted differences in performance weighted by the initial portfolio 
value.  Regression-adjusted differences are the coefficient on an indicator for the securitization group in a 
person-level cross-sectional regression of the dependent variable indicated in first column of the row on a 
securitization group indicator and indicators for age controls, with samplings weights equal to the initial 
portfolio value and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors reported in brackets.  */**/*** denotes statistically 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
       Panel A: Summary Statistics 
 
Securitization Equity Analysts Lawyers 
 
2000q1 2010q4 2000q1 2010q4 2000q1 2010q4 
Number of properties per person 0.603 1.020 0.590 0.993 0.652 1.095 
  (0.693) (0.766) (0.799) (0.809) (0.727) (0.817) 
Value of properties 236.8 751.2 308.2 992.2 191.1 522.6 
  (390.2) (893.8) (568.7) (1210.1) (282.0) (522.4) 
Cash account 848.0 689.2 1159.7 988.0 470.3 375.1 
  (874.7) (975.4) (1090.6) (1005.6) (461.9) (529.5) 
Portfolio value 1084.8 1440.4 1467.9 1980.2 661.4 897.7 
  (1035.9) (1586.0) (1214.1) (1661.3) (548.9) (829.1) 
Housing portfolio weight 0.256 0.542 0.245 0.506 0.322 0.599 
  (0.316) (0.314) (0.327) (0.335) (0.345) (0.291) 
Number of people 400 400 400 
 
Panel B: Performance, 2000q1-2010q4 
 Means and Std. Devs. 
Reg.Adj. Differences 
 
Sctzn. minus: 
  Sctzn. 
Equity 
Analysts Lawyers 
Equity 
Analysts Lawyers 
Return 0.328 0.349 0.357 -0.045 -0.027 
  (0.197) (0.169) (0.221) [-2.63]*** [-1.08] 
Buy-and-hold return 0.366 0.369 0.377 -0.017 -0.008 
  (0.120) (0.116) (0.140) [-1.72]* [-0.75] 
Performance index -0.0378 -0.0199 -0.0198 -0.027 -0.018 
  (0.147) (0.113) (0.145) [-2.19]** [-1.02] 
Return, 2006q4-2010q4 -0.0736 -0.0457 -0.0814 -0.022 0.004 
  (0.108) (0.0936) (0.115) [-2.68]*** [0.44] 
N 400 400 400 766 770 
R-squared on perf. index       0.033 0.034 
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Table 2.8: Within-Securitization Performance Index 
This table reports average performance and regression-adjusted differences in performance within subgroups 
of the securitization sample, weighted by the initial portfolio value.  Regression-adjusted differences are the 
coefficient on an indicator for the securitization group in a person-level cross-sectional regression of the 
dependent variable indicated in first column of the row on a securitization group indicator and indicators for 
age controls, with samplings weights equal to the initial portfolio value and heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors reported in brackets.  */**/*** denotes statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Sell-side vs. Buy-side 
 
Means and SDs 
Reg.Adj 
Diff. 
  Sell-side Buy-side Sell-Buy 
Return 0.275 0.361 -0.092 
  (0.184) (0.198) [-3.01]*** 
Buy-and-hold return 0.347 0.377 -0.031 
  (0.118) (0.120) [-2.17]** 
Performance index -0.0727 -0.0162 -0.060 
  (0.168) (0.127) [-2.44]** 
Return, 2006q4-2010q4 -0.0985 -0.0583 -0.039 
  (0.118) (0.0990) [-2.95]*** 
N 161 239 379 
R-squared on perf. index     0.080 
    Panel B: Worst and Best Performing Firms 
 
Means and Std. Devs. 
Reg.Adj 
Diff. 
  Worst Best Worst-Best 
Return 0.269 0.337 -0.057 
  (0.159) (0.193) [-1.76]* 
Buy-and-hold return 0.347 0.350 0.011 
  (0.135) (0.103) [0.49] 
Performance index -0.0783 -0.0134 -0.068 
  (0.158) (0.138) [-2.29]** 
Return, 2006q4-2010q4 -0.0957 -0.0619 -0.043 
  (0.0977) (0.102) [-2.61]*** 
N 103 77 174 
R-squared on perf. index     0.102 
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Table 2.9: Value-to-Income 
This table presents average value-to-income (VTI) at purchase in three periods for each group.  We 
first average VTI from purchases observed within each person-period before averaging across people 
to obtain an average VTI per purchaser for each period.  Row A tests whether the boom minus pre-
boom difference in averages was zero by projecting person-level income onto an indicator for the 
boom period in a two-period panel of person-level income.  Row B tests whether the difference in 
difference is significant across groups.  Standard errors are clustered at the person level.  */**/*** 
denotes significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
       
     
   
Sctzn. 
Equity 
Analysts Lawyers 
 
 
Pre-Boom period Mean 3.2 2.9 2.9 
 
 
(2000-2003) Median 3.1 2.7 2.5 
 
  
SD 1.3 1.5 1.2 
 
  
People 65 60 49 
 
 
Boom period Mean 3.4 3.1 3.3 
 
 
(2004-2006) Median 3.0 2.8 3.2 
 
  
SD 2.0 1.7 1.7 
 
  
People 73 45 46 
 
 
Bust period Mean 3.1 3.1 2.8 
 
 
(2007-2010) Median 3.0 3.1 2.8 
 
  
SD 1.2 1.4 1.3 
 
 
  People 55 51 40 
 
 
A) Boom-PreBoom Point Est. 0.268 0.175 0.400 
 
  
t-stat [0.94] [0.57] [1.37] 
 
  
N 138 105 95 
 
  
R2 0.006 0.003 0.019 
 
 
B) DID Point Est.   0.093 -0.132 
 
 
Sctzn. minus t-stat   [0.22] [-0.32] 
 
 
Control N   243 233 
 
 
  R2   0.015 0.015 
  
CHAPTER III
Ultimate ownership and bank competition
Jose´ Azar Sahil Raina Martin Schmalz
IESE Univ. of Michigan Univ. of Michigan
Abstract
We use a uniquely extensive branch-level dataset on deposit account interest rates,
maintenance fees, and fee thresholds, and document substantial time-series and cross-
sectional variation in these prices. We then examine whether variation in bank concen-
tration helps explain the variation in prices. The standard measure of concentration,
the HHI, is not correlated with any of the outcome variables. We then construct a
generalized HHI (GHHI) that captures both common ownership (the degree to which
banks are commonly owned by the same investors) and cross-ownership (the extent
to which banks own shares in each other). The GHHI is strongly correlated with all
prices. We use the growth of index funds as an arguably exogenous source of cross-
sectional variation of county-level common ownership to suggest a causal link from
the GHHI to higher prices for banking products.
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3.1 Introduction
Many fees for banking deposit services and the deposit thresholds to avoid the
fees are at historic highs (Figure C.1). Of course, many factors contribute to changes
over time. But those fees, their avoidance thresholds, and the interest rates paid on
the related accounts also vary substantially in the cross section. For example, even in
the low-interest environment of 2013, CD rates vary by almost one percentage point
across US counties (Figure 3.1C). Do di↵erences in bank competition help explain the
variation in prices consumers pay for the privilege of storing their savings? In other
words, which measure(s) of bank concentration e↵ectively capture the price variation
in this input market?
Measuring bank concentration and its consequences has been a primary interest of
financial economists for decades, because it is hugely important for many areas of eco-
nomics. For example, higher bank concentration (1) is related to increased barriers to
entry for firms and latent entrepreneurs – particularly for the poor and for minorities –
and can negatively a↵ect economic growth, (2) hamper the transmission of monetary
policy, (3) slow down the adoption of new technologies, (4) increase inequality and
crime, and (5) adversely a↵ect households, who receive lower rates on their savings
and pay more for consumer loans. The degree of bank competition can also a↵ect
(6) the fragility of the financial system, (7) the value of lending relationships, (8)
lending standards, (9) the propensity of lenders to foreclose on their borrowers, and
(10) the allocation of labor to its most productive use.1 For all these applications,
it is crucial to understand the economic forces governing bank competition and to
1(1) Black and Strahan (2002); Collender and Sha↵er (2003); Beck et al. (2004); Cetorelli (2004);
Cetorelli and Strahan (2006); Kerr and Nanda (2009); Canales and Nanda (2012); Chatterji and
Seamans (2012); Love and Per´ıa (2014), (2) Hannan and Berger (1991); Neumark and Sharpe (1992);
Drechsler et al. (2014); Scharfstein and Sunderam (2014), (3) Allen et al. (2009), (4) Garmaise and
Moskowitz (2006); Beck et al. (2010), (5) Kahn et al. (1999, 2005), Ce´le´rier and Matray (2014), and
others (reviewed below), (6) Beck et al. (2006); Beck (2008); Berger et al. (2009); Martinez-Miera
and Repullo (2010); Hakenes and Schnabel (2011); Anginer et al. (2013); Beck et al. (2013); Egan
et al. (2014), (7) Petersen and Rajan (1995); Simkovic (2013), (8) Ruckes (2004), (9) Favara and
Giannetti (2015); Gormley et al. (2015), (10) Bai et al. (2015).
94
find e↵ective ways to measure them. However, because of data limitations and the
use of conceptually incomplete measures of concentration, our understanding of bank
competition remains uncomfortably limited, as the present study helps illustrate.
This paper contributes to the literature (i) new facts from a uniquely extensive
branch-level panel data set on various prices of bank deposit products, (ii) the com-
putation of a more general and conceptually complete, more realistic, and empirically
more e↵ective measure of bank concentration: the generalized Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index of market concentration (GHHI), (iii) first evidence that common ownership and
cross-ownership increase monopsony power, and (iv) a new source of cross-sectional
variation of ownership structures (and hence market concentration as measured by
the GHHI): index fund growth.
We find that (i) fees and thresholds have increased markedly over the last decade,
and exhibit large cross-sectional variation. In particular, prices of deposit products
are higher in California, New York, and New Jersey than in the midwest (e.g., Kansas
or Nebraska). This is perhaps surprising, given that there are a lot more banks in
New York, and HHI is lower, than in the Midwest (Figure 3.2A). Indeed, we also find
that (ii) changes in the HHI do not correlate with changes in either fees, thresholds,
or deposit spreads.
One reason why the HHI fails to reliably explain variation in prices is that it
assumes that every bank is owned by individuals that hold no stakes in other banks. In
other words, HHI ignores the very high and increasing degree of overlapping ownership
between banks, illustrated in Table 3.1. The same four institutional investors are
among the top 5 shareholders of the nation’s five largest banks. The fifth important
player is Berkshire Hathaway, which ranks among the top five shareholders of three
of the top six banks. In addition to such common ownership links, there are cross-
ownership links: many banks have asset management divisions that are shareholders
of competitor banks. As a consequence, banking is an industry in which an e↵ective
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concentration measure has to jointly take into account common ownership and cross-
ownership.
We provide such a measure: the GHHI. The GHHI is a generalization of the MHHI
of O’Brien and Salop (2000) that accounts not just for common ownership but also for
cross-ownership.2 The market-level GHHI as of 2013 is more than 2,500 points higher
than the HHI (Figure 3.6B); we call this di↵erence “GHHI delta”. This magnitude
compares to regulatory thresholds for merger review of 200 HHI points. Given the
large common ownership concentration (GHHI delta), and given the negative corre-
lation between HHI and GHHI delta, it is not surprising that omitting GHHI delta
leads to a severe downward bias when estimating the e↵ect of concentration on prices
with existing measures (HHI).
By contrast to the HHI, GHHI is strongly and reliably correlated with all fees and
thresholds. Indeed, GHHI levels are higher in the high-price areas on the coasts, com-
pared to the middle of America (Figure 3.2B), and changes over time in market-level
GHHIs correlate with local price changes. These findings indicate that (iii) deposi-
tory institutions’ monopsony power, generated through common ownership and cross-
ownership links, has a strong correlation with prices in one of their input markets:
the market for deposits.
As a final contribution, (iv) we use variation from the growth of index funds (as
opposed to actively chosen portfolios) to suggest a causal relationship between GHHI-
based concentration and prices using two methods. Doings so attenuates several
endogeneity concerns present in the panel regression analysis above, including the
reverse causality concern that “active” investors choose their portfolios in response
2Brito et al. (2015) also develop an index that generalizes MHHI to allow for simulateneous
common ownership and cross-ownership (i.e., partial ownership by competitors). The main di↵erence
between our and Brito et al. (2015)’s derivation is that “our” GHHI has the appealing property that
the ultimate control shares add up to 100%; see Appendix E. The generalization from MHHI to
GHHI is important: there are 656 counties (out of about 3000 counties in the contiguous US) where
the di↵erence between MHHI and GHHI is greater than 100 HHI points, and 231 counties where the
di↵erence is greater than 200 HHI points.
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to expected deposit prices. First, we directly instrument our GHHI measure using
county-level index fund ownership of banks and find that index fund growth-induced
variation in the GHHI is strongly correlated with higher fees, thresholds, and deposit
spreads. Under the assumption that aggregate index fund growth is not primarily
caused by across-county variation in banking market outcomes, this finding indicates
that index fund growth causes higher prices for banking products.
To mitigate the concern implied by the identifying assumption of the instrumental
variable analysis described above, we complement it with a di↵erence-in-di↵erences
(DiD) analysis. Specifically, we show that deposit prices in 2013 can be predicted us-
ing only information about county-level industrial organization of banks, the banks’
ownership, and prices from ten years before. The reason is that higher common own-
ership in 2003 predicts greater increases in common ownership, which in turn predicts
greater price changes over the next decade. We mitigate remaining endogeneity con-
cerns by showing that similar results obtain when we use only variation from changes
over time in within-bank variation across counties in the prices they charge.3 As
long as index fund ownership in a given county in 2003 is not determined by price
changes a decade in the future over and above what is reflected in the market value of
the bank holding companies or any other characteristic of the bank holding company,
these findings imply that greater levels of common ownership cause higher prices for
deposit products.
Given these findings, the question arises which corporate governance mechanism
implements these outcomes. The first thing to note is that the fact that concentrated
ownership is related to higher prices for banking products need not be driven by
collusion, i.e., coordinated price setting between banks. Mutual funds’ unrecorded
“engagement” meetings with their various portfolio firms could in principle be used as
3Within-bank variation exists for large banks, but is limited for fees and thresholds (as opposed
to rates) As a result, statistical significance of the fee and threshold results is reduced when we use
only within-bank variation over time.
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such a coordination device; see Azar et al. (2015) for a more comprehensive discussion
and literature review. But overlapping ownership interests can cause anti-competitive
e↵ects even in a world of competition, in which each firm independently maximizes its
shareholders’ economic interests – their portfolio profits (O’Brien and Salop, 2000).
Such a model is a simple generalization of the traditional Cournot model, which
assumes that shareholders’ portfolios contain only a single stock; the generalization
allows for any portfolio composition. Moreover, Azar (2012) shows that the O’Brien
and Salop (2000) equilibrium can be microfounded as the outcome of the battle for
corporate control, in which potential managers strive to earn the votes of the industry
firms’ shareholders. Managers who–through either conscious calculation, intuition, or
pure luck–propose broad strategic plans that correctly represent shareholder interests
will tend to be selected to run the firms, and managers that fail to propose such
strategic plans will tend to be selected out.4
Thus, rather than actively encouraging or facilitating collusion, it is possible that
the large, diversified mutual funds let portfolio firm managers live a “quiet life” with
high margins and low competition (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). This problem
becomes more severe when index funds can outvote smaller undiversified activist
investors that would otherwise push firms to compete harder (Aslan and Kumar,
2015). Indeed, Ackman (2016) expects that the crowding out of activists by index
funds will lead to keiretsu-style corporate governance failures in the US.
In sum, the outcomes we document can be implemented either by active involve-
ment in corporate governance on behalf of the mutual fund companies, or, more
simply, by the index funds’ failure to push firms to compete hard and prevention of
activist campaigns that would pursue that goal.
The most direct policy implication of our findings is that bank regulators should
consider taking ownership structures into account when measuring bank concentra-
4See Schmalz (2015) for a case study where index funds voted against an activist campaign that
arguably would have strengthened product market competition.
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tion. A failure to do so may lead to “hidden” increases in bank concentration through
partial common- and cross-ownership links that can cause adverse e↵ects on bank
competition and the economy at large that go undetected when using the HHI.
Common ownership has been shown to increase monopoly power in a di↵erent
industry and using di↵erent techniques (Azar et al., 2015). The fact that anti-
competitive e↵ects of concentrated ownership appear to increase market power in
more than one industry, and that the finding is robust to multiple identification
strategies justifies that antitrust agencies now devote more resources to investigating
the role of a small set of large asset management companies in firms’ competitive
behavior.
Let us give some perspective on these players. The largest asset manager, Black-
Rock, has $4.7trn assets under management, and is the largest shareholder of more
than a fifth of all American publicly traded firms. “Some have mistakenly assumed
that [these investors’] predominantly passive [investment] management style suggests
a passive attitude with respect to corporate governance. Nothing could be further
from the truth.” (Vanguard Chairman and CEO F. William McNabb)5 If this mis-
perception continues, further growth and consolidation of these multi-trillion-dollar
asset management firms as well as coordination between them with respect to their
corporate governance activities (Foley and McLannahan, 2016) could lead to further
gradual erosion of competition across the entire economy, with adverse consequences
for consumer welfare, economic e ciency, macroeconomic output, and inequality.
Elhauge (2016) discusses some of these potential consequences as well as legal impli-
cations of our findings.
5February 27, 2015. https://about.vanguard.com/vanguard-proxy-
voting/CEO Letter 03 02 ext.pdf. See also: Carleton et al. (1998); Becht et al. (2007); Chen
et al. (2007); Appel et al. (forthcoming); McCahery et al. (forthcoming); Mullins (2014); Boone and
White (forthcoming); Dimson et al. (forthcoming).
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3.2 Data
In this section, we detail the data sources for our analysis, and then present the
first main result of the paper: the variation over time and across geographies of fees,
thresholds, and deposit interest rates and spreads.6
3.2.1 Data sources
We use three main sources of data: RateWatch, FDIC’s Summary of Deposits, and
Thomson Reuters’s SEC 13F filings database. RateWatch provides branch-level data
on rates and fees that we use as our outcome variables. FDIC’s Summary of Deposits
supplies the branch-level deposits data used to calculate market share. Thomson
Reuters’s database of SEC 13F filings provides data on institutional ownership of
public banks, which we use, along with FDIC data, to construct the GHHI. We also
use Thomson Reuters’s SEC 13F database to measure index fund ownership over
time.
3.2.1.1 Data on banking product prices
RateWatch was established to provide their clients – the major US banks – with
information on competitors’ prices at the branch level. We use their data on fees,
fee thresholds, and deposit rates to examine the total price customers pay when
depositing savings. We have deposit fees data from over 3,000 banks and deposit
rates data from over 9,600 banks.
Our fees data are extensive. For example, in 2013, we have data on money market
maintenance fees for at least one branch in the same county as 99.1% of the US pop-
ulation. Overall, we have over 4.5 million fee amount and fee threshold observations
6Motivated by theory (detailed in the next section), we define deposit rate spreads as the di↵erence
between the ten-year treasury rate and the respective deposit interest rate, normalized by the ten-
year treasury rate. This expression most closely corresponds to the theoretical equivalent for margins,
and is also more stable over time than spreads in levels.
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for both money market and interest-bearing checking accounts.
Our interest rates data coverage is even more extensive than the fees data. For
12-month CDs, in 2013, we have interest rates from at least one branch in the same
county as 99.9% of the US population. Overall, for each deposit rate that we explore,
we have over 60 million observations.
3.2.1.2 FDIC Summary of Deposits
We use FDIC’s Summary of Deposits (SoD) to calculate market share for banks.
SoD is based on an annual survey of deposits completed by all FDIC-insured bank
branches. SoD is a standard source for measuring bank product market concentration
in the extant literature (e.g., Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006; Drechsler et al., 2014).
3.2.1.3 Thomson Reuters SEC 13F data
All institutions that “exercise investment discretion over $100 million or more”
must file a Form 13F every quarter with the SEC that provides information on their
holdings of US firms’ equity. We use the Thomson Reuters collection of this data for
two purposes. First, we use it to calculate GHHI indices, our generalized measure of
market concentration, for local banking markets. Second, we use it to identify five of
the largest index fund groups – iShares, Vanguard, SPDR, Invesco, and Fidelity Spar-
tan. We use their growth as an instrument for exogenous changes in the ownership
structure of banks.
3.2.2 Description of fees, fee thresholds, and rates
We begin with a description of the cross-sectional variation in interest-bearing
checking and money market account maintenance fees that banks charge their cus-
tomers. Figure 3.1A shows that money market account fees are higher in areas which
feature more banks, such as the coastal areas, and in particular the Northeast. These
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fees range from under $8 to $25. Similarly, Figure 3.1B shows considerable geographic
variation in money market account maintenance fee thresholds in 2013, going as high
as $15,000 in some counties and as low as $50 in others. There is similar geographic
variation in money market account fees and thresholds holds in other years and in
interest-bearing checking accounts as well.
Figures 3.3A and B present the annual median, 20th, and 80th percentile county
average maintenance fees for money market and interest-bearing checking accounts,
respectively. These figures confirm that the annual distributions of fees for the two
deposit products have considerable variation across counties. Similarly, Figures 3.4A
and B present the annual 20th, 50th, and 80th percentile county average maintenance
fee thresholds for money market and interest-bearing checking accounts.7 Again, we
see that there is considerable variation in thresholds across counties within each year.8
For the analyses of fees and fee thresholds, we take the annual mean of survey
responses for each outcome variable for each branch and then winsorize the right side
of the distribution at the 1% level to reduce the impact of suspected data errors.9
In our analysis on interest rates, we use deposit rates for CDs with 12-, 24-, and
36-month terms, money market accounts, and interest-bearing checking accounts. We
begin by describing their cross-sectional variation. In Figures 3.1C and D, we present
a map of the average interest rates in each county in 2013 for 12-month CDs and
money market accounts, respectively. The variation is substantial, despite the low
interest rate environment. Rates are somewhat higher in the central regions of the
7The figures discussed in this paragraph present data in constant 2013 USD, adjusted for inflation
using CPI.
8The threshold dispersion in 2002 appears smaller than in other years, but, in proportion to
the mean maintenance fee thresholds in that year, the variation in 2002 is similar to other years.
Additionally, there is less data on thresholds in 2002 than later years. We do not use 2002 in our
regression analyses.
9Some reported fees for some branches within some banks appear to be typos. For example, a
bank reported charging a $213 maintenance fee for certain accounts in some geographies, whereas
most other branches of the same bank charged $13. Such outliers are not part of the data we use.
Unrelated, note the aggregation of responses at the annual level within branches is the reason for
the smaller sample size reported in our analyses.
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US than in coastal regions, with rates ranging from 0.8% for 12-month CDs and 0.5%
for money market accounts in some counties to close to 0% for both types of deposit
accounts in other counties. There is similar geographic variation in rates for other
years in 12-month CDs and money market accounts and in 24- and 36-month CDs
and interest-bearing checking accounts as well. In sum, perhaps surprisingly, banks
are able to charge higher spreads in the banking markets that feature more natural
competitors, such as the east coast and California, than in the markets that feature
fewer competitors, such as the midwest.
Figures 3.5A, B, and C plot quarterly median, 20th percentile, and 80th percentile
county-level average interest rates for 12-month CDs, money market accounts, and
interest-bearing checking accounts, respectively. We observe cross-sectional dispersion
in the interest rates for all three products, although there is less dispersion in the 12-
month CD rates. As these figures show, the distribution of interest rates and their
spread margins expands and contracts enormously over time as interest rates increase
or decrease with the business cycle. This can be problematic, for example, because
a bank with relatively low rates during a period of high interest rates would see a
smaller drop in rates as the overall level of interest rates decline, relative to a bank
with higher initial rates, simply because there is less room for its rates to fall. To
avoid this “accordion” econometric problem, we run our analyses for interest rates on
the within-year ranking of interest rate spread margins
We prepare the interest rates data for analysis by, first, calculating the di↵erence
between the 10-year Treasury Constant Maturity average rate for each month and our
deposit interest rates as a fraction of the Treasury rate. Next, like for the fees analyses,
we take annual means of the reported interest rate spread margins for each branch
in the data. After that, we symmetrically winsorize the data at the 2% level. This
helps reduce the impact of outliers on our analyses. Finally, we take the within-year
percentiles of these rate spread margins to minimize problems tied to the “accordion”
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problem discussed above.
3.2.3 Banking market concentration
In this paper, we take ownership into account by measuring bank concentration
using GHHI, our generalized measure of bank concentration.10 Figures 3.2A and B
present the geographic dispersion of the HHI and GHHI measures of bank concentra-
tion in 2013, respectively. Based on the maps, we observe that considering ownership
significantly increases county-level banking concentration. This impact is especially
clear on the coasts, particularly the New York City and DC metropolitan areas and
California.
Figure 3.7 shows the cross-sectional distribution and the growth of county-level
ownership-based concentration (GHHI delta) from 2002 to 2013. As most of the
points are above the 45-degree line, ownership-based concentration increased in most
counties from 2002 to 2013. The figure also shows that there are many counties in 2002
with high ownership-based concentration in 2002 and 2013, implying that ownership
adds to county-level banking concentration not just in 2013 but in all years.
3.3 Hypothesis development and basic research design
3.3.1 HHI versus generalized (G)HHI
This paper tests two alternative concentration measures for their e↵ectiveness in
capturing di↵erences across markets and over time in the competitiveness of the local
banking sector. The standard measure, used by regulators and researchers alike, is
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of market concentration, which is simply the
10The economic reasoning for considering ownership when measuring concentration is presented
in Section 3.3.
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sum across firms j of market shares squared,
HHI =
X
j
s2j . (3.1)
This measure of market concentration is meaningful if each firm maximizes its own
profits, i.e., each firm acts in the financial interest of an investor who has no wealth
invested in other firms in the industry (or several investors with such undiversified
portfolios). Under that assumption, if firms compete a` la Cournot,11 markups
P C0j(xj)
P
in a given market will be proportional to the market’s HHI,
⌘
X
j
sj
P   C 0j(xj)
P
= HHI =
X
j
s2j . (3.2)
A corresponding empirical prediction is that markets with high HHI should have
higher prices. This prediction assumes that marginal cost is constant across markets.
This relatively strong assumption can be weakened by instead correlating changes
over time in the HHI with changes in prices. A regression in changes captures the
above prediction under the weaker assumption that within a market, marginal costs
don’t change over time, whereas marginal costs are allowed to di↵er across markets
in ways that are correlated with firm’s entry and exit decisions. Adding time fixed
e↵ects also allows for changes in marginal costs over time if they are similar across
markets. These are the standard regressions the literature has examined.
As reviewed in Section 3.7, existing work finds mixed results on the correlation
between the HHI and prices, especially for regressions in changes. One possible in-
terpretation of a missing link between changes in the HHI and changes in prices is
that changes in the HHI are accompanied not only by increases in market power, but
11Note however that the HHI as a measure of concentration is also applicable in contexts other
than Cournot competition. See for example, Moresi et al. (2008).
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also by decreases in marginal costs, i.e., e ciency gains. Or perhaps deposit markets
simply are not local and do not vary at the county level.
An alternative interpretation of the tenuous link between prices and the HHI is
that the regression model corresponding to Equation 3.2 does not fully reflect the eco-
nomic forces shaping bank competition. We show below that making counterfactual
assumptions about ownership leads to such a mismeasurement of economic forces,
and leads to an omitted variable bias in the empirical implementation that can lead
to a false negative in these regressions.
Specifically, one way in which the HHI model is inconsistent with factual reality
is that it assumes that each bank is controlled by undiversified investors who do not
own stakes in competitors. We have shown that assumption to be factually wrong in
Table 3.1A. A generalized version of the HHI, the GHHI, can adjust the HHI model
to reflect these realities.
Similar to the HHI, the GHHI can be derived from a Cournot game between
competitors. Also, the assumption that the firm acts in its shareholders’ interests is
maintained, i.e., does not change relative to the HHI model. The only di↵erence is that
the generalized approach does not restrict the competitors to have only undiversified
controlling shareholders; instead, any shareholder structure is allowed. In particular,
the GHHI allows for simultaneous common ownership and cross-ownership as well.
This is an important generalization of existing concentration measures especially for
measuring bank concentration. The reason is that many large banks have large asset
management divisions, which are major owners of other banks. We explain this point
in more detail below.
Allowing for general ownership structures implies that shareholder unanimity may
fail. That is, the interests of investors with di↵erent portfolios may di↵er. An as-
sumption has to be made how such conflicts are resolved. We follow O’Brien and
Salop (2000) in assuming that each firm maximizes the weighted average of its share-
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holders economic interests. Denoting shareholder i’s share of control rights in firm j
as  ij and her share of cash flow rights in firm k as  ik, firm j’s objective function is
assumed to be
max
xj
⇧j =
MX
i=1
 ij
NX
k=1
 ik⇡k, (3.3)
where ⇡k are firm k’s profits,  ik is the ultimate financial interest of shareholder i in
firm k, and  ik is the ultimate control share of shareholder i in firm k. Thus,  ik⇡k
are shareholder i’s portfolio profits.
That is, we assume that firms primarily focus on the economic incentives of those
shareholders with the most control rights in the firm. The outcome is that the firm
will put weight not only on its own profits but also on the profits of its competitors – to
the extent that its most powerful shareholders also have stakes in those competitors.
Indeed, the firm’s objective function (3.3) is proportional to
⇡j +
X
k 6=j
P
i  ij ikP
i  ij ij
⇡k. (3.4)
That is, under common ownership, firm j will not compete quite so hard with
more commonly owned competitors as it does with competitors that are not part of
firm j’s largest owners’ portfolios, because any increase in own profits would come
at the expense of that commonly owned competitor; such a product market strategy
would not be in the largest investors’ interests. In other words, the assumption is
that firms internalize the externalities that come from aggressive product market
behavior that they impose on competitors, to an extent that is proportional to the
degree to which these competitors are owned by their largest shareholders. Note that
the maximization problem in the traditional HHI model is a special case of the one
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presented here.
If firms represent their (potentially diversified) investors’ economic interests and
compete a` la Cournot, the prediction ensues that markups are proportional to the
GHHI index,
⌘
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sj
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i  ij ij
. (3.5)
As a result, the same regressions as in the traditional literature can be run, with
the only change that the HHI index is replaced with its generalized version, the GHHI.
In particular, we can examine if changes of ownership and control (e.g. because of
Berkshire Hathaway’s acquisition of a multi-billion dollar stake in Bank of America’s
cash flows in addition to the top ownership and control of Wells Fargo, or because
of index fund growth) are related to price changes. The main empirical question this
paper addresses is which one of these alternative indexes, the HHI or the GHHI, is
better able to capture variation in prices of banking products.
3.3.2 Ultimate ownership
A complication arises in the construction of the GHHI in the banking industry.
Banks often have asset management divisions, which own substantial stakes in other
banks. As a result, many banks are both competitors and non-trivial owners of other
banks. In addition, “pure” asset management firms such as BlackRock or Vanguard
typically own large stakes in several banks. Hence, the ownership structure combines
cross-ownership and common ownership. Existing modified measures of market con-
centration, such as the MHHI by O’Brien and Salop (2000), cannot be applied directly
to this situation. We use a more general index that solves for ultimate ownership, and
can simultaneously account for general patterns cross-ownership and common own-
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ership. We describe the construction of this general index of market concentration
in Appendix B. When ultimate ownership is the same as direct ownership (as is the
case in the study of airline competition, Azar et al. (2015)) the MHHI and the GHHI
are the same.
3.3.3 Empirical methodology: panel regressions
To examine the question whether the HHI or the GHHI better captures variation
in prices of banking products, we start by examining simple correlations between the
two concentration measures and banking prices. The panel regressions we run are of
the form
Rijbt =   · Concentration Indexit + ✓ ·Xit + ⇠ ·Qbt + ⌫j + ⇣t + "ijbt, (3.6)
where Rijbt is an outcome variable (various fees, fee thresholds, and deposit interest
rate spreads) assessed by branch j of bank b in county i in period t. Concentration
Indexit is alternatively the HHIit or GHHIit. As controls Xit, we include market char-
acteristics such as log median household income and log population. Qbt is the market
capitalization of each bank. ⌫j and ⇣t are branch and year fixed e↵ects, respectively.
The motivation for market-level controls such as household income and population is
to account for di↵erences in the demand for deposit products across markets. Banks’
market capitalization is included in regressions as a proxy for di↵erences across banks
in the level and and changes over time in variable costs. We include branch fixed
e↵ects to capture di↵ering levels of service, product o↵erings, etc. that might oth-
erwise bias our estimate of  . In our regressions, we estimate the coe cient   not
from cross-sectional variation across markets alone, but from changes over time in
the cross-sectional di↵erences between markets. We run our panel regressions on all
branches in RateWatch from 2003 to 2013 and cluster standard errors at the county
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level as there may be a shared component in the variation of data across branches in
a given county.12
3.3.4 Empirical hypotheses
The key question we examine in the following section is whether the HHI or the
GHHI are more robustly linked to various prices of banking deposit products. Because
the only di↵erence between the HHI and the GHHI is taking ownership structures
into account, this question can be restated equivalently as whether ownership of banks
matters empirically in important ways or not.
There are several reasons why the anti-competitive incentives arising from common-
and cross-ownership might not get implemented: for example, agency conflicts be-
tween shareholders and management, informational frictions, or fear of antitrust back-
lash on behalf of the investors. Corresponding to the idea that these frictions over-
whelm any anti-competitive incentives from overlapping ownership, our null hypoth-
esis is that partial ownership links are irrelevant for economic outcomes. In that case,
the HHI and the GHHI should be equally e↵ective at capturing variation in prices.
(Recall that the HHI is the special case of the GHHI in which common ownership
links are irrelevant.)
H0: The HHI and the GHHI are equally e↵ective at capturing variation in prices.
On the other hand, if firms (here: banks) indeed act in their most important
shareholders’ economic interests, i.e., if economic incentives matter for economic out-
comes, the following alternative hypothesis should find support in the data.
H1: The GHHI is a better predictor of prices of banking products than the HHI.
12We do not two-way cluster our standard errors using counties and years because our panel is
not long enough to justify clustering errors within years.
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Formally, an important reason for the prediction that the GHHI is a stronger
predictor of prices than the HHI is a classic omitted variable problem. The HHI and
the di↵erence between the GHHI and the HHI, called GHHI delta, are negatively
correlated. The reason is that deposit markets such as New York City or many
areas of California feature a large number of banks (low HHI), but many of them are
commonly owned to a large degree (high GHHI delta), whereas banking markets in
the midwest often feature only a small number of banks (high HHI), but these banks
tend to be independently owned. (HHI-based merger regulation can contribute to
generating this pattern.) Whatever the cause for the negative correlation, omitting
the GHHI delta from the standard HHI regression (as specified in Equation 3.6)
hence leads to a downward bias of the coe cient on the HHI, E[ ˆHHI | X] =  HHI +
(X 0X) 1X 0( GHHI delta ·GHHI delta).
This section only laid out the basic research design using panel regressions. We
describe our strategies that examine causality in Sections 3.5 and 3.6 for our instru-
mental variable and di↵erence-in-di↵erences designs.
3.4 Panel regression results
In our panel regressions, we compare the relationship between changes in deposit
product prices and changes in the two alternative market concentration measures
defined in Section 3.3: the HHI and the GHHI. As dependent variables, we consider
fees, fee thresholds, and the (within-year) percentile ranking of interest rate spread
margins.
We measure interest rate spreads as the di↵erence between the 10-year Treasury
Constant Maturity rate and each interest rate, expressed as a percent of the 10-year
treasury yield.13 The reason for calculating percentage spreads is that we try to
13The results are similar when we use 1-year primary mortgage average rates from Freddie Mac
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proxy for margins, as given in Equations 3.2 and 3.5. Relatedly, the reason we look
at percentile rankings is to avoid the “accordion” econometric problem explained in
Section 3.2.
Overall, we find that the relationship between concentration and fee amounts and
thresholds is much stronger and more robust when concentration is measured using
the GHHI. Similarly, a GHHI-based estimation of the relationship between concen-
tration and CD rate spreads is a lot more e↵ective than an HHI-based estimation.
The sensitivity of rate spreads to changes in concentration is insignificant for both
the HHI and the GHHI only for checking account accounts, for which banks charge
higher fees and thresholds when concentration is higher. However, this non-result
could also be due to the “accordion” econometric problem explained above. Gen-
erally, we find a positive and, at times, statistically significant relationship between
within-year rate spread percentiles and the GHHI, suggesting that banks also adjust
rates to concentration (but perhaps not as much as fees).
We now turn to a detailed discussion of the results. In Table 3.3A, we regress
within-year CD interest rate spread margin percentiles on banking sector concentra-
tion for CDs with 12-, 24-, and 36-month maturities. the HHI has a small, positive,
and statistically insignificant correlation with interest rate spreads for all three types
of CDs, as shown in columns (1), (3), and (5). By contrast, we see in columns (2),
(4), and (6) that the GHHI consistently has a four- to eight-fold larger correlation
with rate spreads that is highly statistically significant for all three types of CDs.
In terms of economic magnitudes, a one-standard deviation increase in the GHHI is
associated with a 2.9 percentile point higher ranking in 12-month CD rate spreads, a
3.4 percentile point higher ranking in 24-month CD rate spreads, and a 3.5 percentile
point higher ranking in 36-month CD rate spreads for the average branch. Note,
however, that these are equilibrium correlations rather than causal e↵ects (which we
to calculate spread margins. Aside from 10-year and 1-year loan rates for normalization, we ran
specifications using raw average rates, also with similar results.
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discuss in later sections).
In Table 3.3B, we present the results of regressions with the prices of money mar-
ket accounts as the dependent variables. Columns (1) and (2) present maintenance
fee amount regressions against the HHI and the GHHI, respectively. Columns (3)
and (4) present maintenance fee threshold regressions. Columns (5) and (6) present
interest rate spread margin percentile regressions. In columns (1), (3), and (5), we
observe that concentration measured by the HHI has basically no statistically sig-
nificant correlation with money market account prices: there is a small, marginally
statistically significant relationship of the HHI with maintenance fees but all the other
prices are not correlated with the HHI at all (if anything, the other prices are nega-
tively correlated with the HHI). On the other hand, in columns (2), (4), and (6), we
see that GHHI-based concentration shows a highly statistically significant, positive
correlation with fee amounts, fee thresholds, and rate spreads. To get a sense of the
economic magnitude of the coe cients, note that a one-standard deviation increase
in the GHHI is associated with a $0.21 increase in maintenance fees (a 2.1% increase),
a $230 increase in maintenance fee thresholds (a 7.9% increase), and a 1.6 percentile
point higher ranking for the average branch’s money market account.
Finally, Table 3.3C shows the results of regressing interest-bearing checking ac-
count maintenance fee amount, maintenance fee threshold, and interest rate spread
on banking sector concentration. First, examining fee amounts (column (1)) and
thresholds (column (3)) we find that the HHI has no statistically significant corre-
lation with fee amounts and thresholds. However, when we measure concentration
using the GHHI (columns (2) and (4), respectively), we see a large, highly statistically
significant, positive correlation of concentration with both dependent variables. For
interest rate spreads, we find in column (5), that the HHI has, against the standard
HHI model’s prediction, a highly statistically significant negative relationship with
interest rate spread margin percentiles. On the other hand, the GHHI has a posi-
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tive but statistically insignificant relationship with rate spreads (column (6)). Again,
looking at economic magnitudes of these correlations, we find that a one-standard de-
viation increase in the GHHI is associated with a $0.56 increase in maintenance fees
(a 4.6% increase) and a $408 increase in maintenance fee thresholds (a 9.5% increase)
for the average branch’s interest-bearing checking account.
To summarize, the panel regressions provide supportive evidence for the hypothe-
sis that banking concentration as measured by the GHHI more robustly explains the
variation in prices of banking products than the HHI.14 This is true for maintenance
fees, maintenance fee thresholds, and CD and money market account interest rate
spreads as outcome variables. There does not seem to be a significant association be-
tween the GHHI and interest checking rate spreads. On the other hand, the HHI as a
measure of concentration shows inconsistent statistical significance and inconsistent
signs of the regression coe cient. Overall, the results reject the null hypothesis that
the HHI and the GHHI are equally e↵ective, and support the alternative hypothesis
that the GHHI is more e↵ective.
While many potentially omitted variables are di↵erenced out already in the results
presented above, reverse causality remains a potential concern. The results so far leave
open the possibility that investors predict banks’ profit margins, buy more stock in
those banks, and thus generate the link between the GHHI and prices we documented
above. To examine if that is indeed the main driver of the results, in the following
two sections, we use variation in the GHHI from “passive” index funds’ ownership
alone and thus address the question whether there is a causal link between the GHHI
and prices.
14The R2 for HHI versus GHHI regressions does not seem to di↵er in our tables because the co-
variates and fixed e↵ects di↵erentially absorb the variation remaining in our banking product prices,
masking any di↵erence in explanatory power. In unreported regressions where we first regress prices
on covariates and fixed e↵ects only and then regress the residuals from this first stage regression, we
find that the R2s for residual regressions against the GHHI are higher than for residual regressions
against the HHI.
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3.5 Instrumental Variables results using index fund owner-
ship
Thus far, we have documented new facts about variation in fees, fee thresholds,
and interest rates across markets and over time, and have shown the variation in
fees and fee thresholds to correlate far more strongly and reliably with the GHHI
than with the HHI. The GHHI also correlates strongly with CD and money market
account rates; the HHI does not. The di↵erence between the HHI and the GHHI
is common ownership concentration. This section addresses the question of whether
the association between concentration and prices is driven only by the endogenous
choice of active fund managers’ portfolios, or also by changes in ownership of investors
with passive investment strategies such as index funds. We use variation in prices
correlated with changes in causation caused by the latter source as evidence of the
causal e↵ect of concentration on banking product prices.
3.5.1 Using index fund ownership for variation in common ownership and
market concentration (GHHI)
To address the question of whether “passive” ownership of banks is related to
higher prices of banking products at the branch level, we use variation in index fund
ownership of banks. The idea for this research design is as follows. First, index funds’
ownership changes are not driven by fund managers predicting temporary changes
in margins in some banking markets versus others. As a result, reverse causality
stemming from active fund managers’ investment strategies that could be related
to branch-level prices should not be a concern for the results we obtain using this
strategy.15
15The reason that despite index funds’ “passive” portfolio choice, they nevertheless can have a
substantial impact on firm policies is that funds typically make their voting rights available to their
fund family’s central proxy voting o ce. These o ces also engage with their portfolio firms with the
aim of increasing the value of their portfolio firms. (Fund families’ revenues are typically a fraction
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Index fund ownership can cause cross-sectional di↵erences in the GHHI as follows.
Some banks are part of stock indices. Index funds’ ownership of these banks grows
when the overall fund size grows. Index funds grow when people invest their savings
in index funds or when the value of their aggregate holdings goes up. Neither depends
on the performance or pricing decisions of an individual bank, let alone bank branch.
Hence, to a first order, index fund growth is exogenous to pricing decisions. But
how does this cause cross-sectional shocks? Not all banks are part of an index –
indeed, there are many privately owned, not publicly traded, banks in our sample.
Those banks’ ownership structure does not change when index funds grow. And some
geographical areas have more banks that are part of an index than others to start
with. Index fund growth thus a↵ects the ownership structure of banks, and thus the
GHHI, di↵erentially in markets in which all players are publicly traded banks that
are part of an index than in markets mainly comprised of privately owned banks or of
publicly traded banks that are not part of major stock indices. Employing variation
in the GHHI arising from changes in index fund ownership of banks in each market
is the basic idea of our instrumental variable (IV) regression analysis.
3.5.2 Implementation
The IV regression analysis we implement is based on the specification presented in
Equation 3.6. The di↵erence is that we instrument the variation in the GHHI using
index fund ownership of banks in each market, which we measure as
Index Fund Ownershipit =
X
j
sijt ⇥ Pct. Owned by Top Index Fundsjt, (3.7)
of assets under management. Assets under management grow when the firms in the portfolio become
more valuable. Firms become more valuable when their profits increase.) In that sense, there is
no di↵erence between the anti-competitive threats from common ownership of index funds or from
common ownership of Berkshire Hathaway, Warren Bu↵ett’s investment firm. See Azar et al. (2015)
for a more comprehensive discussion.
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where sijt is the share of deposits in county i owned by bank j in period t and Pct.
Owned by Top Index Fundsjt is the percent of bank j owned by top index funds in
period t. We define top index funds as five index fund groups and ETFs: iShares
(currently part of BlackRock, previously managed by Barclays Global Investors),
Vanguard’s index funds, SPDR (managed by State Street Global Advisers), Invesco’s
PowerShares, and Fidelity’s Spartan index funds.
We use variation in the county-level index fund ownership measure described above
to generate “exogenous” variation in the GHHI. The first stage of our IV regression
is as follows:
GHHIijbt =   · Index Fund Ownershipit +⇥ ·Xit + ⇠ ·Qbt + ⌘j +  t +  ijbt (3.8)
where controls Xit and Qbt are defined as in Equation 3.6, ⌘j is a branch fixed e↵ect,
and  t is a year fixed e↵ect. The second stage of our IV regression is identical to
Equation 3.6 with variation in our GHHI concentration index instrumented by index
fund ownership from our first stage. We implement our IV analysis on a sample of all
bank branches in RateWatch from 2003 to 2013, clustering errors at the county level.
3.5.3 Results
We implement our IV regression on prices for all three types of deposit prod-
ucts explored in Section 3.4: interest rate spread margin percentiles for 12-, 24-, and
36-month CDs and maintenance fee amounts, maintenance fee thresholds, and inter-
est rate spread margin percentiles for money market accounts and interest-bearing
checking accounts. We present results for regressions where we examine the direct cor-
relation between prices and index fund ownership and the correlation between prices
and the GHHI instrumented by index fund ownership. The results indicate that in-
creases in concentration due to index fund ownership are indeed robustly linked to
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higher prices of all of these banking products.
Before presenting IV regression results, we should note that the first stage of the
IV analyses for all explored depository prices show a large and highly statistically
significant positive relationship between the GHHI and Index Fund Ownership, with
t-statistics around 20 in all cases. The results of all the first stage regressions can be
found in the panels of Table D.1.
For CD interest rate spreads, we find clear evidence that increases in common
ownership due to index fund ownership are linked to higher interest rate spreads. In
Table 3.4A, we present this evidence. Columns (1), (3), and (5) show that index fund
ownership is positively, strongly, and highly statistically significantly correlated with
rate spread margin percentiles for 12-, 24-, and 36-month CD rate spreads. In columns
(2), (4), and (6), we present results for the second stage of our IV regression and find
that the GHHI instrumented by index fund ownership has a positive and highly
statistically significant e↵ect on the within-year percentiles of rate spread margins for
CDs of all three maturities.
Interpreting the GHHI results causally, we estimate that a one-standard deviation
increase in the GHHI due to changes in common ownership causes a 5.7 percentile
point higher ranking in 12-month CD rate spreads, an 8.0 percentile point higher
ranking in 24-month CD rate spreads, and an 8.5 percentile point higher ranking in
36-month CD rate spreads. These results imply that common ownership has eco-
nomically large e↵ects as we see that concentration changes due common ownership
substantially alter the relative location of branches within the CD rate spread distri-
bution.
The IV regression results of Table 3.4B show that common ownership due to index
fund ownership has a positive and highly significant e↵ect on prices for money market
accounts. In particular, columns (1), (3), and (5) show that index fund ownership
is positively and highly statistically significantly correlated with fee amounts, fee
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thresholds, and within-year rate spread margin percentiles. The IV results confirm
these findings. In columns (2) and (4), we see that the GHHI instrumented by index
fund ownership has a positive and highly statistically significant e↵ect on maintenance
fee amounts and thresholds of money market accounts. Column (6) shows that rate
spread margin percentiles are positively a↵ected by the GHHI instrumented by index
fund ownership as well and the e↵ect is highly statistically significant. Interpreting the
IV results causally, we estimate that a one-standard deviation increase in the GHHI
causes an increase of $0.31 in fees (a 3.2% increase), an increase of $490 in thresholds
(a 16.9% increase), and a 2.4 percentile point higher ranking in rate spreads for money
market accounts. From 2003 to 2013, fees and thresholds for money market accounts
grew by $3.15 and $1,960, respectively. The e↵ect of a one-standard deviation increase
in the GHHI is comparable to 10% of the overall growth of fees and 25% of the
overall growth of thresholds in that period, which suggests that these GHHI e↵ects
have relatively large economic magnitude. The percentile change in rate spreads
is also substantial, suggesting that the GHHI e↵ects for interest rates are similarly
important.
We find that the GHHI has a positive and highly significant e↵ect on fees and
thresholds for interest-bearing checking accounts but not on the interest rate spreads
for the accounts. Table 3.4C presents the results for interest-bearing checking ac-
count prices. Columns (1) and (3) show that index fund ownership is positively and
highly statistically significantly correlated with fee amounts and thresholds for inter-
est checking olumn (5) shows that rate spread margin percentiles are positively, but
statistically insignificantly, correlated with index fund ownership. IV results bear out
these reduced form findings. Columns (2) and (4) show positive, highly statistically
significant e↵ects of the instrumented GHHI on maintenance fee amounts and thresh-
olds for interest checking accounts. Column (6) shows a positive, but statistically
insignificant, e↵ect of the instrumented GHHI on money market rate spread margin
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percentiles. We estimate that a one-standard deviation increase in the GHHI due to
changes in common ownership leads to an increase of $1.33 in fees (an 11% increase)
and an increase of $719 in thresholds (a 16.8% increase). From 2003 to 2013, fees and
thresholds for interest-bearing checking accounts grew by $6.64 and $4,100, respec-
tively. Again, this suggests that the GHHI e↵ects we observe on fees are economically
large: the e↵ect of a one-standard deviation increase in the GHHI is comparable to
20% of the growth in fees and 17% of the growth in thresholds for interest-bearing
accounts in that period.
3.5.4 Remaining identification challenges
The Panel IV identification strategy is of course not perfect. Its merits are that
using index fund ownership variation eliminates the reverse causality concern that
active fund managers’ holdings decisions are endogenous to branch-level variation
in prices as we simply do not use that variation here. However, a challenge is that
market-level variation in concentration stemming from changes in “passive” ownership
does not only come from the aggregate growth of index funds, but could also stem
from the inclusion and exclusion of banks in indices, as well as from entry and exit
of banks with di↵erent levels of index ownership concentration into and out of a
particular banking market. To illustrate why that is a concern, consider that the
inclusion of a bank in an index could be endogenous to market-level outcomes. This
observation does not challenge the primary motivation, which is showing that the
variation in ownership from index fund growth is related to prices, but it puts limits
on a causal interpretation of the results. In sum, the strategy employed in this section
removes endogeneity concerns present in the panel regression design, but not all of
them. We therefore o↵er di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DiD) analyses in the following
section that avoids this concern.
Before we turn to the DiD analyses, let us examine the likely importance of the
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concern with the IV. To do so, we compare the baseline IV results with specifications
in which the instrument is lagged by one year. The idea is that predicting the future
is harder for longer-term predictions. Hence, the reverse causality concern should be
attenuated when lagging the instrument. That is, the coe cients should be smaller
on a lagged instrument if reverse causality due to index inclusions is the key driver
behind our results. Contrary to that prediction, we find that, in general, coe cients
are higher when the instrument is lagged. We conclude that reverse causality is less
likely to be the driver of the baseline results (but, again, not impossible).
To summarize, across all the deposit products discussed, we find evidence of a
robust relationship between increased common ownership and higher prices. We now
o↵er DiD analyses that use di↵erent sources of variation from the IV and thus mitigate
the endogeneity concerns pointed out above.
3.6 Di↵erence-in-Di↵erences results
In this section, we present our di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DiD) analyses. These
analyses help mitigate reverse causality concerns that are not fully addressed by the
IV regressions presented in Section 3.5. We show that one can predict price changes
for deposit products a decade into the future, using only cross-sectional information
about banks’ market shares, ownership, and current price levels. Specifically, index
ownership of a county’s banks in 2003 predicts how much index ownership in a county
increases until 2013, which predicts how much deposit prices change from 2004 to
2013.
3.6.1 Implementation
Our DiD analysis takes as given the cross-section of counties and their character-
istics in 2003. This information is useful to predict the cross-section of deposit price
changes over the next decade. In other words, we compare the di↵erence in the change
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in deposit product prices from 2004 and 2013 between bank branches in treatment
and control counties, where treatment is determined by index fund ownership terciles
in 2003. The regression specification for these analyses is:
 Rijb2004 2013 =   · (Index Fund Ownership Tercilei2003 = 1) +   ·Rijb2004
+⇥ ·Xi2004 + ⇠ ·Qb2004 + "ijb,
8 i s.t. Index Fund Ownership Tercilei2003 2 {1, 3}, (3.9)
where  Rijb2004 2013 is the change in an outcome variable for branch j of bank b in
county i between 2004 and 2013, Index Fund Ownership Tercilei2003 is an indicator
for the tercile to which county i belongs, based on index fund ownership in 2003,
Rijb2004 is the outcome variable value for branch j of bank b in county i in 2004,
Xi2004 is a vector of market-level controls (median county income, county population)
in 2004, and Qb2004 is 2004 market capitalization for bank b. The 2004 market-level
controls are included to control for the potential e↵ect of local demand for deposit
products on subsequent product price growth and index fund ownership growth. The
obvious remaining concern is that treatment may not be exogenous even conditional
on these controls because (i) the size of the bank holding company corresponding to
branch j may be related to changes in cost of capital or other variable costs between
2003 and 2013, and/or (ii) larger banks may be smarter in market selection and be
invested in higher-growth markets in 2003, combined with the fact that larger banks
are more likely to be included in index funds. To control for this potential mechanism,
we include Qb2004, the banks’ market capitalization in 2004, as well. Of course, this
strategy does not rule out all potential endogeneity concerns, but it mitigates the
most obvious ones.
Note that we only include branches in top and bottom tercile counties in this
analysis, with top tercile counties forming our treatment group and bottom tercile
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counties forming our control group. Bank branches in counties for which we do not
possess index fund ownership data are included as control branches. Our standard
errors for these regressions are clustered at the county level and we run the regressions
on all bank branches in RateWatch for which we have data in 2004 and 2013.
Compared to the IV regressions in Section 3.5, these DiD analyses are far less
exposed to the aforementioned concerns of reverse causality. The reverse causality
concern is that inclusion of a bank in an index is endogenous to the profit margins
in the markets in which it chooses to operate. In our DiD analyses, we “instrument”
ultimate ownership changes through index fund ownership from up to a decade ago.
For the reverse causality concern to be valid for the DiD “instrument” (and our
identifying assumption to be invalid), index ownership must depend on performance
of banking markets and banks’ entry into and exit out of markets up to a decade
in the future, over and above what is reflected in the market value of the bank and
conditional on the other controls.
Finally, in these DiD analyses, we do not employ a concentration measure that
we constructed. The terciles of index fund ownership that define our treatment and
control groups are based on aggregations of ownership across banks in each county
in 2003. Therefore, the findings in this section also help alleviate any concerns that
our panel and IV findings arise from our GHHI measure being defined to exaggerate
relationships between prices and ultimate ownership. In other words, they also o↵er
a less structural test of the e↵ect of ultimate ownership on prices.
3.6.2 Results
We implement the regression specified in Equation 3.9 for all the outcome variables
explored previously: within-year interest rate spread margin percentiles for 12-, 24-,
and 36-month CDs and maintenance fee amounts, maintenance fee thresholds, and
within-year interest rate spread margin percentiles for money market and interest-
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bearing checking accounts. Overall, the results indicate that banking product prices
increase significantly more from 2004 to 2013 for our treated bank branches than
for control group branches. In fact, the di↵erence in growth for fee amounts and
thresholds between the treatment and control branches is comparable to the overall
growth of these prices in the same period documented in Appendix C.
Before presenting the treatment e↵ect of being in a high index fund ownership
county on price growth, we note the clear positive relationship between high ultimate
ownership in 2003 and ultimate ownership growth in 2004 through 2013. As we
observe in the first row of Table 3.5, a bank branch in a top tercile county, where
terciles are based on index fund ownership in 2003, sees 586 points greater growth
in the GHHI over the 2004-2013 period than a bank branch in a bottom tercile
county. In other words, higher index fund ownership in 2003 indeed predicts increases
in common ownership over the next decade. This di↵erence is highly statistically
significant. Furthermore, relative to the overall growth in the GHHI over the same
period of about 1,200 HHI points, this di↵erence in ultimate ownership growth rates
is economically large.
Table 3.6A shows that bank branches in top tercile counties have much higher
growth in interest rate spread margin percentiles for CDs than bottom tercile counties.
In Table 3.6A, column (1), we see that 12-month CD spreads percentile ranking
growth is more than 3.5 percentile points higher for top tercile counties. Column (2)
shows that the percentile ranking of 24-month spreads rises by 5.5 percentile points
more for top tercile counties and column (3) shows that the percentile ranking of
36-month spreads rises by nearly 5.2 percentile points more for top tercile counties.
Furthermore, these di↵erences are highly statistically significant.
Table 3.6B presents evidence that money market prices increase more for branches
in top tercile counties than for branches in bottom tercile counties. Column (1) shows
that the growth in maintenance fees is $1.16 higher for branches in top tercile counties
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and column (2) shows that maintenance fee threshold growth is over $900 higher for
these branches. The di↵erences between top and bottom tercile county branches are
highly and moderately statistically significant for the fees and thresholds, respectively.
And, given that average fees and thresholds for money market account maintenance
increased by approximately $0.80 and $1,200 from 2004 to 2013, respectively, the
di↵erences in growth between the top and bottom terciles are economically quite
large. Column (3) shows that rate spread growth is 3.4 percentile points higher in
top tercile counties. That di↵erence is highly statistically significant as well.
In Table 3.6C, we observe that overall interest-bearing checking account price
growth is greater for branches in top tercile counties. In column (1), we see that
interest-bearing checking account maintenance fees grow $1.41 more in top tercile
county branches. Column (2) shows that maintenance fee thresholds grow by nearly
$2,600 more in top tercile county branches. Both these interest-bearing checking ac-
count price growth di↵erences are highly statistically significant. They are also eco-
nomically meaningful as the overall growth of fees and thresholds for interest-bearing
checking accounts in that same time period was approximately $5 and $4,000, respec-
tively. Column (3) shows that there is no statistically significant di↵erence between
top and bottom tercile county branches in terms of growth of interest rate spread mar-
gin percentiles (although, ignoring statistical significance, top tercile counties seem
to have 1.5 percentile point higher growth in that period).
In Table 3.7, we present DiD findings that address questions associated with dif-
ferences across banks. The general theme is that di↵erences in these characteristics
may be driving the cross-sectional variation in both deposit prices charged by banks’
branches and banks’ choice of markets in which they operate. The findings we present
in Table 3.7 incorporate bank fixed e↵ects into our DiD analyses precisely to absorb
the e↵ect of bank characteristics that might be driving our results. What we find
is that, across all deposit products, the treatment e↵ect is strong and statistically
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significant for interest rate spreads. For money market and interest-bearing checking
accounts, the e↵ect on spreads actually seems to strengthen (Table 3.7B and Ta-
ble 3.7C, respectively). For fees and thresholds, the treatment e↵ect, while in the
correct direction, is weaker. This is likely because of a general lack of within-bank
variation in our fees datasets.16 Nevertheless, these within-bank DiD findings ease
concerns about bank-related endogeneity driving our results.
3.7 Related literature
This paper contributes to a large literature on bank competition and to a smaller
literature on the anti-competitive e↵ects of common ownership and cross-ownership.
Within the literature on bank competition, this is the first paper that studies the
relationship between a broad set of fees and competition. Considering fees as part
of the price vector is important for an accurate measurement of the e↵ective price
of deposit banking, especially in times of low interest rates. Studying the relation
between competition and fee thresholds is important because it uncovers a previously
undiscussed mechanism that can amplify inequality.17,18 The only paper in the lit-
erature we are aware of that examines a relation between fees and competition is
Melzer and Morgan (2014). That paper is based on information on checking account
overdraft fees for a sample of depository institutions. Berg et al. (2015b) examine
16For instance, in 2004 and 2013, the RateWatch money market fees dataset includes data from
branches of approximately 1,000 and 1,500 banks, respectively. However, in those years, less than 50
banks (around 3% in each year) have cross-sectional variation in fees. With so little cross-sectional
variation, it is unsurprising that we have di culty identifying statistically significant relationships
for fees and thresholds.
17While no academic study on deposit fees and fee thresholds exists, there is a public debate,
largely based on bank-level revenues from fees versus rates; see, e.g., Wall Street Journal, May
12, 2015, “Overdraft Fees Continue to Weigh on Bank Customers,” BloombergView, November 11,
2015, “A checking account is a dangerous thing,” USA Today, September 29, 2014, “Survey: ATM,
checking overdraft fees surge,” or US News & World Report, “Are bank fees set to rise?”. The New
York Times reports that 8% of 2015 bank profits stem from overdraft fees alone.
18Depositors can avoid account maintenance fees by maintaining a balance in excess of some fee
avoidance threshold. Naturally, richer households are in a better position to avoid such fees than less
a✏uent depositors. Hence, if lessened competition was associated with higher thresholds, lessened
bank competition would contribute to inequality through this channel.
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the role of fees in syndicated loans between the US and Europe, but without study-
ing competition as a factor. Moreover, for deposits and loan rates, our data has an
order of magnitude more banks (over 9,000) and over two orders of magnitude more
observations (over 60 million interest rate data points each for 12-month CDs, money
market, and interest-bearing checking accounts) than most existing studies.
Within the literature on the anti-competitive e↵ects of common ownership and
cross-ownership, the conceptual contribution of the present paper is to jointly study
common ownership and cross-ownership. The GHHI index we develop is the most
general in the literature, and is thus suitable for future studies of market concentration
in all areas of economics. In addition, we contribute a new source of exogenous
variation in ownership: index fund growth. Lastly, we o↵er first evidence for increased
monopsony power through common ownership.
We contribute to the more general literature in industrial organization by provid-
ing a new explanation – common ownership as an omitted variable – for the failure of
the HHI to capture variation in markups. This contribution is important because it
suggests a re-interpretation of several results in the literature that have attributed the
lack of correlation between the HHI and prices to potential e ciency gains reflected
in increased HHIs, or the failure of the Cournot model to capture the economic forces
at play. Those are not the reasons for a lack of correlation between the HHI and
prices in our data – here, omitting common ownership is the reason for the lack of
correlation between the HHI and prices.
A more detailed comparison to the most closely related papers is given below.
Literature on the relation between bank concentration, profits, and prices
The literature on the relation between bank concentration, profits, and prices,
reviewed by Northcott et al. (2004); Gilbert and Zaretsky (2003), finds that the HHI
captures some cross-sectional di↵erences in the level of competition between banks, to
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various extents. Specifically, local market HHIs correlate positively with bank profits
(Rhoades, 1995; Pillo↵ and Rhoades, 2002; Akhigbe and McNulty, 2003) and loan
rates (Cyrnak and Hannan, 1999; Hannan, 1991; Hannan and Liang, 1995; Berger
et al., 2001), and negatively with deposit rates (Sharpe, 1997; Prager and Hannan,
1998; Heitfield and Prager, 2004). CR3, a measure closely related to the HHI, also
correlates with higher loan rates (Edwards, 1964) and lower deposit rates (Berger and
Hannan, 1989; Calem and Carlino, 1991).
However, the correlation between the HHI and prices is not very robust over time,
to the introduction of controls, or to other changes in the econometric specification.
Moore et al. (1998) find that the correlation of the HHI with profits declines over
time and is only present in the early years of their sample; similarly, Hannan and
Prager (2004) also find that the HHI loses its significant influence on deposit rates
over time. Note that the disappearance of the HHI e↵ect can be explained with
an increased importance of the omitted variable concern. Controlling for market or
bank characteristics is su cient to render the HHI coe cient insignificant in Flechsig
(1965); Berger (1995); Hannan (1997); Melzer and Morgan (2014). A redefinition
of profitability eliminates the correlation between the HHI and profitability also in
Punt and Van Rooij (1999). Also, the literature finds that a correlation between the
HHI and prices is more di cult to find in changes, a specification that comes closer
to the theoretical idea of the Cournot model.19 For example, Corvoisier and Gropp
(2002) use country-product-level prices and variation in the HHI from bank mergers
to examine the concentration-price relationship. They find no robust e↵ect of the HHI
changes on prices, and interpret their finding as consistent with e ciency increases
from the mergers.20
19The Cournot model predicts that markups – not prices – correlate with the HHI. Absent mea-
sures of markups, research designs in changes thus more closely approximate the model: assuming
constant cost, changes in the HHI should relate to changes in prices as costs are di↵erenced out.
20Related in a di↵erent way is Allen et al. (2014), who point to a reason other than common
ownership – namely, search frictions – why market power can be underestimated. Their result is
likely to be strictly complementary to ours, because common ownership and search frictions are
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Lastly, ours is not the first paper that points out that banks assess fees for ser-
vices. Greenwood and Scharfstein (2013) present evidence showing that aggregate
nation-wide revenue from fees has replaced interest revenue from 1997 to 2007. By
contrast, we present evidence on prices (not revenues) at the branch level, and relate
changes in prices to changes in competition. Berg et al. (2015a) show that fees are a
significant contributor to the cost of corporate borrowing, whereas we analyze fees as
a contributor to the cost of depositing money with a bank, and relate the variation
in fees to bank concentration.
Literature on anti-competitive e↵ects of common ownership and cross-
ownership
There is a long theoretical literature that predicts anti-competitive e↵ects of com-
mon ownership and cross-ownership (Rotemberg, 1984; Gordon, 1990; Gilo, 2000;
O’Brien and Salop, 2000; Gilo et al., 2006). Also, there are historical precedents of
increased profits due to common ownership, such as the “Morganization” of the US
railroads in the 19th century, voting trusts, as well as studies of pyramidal struc-
tures in the economic history literature (Kandel et al., 2013). However, the literature
has thus far o↵ered only one piece of empirical support from one particular indus-
try for a causal link between common ownership and anti-competitive prices (Azar
et al., 2015). Relative to Azar et al. (2015), the present paper does not only expand
the evidence to a larger and macro-economically important industry, it also o↵ers
the conceptual and technical innovation to jointly examine common ownership and
cross-ownership to solve for ultimate control and financial interest, inspired by Leon-
tief (1941), Leontief (1966), Ellerman (1991), Gilo et al. (2006), Brito et al. (2013).
Moreover, the present paper contributes a new arguably exogenous source of variation
not obviously related. Note also that our results can result from uncoordinated, unilateral anti-
competitive e↵ects that arise under competition under common ownership; they need not be ascribed
to common ownership fostering collusion, which is the mechanism considered by Knittel and Stango
(2003).
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in ownership that can be used generically in future research. Lastly, deposit prices
are input prices for banks, so the present paper studies monopsony power, whereas
airline tickets are outputs, i.e., Azar et al. study monopoly power.
3.8 Conclusion
There are two main empirical takeaways from this paper. First, we provide evi-
dence that prices of deposit products are at an all-time high and vary substantially
in the cross-section. Variation in bank competition that is due to variation in partial
common ownership links helps explain the variation in prices. The inclusion of fees
and thresholds is important: because fees and thresholds seem to be as responsive as
interest rates to changes in competition, an exclusive focus of researchers and regula-
tors on interest rates can result in an incomplete picture of the competitive outcomes
in the banking industry.
Second, the paper provides a more complete picture of the economic forces shaping
bank competition, with direct implications for policy. We show that who owns the
banks matters for how the banks compete. Specifically, we calculate a new generalized
concentration index, the GHHI, which can capture the e↵ect of general ownership
structures. Empirically, the GHHI is a more e↵ective and robust predictor of market
outcomes than the HHI, the measure traditionally used by researchers and regulators.
In addition, we provide analyses that suggest a causal link from the GHHI to prices
by using index funds’ ownership of banks as a source of variation in bank ownership
patterns across geographical markets. Given that concentrated ownership causes
higher product prices in other industries (Azar et al., 2015), it appears reasonable
that antitrust agencies and Senate allocate considerable resources to understanding
the role of institutional investors in product pricing and capacity decisions (Drew,
2015; Dayen, 2016).
Aside from having direct policy implications, these results also challenge the way
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researchers have thought about corporate finance, industrial organization, and an-
titrust law for the past few decades. From a corporate finance perspective, our
findings indicate that firms, at least to some extent, maximize their shareholders’
economic interests, i.e., their portfolio profits. That means that a firm’s objective
function does not necessarily coincide with its individual profits. The contribution to
the industrial organization literature is to point out that not only full mergers, but
also partial ownership links matter. Implications for antitrust law are discussed by
Elhauge (2016) and responses by Baker (2016) and others.
Researchers could benefit from taking partial ownership stakes into account to re-
examine various questions also in other fields of economics. For example, decreased
competition due to common ownership concentration has the potential to explain the
rising capital share of income, increased inequality, reduced aggregate output, and
sluggish macroeconomic growth amid record corporate profits.21
Aside from using GHHIs to measure concentration, what should policy makers
do about the problem? There are remedies in existing US competition law that may
help restore the e ciency loss due to market power that arises under concentrated
ownership structures as the ones we document, but additional assumptions are needed
to decide whether the enforcement of these laws would increase welfare.
Elhauge (2016) argues that stock acquisitions that substantially lessen competition
are illegal under Clayton Act Section 7, irrespective of whether there was an intent
to lessen competition, and irrespective of the mechanism by which the outcome is
implemented. Acquisitions by modern-day index funds that lead to higher prices are
not exempt from that law. Hence, if existing antitrust laws were to be enforced,
it would become a necessity to rethink either the industrial organization of asset
management (and, specifically, consider limits to within-industry diversification) or
21High margins amid slow growth are a large enough puzzle even for Goldman Sachs to ask
“broader questions about the e cacy of capitalism.” (Bloomberg 2/3/16: “Goldman Sachs says it
may be forced to fundamentally question how capitalism is working.”)
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the meaning of “good governance” (specifically, consider limits to the voting power
of the large institutions that also hold stock in natural competitors).
If such re-thinking were to be done, however, much care would have to be taken
to appropriately weigh the benefits and costs of the current structure of the asset
management industry. These benefits can be substantial, even if one ignores potential
pro-competitive e↵ects of concentrated ownership. Specifically, the benefit to asset
owners of large-scale diversified asset management are (i) cheap diversification as
well as (ii) improved corporate governance as a result of active involvement by the
largest asset managers. These activities serve individual investors’ interests in ways
the investors could not achieve as independent agents. Indeed, the mutual funds’
coordination of corporate governance activities may constitute a partial solution to the
free-rider problem that arguably plagued corporate governance in previous decades,
when more individuals held stocks directly and there weren’t many large shareholders
that engaged in monitoring activities.
Unfortunately, the benefits to shareholders from diversification and good gover-
nance come at a cost to consumers, and to society at large: e cient capital markets
with perfect diversification and “good governance” imply deadweight losses in input
and output markets. Examining this tradeo↵ between three individually desirable
goals is a quantitative question we leave for future research.
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Tables
Table 3.1. Top 5 owners of the largest six US banks These tables show the top 5 sharehold-
ers in the second quarter of 2013 and the first quarter of 2002 of the largest six American banks
by deposits in the second quarter of 2013. The data source is Thomson institutional ownership
data and proxy statements in the second quarter of 2013.
JP Morgan Chase [%] Bank of America [%] Citigroup [%]
BlackRock 6.4 Berkshire Hathaway⇤ 6.9 BlackRock 6.1
Vanguard 4.7 BlackRock 5.3 Vanguard 4.4
State Street 4.5 Vanguard 4.5 State Street 4.2
Fidelity 2.7 State Street 4.3 Fidelity 3.6
Wellington 2.5 Fidelity 2.1 Capital World Investors 2.4
Wells Fargo [%] U.S. Bank [%] PNC Bank [%]
Berkshire Hathaway 8.8 BlackRock 7.4 Wellington 8.0
BlackRock 5.4 Vanguard 4.5 BlackRock 4.7
Vanguard 4.5 Fidelity 4.4 Vanguard 4.6
State Street 4.0 State Street 4.4 State Street 4.6
Fidelity 3.5 Berkshire Hathaway 4.3 Barrow Hanley 4.0
* These are warrants with no voting rights.
(A) Top 5 owners in 2013q2
JP Morgan Chase [%] Bank of America [%] Citigroup [%]
Capital Research 6.0 AXA 4.2 State Street 4.4
Barclays 3.9 Barclays 4.0 Fidelity 3.9
AXA 3.7 Capital Research 3.6 AXA 3.7
State Street 2.5 Fidelity 3.2 Barclays 3.7
Fidelity 2.3 State Street 2.4 Wellington 1.8
Wells Fargo [%] U.S. Bank [%] PNC Bank [%]
Barclays 3.4 Putnam Investment 7.4 Fidelity 6.8
Fidelity 3.2 Barclays 3.7 Barclays 3.9
Berkshire Hathaway 3.1 U.S. Bank 3.0 Barrow Hanley 3.7
Citigroup 2.9 JP Morgan Chase 2.8 Wellington 2.9
State Street 2.3 State Street 2.5 State Street 2.3
(B) Top 5 owners in 2002q1
Table 3.2. Summary statistics. This table provides annual, branch-level summary statistics
that describe our outcome and explanatory variables. The first three variables are maintenance
fee amounts, the next three are maintenance fee thresholds. The next six variables are interest
rates for each of the deposit products examined. The next two variables are county-level HHI and
GHHI, our two concentration measures. Finally, the last two variables are two covariates that we
employ in our regressions: log of county-level average income and county population.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Maintenance Fee: Interest Checking 12.126 6.244 0 25 535360
Maintenance Fee: Money Market 9.800 4.251 0 20 536451
Maintenance Fee Threshold: Interest Checking 4291.701 4685.847 0 25000 493563
Maintenance Fee Threshold: Money Market 2904.967 2831.349 0 15000 491310
Interest Rate: 12-Month CD 1.674 1.381 0.042 5.608 951588
Interest Rate: 24-Month CD 1.963 1.343 0.094 6.36 932394
Interest Rate: 36-Month CD 2.201 1.324 0.1 5.758 907310
Interest Rate: Money Market 0.656 0.690 0.01 4.325 914586
Interest Rate: Interest Checking 0.205 0.264 0.01 2.5 917577
HHI 0.184 0.115 0.05 1 1004842
GHHI 0.325 0.148 0.059 1 1004842
Top Index Fund Ownership (Percent) 2.395 1.692 0 13.028 1005055
Log Income 10.799 0.255 9.766 11.706 1002906
Log Population 12.468 1.655 6.084 16.12 1002906
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Table 3.3. Panel regressions of deposit prices on HHI and GHHI
(A) Panel regressions of time deposit spread percentiles on HHI and GHHI, respec-
tively. This table shows the e↵ect of market concentration measures on time deposit spread
percentiles with 12-, 24-, and 36-month maturities. Percentiles are calculated for each year
based on spreads defined as the di↵erence between the 10-year Treasury Constant Maturity
rate and the deposit rate, expressed as a percent of the Treasury rate. The sample includes all
bank branches in RateWatch from the period 2003 to 2013. Standard errors are clustered at
the county level. While throughout the paper the HHI and GHHI are expressed on a scale of 0
to 10,000, we use a scale of 0 to 1 for the regressions.
12-Month CD Spread
(Percentile)
24-Month CD Spread
(Percentile)
36-Month CD Spread
(Percentile)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HHI 4.822 5.115 3.526
(5.257) (4.046) (3.973)
GHHI 19.44*** 22.75*** 23.49***
(3.577) (3.548) (3.520)
Log Income -27.27*** -24.53*** -16.28*** -13.13*** -12.35** -9.140*
(3.556) (3.498) (4.360) (4.300) (5.220) (5.141)
Log Population 21.73*** 20.48*** 23.25*** 21.85*** 21.30*** 19.85***
(4.331) (4.168) (5.446) (5.164) (6.244) (5.931)
Log(1+Market Cap) 0.266*** 0.235*** 0.368*** 0.332*** 0.414*** 0.376***
(0.0226) (0.0228) (0.0238) (0.0215) (0.0310) (0.0274)
Year FE X X X X X X
Branch FE X X X X X X
Observations 947,052 947,052 927,727 927,727 902,540 902,540
R-squared 0.672 0.673 0.659 0.660 0.670 0.672
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(B) Panel regressions of money market account maintenance fees, thresholds, and
spreads on HHI and GHHI, respectively. This table shows the e↵ect of market concen-
tration measures on money market account maintenance fees, maintenance fee thresholds, and
interest rate spread percentiles. Spread percentiles are calculated as the within-year percentile
rank of the di↵erence between the 10-year Treasury Constant Maturity rate and the deposit
rate, expressed as a percent of the Treasury rate. The sample includes all bank branches in
RateWatch from the period 2003 to 2013. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
While throughout the paper the HHI and GHHI are expressed on a scale of 0 to 10,000, we use
a scale of 0 to 1 for the regressions.
Maintenance Fee
Maintenance Fee
Threshold
Spread
(Percentile)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HHI 0.842* -118.4 -1.945
(0.479) (746.5) (3.463)
GHHI 1.418*** 1,554*** 10.76***
(0.354) (495.9) (3.495)
Log Income -1.576*** -1.303*** -1,294** -1,016* -13.30*** -11.83***
(0.530) (0.504) (611.8) (586.4) (3.925) (3.662)
Log Population -0.718 -0.803 2,509*** 2,439*** -4.800 -5.357
(0.610) (0.600) (804.9) (783.1) (4.586) (4.423)
Log(1+Market Cap) 0.0313*** 0.0292*** 45.28*** 42.88*** 0.0177*** 0.339*** 0.321***
(0.00360) (0.00370) (4.505) (4.457) (0.0236) (0.0233)
Year FE X X X X X X
Branch FE X X X X X X
Observations 533,815 533,815 488,666 488,666 911,361 911,361
R-squared 0.795 0.795 0.529 0.530 0.655 0.655
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(C) Panel regressions of interest checking account maintenance fees, thresholds,
and spreads on HHI and GHHI, respectively. This table shows the e↵ect of market
concentration measures on interest checking account maintenance fees, maintenance fee thresh-
olds, and interest rate spread percentiles. Spread percentiles are calculated as the within-year
percentile rank of the di↵erence between the 10-year Treasury Constant Maturity rate and the
deposit rate, expressed as a percent of the Treasury rate. The sample includes all bank branches
in RateWatch from the period 2003 to 2013. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
While throughout the paper the HHI and GHHI are expressed on a scale of 0 to 10,000, we use
a scale of 0 to 1 for the regressions.
Maintenance Fee
Maintenance Fee
Threshold
Spread
(Percentile)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HHI 1.148 492.8 -7.058***
(0.961) (858.3) (2.631)
GHHI 3.797*** 2,758*** 1.590
(0.712) (685.2) (3.475)
Log Income -6.565*** -5.880*** -2,168** -1,656* -12.64*** -12.52***
(0.932) (0.958) (892.2) (904.1) (3.822) (3.664)
Log Population 6.286*** 6.116*** 9,024*** 8,884*** -23.99*** -24.00***
(1.553) (1.470) (1,365) (1,363) (4.493) (4.559)
Log(1+Market Cap) 0.0242*** 0.0181*** 36.90*** 32.53*** 0.327*** 0.324***
(0.00711) (0.00645) (6.316) (6.365) (0.0207) (0.0185)
Year FE X X X X X X
Branch FE X X X X X X
Observations 532,634 532,634 490,230 490,230 913,328 913,328
R-squared 0.704 0.705 0.582 0.583 0.752 0.752
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.4. Panel regressions of deposit prices on index fund ownership and panel IV
regressions instrumenting GHHI with index fund ownership.
(A) Panel regressions of time deposit spread percentiles on index fund ownership
and panel IV regressions instrumenting GHHI with index fund ownership. This table
shows the e↵ect of index fund ownership, and the e↵ect of the GHHI instrumented with index
fund ownership, on time deposit spread percentiles with 12-, 24-, and 36-month maturities.
Percentiles are calculated for each year based on spreads defined as the di↵erence between the
10-year Treasury Constant Maturity rate and the deposit rate, expressed as a percent of the
Treasury rate. The sample includes all bank branches in RateWatch from the period 2003 to
2013. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. While throughout the paper the HHI
and GHHI are expressed on a scale of 0 to 10,000, we use a scale of 0 to 1 for the regressions.
12-Month CD Spread
(Percentile)
24-Month CD Spread
(Percentile)
36-Month CD Spread
(Percentile)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Index Fund Ownership 1.830*** 2.567*** 2.761***
(0.204) (0.239) (0.237)
GHHI 38.77*** 54.15*** 57.72***
(4.196) (4.884) (5.031)
Log Income -24.22*** -22.54*** -11.53*** -9.191** -7.706 -5.113
(3.174) (3.624) (3.888) (4.437) (4.821) (5.123)
Log Population 17.00*** 19.35*** 16.93*** 20.18*** 15.10*** 18.45***
(4.021) (4.255) (4.970) (5.224) (5.685) (5.867)
Log(1+Market Cap) 0.228*** 0.202*** 0.312*** 0.276*** 0.354*** 0.316***
(0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0223) (0.0213) (0.0283) (0.0262)
Year FE X X X X X X
Branch FE X X X X X X
Observations 947,052 947,052 927,727 927,727 902,540 902,540
R-squared 0.674 0.672 0.662 0.658 0.672 0.667
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(B) Panel regressions of money market account maintenance fees, thresholds, and
spreads on index fund ownership and panel IV regressions instrumenting GHHI
with index fund ownership. This table shows the e↵ect of index fund ownership, and
the e↵ect of the GHHI instrumented with index fund ownership, on money market account
maintenance fees, maintenance fee thresholds, and interest rate spread percentiles. Spread
percentiles are calculated as the within-year percentile rank of the di↵erence between the 10-
year Treasury Constant Maturity rate and the deposit rate, expressed as a percent of the
Treasury rate. The sample includes all bank branches in RateWatch from the period 2003 to
2013. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. While throughout the paper the HHI
and GHHI are expressed on a scale of 0 to 10,000, we use a scale of 0 to 1 for the regressions.
Maintenance Fee
Maintenance Fee
Threshold
Spread
(Percentile)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Index Fund Ownership 0.111*** 178.5*** 0.765***
(0.0303) (42.03) (0.236)
GHHI 2.101*** 3,313*** 16.20***
(0.555) (771.7) (4.814)
Log Income -1.345** -1.178** -953.5 -699.6 -12.36*** -11.65***
(0.524) (0.496) (604.7) (606.0) (3.573) (3.511)
Log Population -0.905 -0.829 2,271*** 2,355*** -7.090 -6.076
(0.626) (0.596) (782.0) (764.0) (4.521) (4.274)
Log(1+Market Cap) 0.0295*** 0.0281*** 42.40*** 40.17*** 0.317*** 0.306***
(0.00371) (0.00380) (4.539) (4.502) (0.0237) (0.0243)
Year FE X X X X X X
Branch FE X X X X X X
Observations 533,815 533,815 488,666 488,666 911,361 911,361
R-squared 0.795 0.795 0.530 0.529 0.655 0.655
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(C) Panel regressions of interest checking account maintenance fees, thresholds, and
spreads on index fund ownership and panel IV regressions instrumenting GHHI
with index fund ownership. This table shows the e↵ect of index fund ownership, and
the e↵ect of the GHHI instrumented with index fund ownership, on interest checking account
maintenance fees, maintenance fee thresholds, and interest rate spread percentiles. Spread
percentiles are calculated as the within-year percentile rank of the di↵erence between the 10-
year Treasury Constant Maturity rate and the deposit rate, expressed as a percent of the
Treasury rate. The sample includes all bank branches in RateWatch from the period 2003 to
2013. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. While throughout the paper the HHI
and GHHI are expressed on a scale of 0 to 10,000, we use a scale of 0 to 1 for the regressions.
Maintenance Fee
Maintenance Fee
Threshold
Spread
(Percentile)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Index Fund Ownership 0.480*** 258.2*** 0.359
(0.0644) (67.51) (0.223)
GHHI 8.972*** 4,858*** 7.592
(1.186) (1,270) (4.738)
Log Income -5.653*** -4.970*** -1,672* -1,272 -13.50*** -13.18***
(0.952) (1.015) (923.0) (1,025) (3.669) (3.695)
Log Population 5.565*** 5.952*** 8,618*** 8,793*** -26.58*** -26.13***
(1.486) (1.427) (1,386) (1,396) (4.821) (4.695)
Log(1+Market Cap) 0.0160** 0.00965 32.55*** 29.16*** 0.303*** 0.298***
(0.00692) (0.00651) (6.204) (6.053) (0.0196) (0.0193)
Year FE X X X X X X
Branch FE X X X X X X
Observations 532,634 532,634 490,230 490,230 913,328 913,328
R-squared 0.705 0.703 0.583 0.582 0.753 0.753
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.5. Regressions of change in GHHI between 2004 and 2013 on whether the
county is in the top or bottom tercile of index fund ownership in 2003. This table shows
the e↵ect of an indicator variable for whether a market’s index fund ownership is in the top or the
bottom tercile of the distribution of index fund ownership in 2003 on the change over the period
2004-2013 in GHHI. The sample includes all bank branches in RateWatch. Standard errors are
clustered at the county level. While throughout the paper the HHI and GHHI are expressed on a
scale of 0 to 10,000, we use a scale of 0 to 1 for the regressions.
  GHHI
(1)
Top Tercile Index Fund Ownership in 2003 0.0586***
(0.0192)
Log Income 0.00968
(0.0266)
Log Population 0.0226***
(0.00546)
Log(1+Market Cap) 9.17e-05
(0.000165)
Constant -0.329
(0.259)
Observations 50,684
R-squared 0.198
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.6. Regressions of change in deposit prices between 2004 and 2013 on whether
the county is in the top or bottom tercile of index fund ownership in 2003.
(A) Regressions of change in time deposit spread percentiles between 2004 and
2013 on whether the county is in the top or bottom tercile of index fund ownership
in 2003. This table shows the e↵ect of an indicator variable for whether a market’s index
fund ownership is in the top or the bottom tercile of the distribution of index fund ownership
in 2003 on the change over the period 2004-2013 in time deposit spread percentiles with 12-
, 24-, and 36-month maturities. Percentiles are calculated for each year based on spreads
defined as the di↵erence between the 10-year Treasury Constant Maturity rate and the deposit
rate, expressed as a percent of the Treasury rate. The sample includes all bank branches in
RateWatch. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
  12-Month
CD Spread
(Percentile)
  24-Month
CD Spread
(Percentile)
  36-Month
CD Spread
(Percentile)
(1) (2) (3)
Top Tercile Index Fund Ownership in 2003 3.597*** 5.594*** 5.172***
(1.066) (0.848) (1.058)
Log Income2004 8.182*** 9.651*** 7.721***
(1.854) (1.800) (1.903)
Log Population2004 3.204*** 3.932*** 4.606***
(0.510) (0.412) (0.462)
Log(1+Market Cap2004) 0.726*** 0.782*** 0.773***
(0.0366) (0.0362) (0.0324)
Spread2004 -0.659*** -0.803*** -0.774***
(0.0148) (0.0166) (0.0188)
Constant -101.9*** -121.2*** -110.3***
(17.07) (17.14) (17.95)
Observations 50,684 49,429 47,930
R-squared 0.412 0.529 0.531
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(B) Regressions of change in money market fees, thresholds, and spreads between
2004 and 2013 on whether the county is in the top or bottom tercile of index
fund ownership in 2003. This table shows the e↵ect of an indicator variable for whether a
market’s index fund ownership is in the top or the bottom tercile of the distribution of index
fund ownership in 2003 on the change over the period 2004-2013 in money market account
maintenance fees, maintenance fee thresholds, and interest rate spread percentiles. Spread
percentiles are calculated as the within-year percentile rank of the di↵erence between the 10-year
Treasury Constant Maturity rate and the deposit rate, expressed as a percent of the Treasury
rate. The sample includes all bank branches in RateWatch. Standard errors are clustered at
the county level.
  Maintenance Fee
  Maintenance Fee
Threshold
  Spread
(Percentile)
(1) (2) (3)
Top Tercile Index Fund Ownership in 2003 1.158*** 909.4** 3.377***
(0.301) (360.0) (0.965)
Log Income2004 -0.993 -178.3 1.774
(0.708) (408.1) (1.683)
Log Population2004 0.0149 -4.710 1.372***
(0.0861) (92.42) (0.258)
Log(1+Market Cap2004 -0.0448*** -59.67*** 0.162***
(0.00853) (9.879) (0.0288)
Maintenance Fee2004 -0.417***
(0.0290)
Maintenance Fee Threshold2004 -0.422***
(0.0407)
Spread2004 -0.538***
(0.0133)
Constant 14.05* 3,391 -12.62
(7.412) (3,805) (17.00)
Observations 16,818 13,414 46,763
R-squared 0.275 0.174 0.277
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
143
(C) Regressions of change in interest checking fees, thresholds, and spreads between
2004 and 2013 on whether the county is in the top or bottom tercile of index
fund ownership in 2003. This table shows the e↵ect of an indicator variable for whether
a market’s index fund ownership is in the top or the bottom tercile of the distribution of
index fund ownership in 2003 on the change over the period 2004-2013 in interest checking
account maintenance fees, maintenance fee thresholds, and interest rate spread percentiles.
Spread percentiles are calculated as the within-year percentile rank of the di↵erence between
the 10-year Treasury Constant Maturity rate and the deposit rate, expressed as a percent of
the Treasury rate. The sample includes all bank branches in RateWatch. Standard errors are
clustered at the county level.
  Maintenance Fee
  Maintenance Fee
Threshold
  Spread
(Percentile)
(1) (2) (3)
Top Tercile Index Fund Ownership in 2003 1.410*** 2,585*** 1.477
(0.417) (645.8) (1.000)
Log Income2004 1.557 480.2 0.971
(1.380) (929.1) (1.858)
Log Population2004 0.636*** -215.3 2.265***
(0.149) (149.0) (0.353)
Log(Market Cap2004) 0.172*** 64.88*** 0.385***
(0.0138) (14.21) (0.0451)
Maintenance Fee2004 -0.652***
(0.0245)
Maintenance Fee Threshold2004 -0.446***
(0.0388)
Spread2004 -0.523***
(0.0135)
Constant -16.53 -399.1 -15.88
(14.53) (9,615) (18.33)
Observations 16,105 10,678 48,004
R-squared 0.350 0.100 0.254
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.7. Regressions of change in deposit prices between 2004 and 2013 on whether
the county is in the top or bottom tercile of index fund ownership in 2003 with bank
fixed e↵ects.
(A) Regressions of change in time deposit spread percentiles between 2004 and
2013 on whether the county is in the top or bottom tercile of index fund ownership
in 2003 with bank fixed e↵ects. This table shows the e↵ect of an indicator variable for
whether a market’s index fund ownership is in the top or the bottom tercile of the distribution
of index fund ownership in 2003 on the change over the period 2004-2013 in time deposit spread
percentiles with 12-, 24-, and 36-month maturities. Percentiles are calculated for each year
based on spreads defined as the di↵erence between the 10-year Treasury Constant Maturity
rate and the deposit rate, expressed as a percent of the Treasury rate. The sample includes all
bank branches in RateWatch. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and bank-level
fixed e↵ects absorb all across-bank variation.
  12-Month
CD Spread
(Percentile)
  24-Month
CD Spread
(Percentile)
  36-Month
CD Spread
(Percentile)
(1) (2) (3)
Top Tercile Index Fund Ownership in 2003 2.158*** 2.317*** 2.281***
(0.426) (0.437) (0.352)
Log Income2004 0.580 0.608 0.0209
(0.386) (0.416) (0.331)
Log Population2004 -0.131 0.000697 0.193***
(0.0815) (0.0962) (0.0563)
Spread2004 -0.923*** -0.943*** -0.952***
(0.00888) (0.00813) (0.00743)
Constant 41.83*** 41.12*** 45.56***
(4.105) (4.371) (3.563)
Bank FE X X X
Observations 50,684 49,429 47,930
R-squared 0.970 0.978 0.980
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(B) Regressions of change in money market fees, thresholds, and spreads between
2004 and 2013 on whether the county is in the top or bottom tercile of index fund
ownership in 2003 with bank fixed e↵ects. This table shows the e↵ect of an indicator
variable for whether a market’s index fund ownership is in the top or the bottom tercile of
the distribution of index fund ownership in 2003 on the change over the period 2004-2013 in
money market account maintenance fees, maintenance fee thresholds, and interest rate spread
percentiles. Spread percentiles are calculated as the within-year percentile rank of the di↵er-
ence between the 10-year Treasury Constant Maturity rate and the deposit rate, expressed as
a percent of the Treasury rate. The sample includes all bank branches in RateWatch. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the county level and bank-level fixed e↵ects absorb all across-bank
variation.
  Maintenance Fee
  Maintenance Fee
Threshold
  Spread
(Percentile)
(1) (2) (3)
Top Tercile Index Fund Ownership in 2003 0.238 385.0 0.919**
(0.178) (377.9) (0.461)
Log Income2004 -0.0632 -49.07 1.131**
(0.0485) (74.39) (0.461)
Log Population2004 -0.00816 -14.32 0.309***
(0.0107) (20.81) (0.0734)
Maintenance Fee2004 -0.947***
(0.0254)
Maintenance Fee Threshold2004 -0.994***
(0.00305)
Spread2004 -0.867***
(0.0127)
Constant 10.17*** 3,400*** 28.37***
(0.431) (689.5) (4.926)
Bank FE X X X
Observations 16,818 13,414 46,763
R-squared 0.988 0.976 0.949
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(C) Regressions of change in interest checking fees, thresholds, and spreads be-
tween 2004 and 2013 on whether the county is in the top or bottom tercile of index
fund ownership in 2003 with bank fixed e↵ects. This table shows the e↵ect of an indi-
cator variable for whether a market’s index fund ownership is in the top or the bottom tercile
of the distribution of index fund ownership in 2003 on the change over the period 2004-2013
in interest checking account maintenance fees, maintenance fee thresholds, and interest rate
spread percentiles. Spread percentiles are calculated as the within-year percentile rank of the
di↵erence between the 10-year Treasury Constant Maturity rate and the deposit rate, expressed
as a percent of the Treasury rate. The sample includes all bank branches in RateWatch. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the county level and bank-level fixed e↵ects absorb all across-bank
variation.
  Maintenance Fee
  Maintenance Fee
Threshold
  Spread
(Percentile)
(1) (2) (3)
Top Tercile Index Fund Ownership in 2003 0.110 406.7*** 1.247***
(0.0938) (149.4) (0.481)
Log Income2004 -0.00920 -270.9 1.128
(0.0506) (378.1) (0.876)
Log Population2004 -0.0257** -197.5** -0.313*
(0.0130) (83.25) (0.185)
Maintenance Fee2004 -0.989***
(0.00341)
Maintenance Fee Threshold2004 -0.763***
(0.0533)
Spread2004 -0.888***
(0.0173)
Constant 15.13*** 11,019*** 37.35***
(0.506) (3,807) (8.665)
Bank FE X X X
Observations 16,105 10,678 48,004
R-squared 0.995 0.911 0.915
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figures
Figure 3.1. 2013 Average Prices, by County
(A) Money market account maintenance fee amounts by county (2013). This figure
shows the average money market account maintenance fee amount for each county in 2013. The
counties in grey are counties in which RateWatch has no data on any bank branches.
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(B) Money market account maintenance fee thresholds by county (2013). This figure
shows the average money market account maintenance fee threshold for each county in 2013.
The counties in grey are counties in which RateWatch has no data on any bank branches.
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(C) 12-month CD rates by county (2013). This figure shows the average 12-month CD
interest rate for each county in 2013. The counties in grey are counties in which RateWatch
has no data on any bank branches.
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(D) Money market account rates by county (2013). This figure shows the average money
market account interest rate for each county in 2013. The counties in grey are counties in which
RateWatch has no data on any bank branches.
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Figure 3.2. Banking market concentration, county-level (2013). This figure shows the
county-level banking sector concentration in 2013, as measured using HHI and GHHI.
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Figure 3.3. Median, 20th percentile, and 80th percentile maintenance fee amounts,
2002-2013. This figure shows the annual median, 20th percentile, and 80th percentile of mainte-
nance fee amounts for money market accounts and interest-bearing checking accounts, for 2002-
2013, in 2013 USD (adjusted for inflation using CPI).
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Figure 3.4. Median, 20th percentile, and 80th percentile maintenance fee thresh-
olds, 2002-2013. This figure shows the annual median, 20th percentile, and 80th percentile of
maintenance fee thresholds for money market accounts and interest-bearing checking accounts,
for 2002-2013, in 2013 USD (adjusted for inflation using CPI).
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Figure 3.5. Median, 20th percentile, and 80th percentile interest rates, 2002-2013.
This figure shows the quarterly median, 20th percentile, and 80th percentile of the interest rate
for deposit products o↵ered by banks from 2002 through 2013. The bank interest rates in this
figure are for 12-month CDs with $10,000 minimum deposit, money market accounts, and interest-
bearing checking accounts.
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Figure 3.6. National and County-Level Bank Concentration, 2002-2013. This figure
shows the annual bank concentration from 2002 through 2013 taking the entire United States as a
unified market, and the deposit-weighted average across counties of bank concentration measures.
Bank concentration is measured using the HHI and GHHI.
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Figure 3.7. GHHI Delta County-Level Scatter, 2002 to 2013. This figure is a scatterplot
of county-level GHHI deltas in 2013 against county-level GHHI deltas in 2002. The horizontal axis
plots the GHHI delta of counties in 2002 and the vertical axis plots the GHHI delta of counties in
2013. The diagonal red line is a 45 , which is where all counties would lie if there was no change
in GHHI delta from 2002 to 2013 in any county. Finally, the size of the plotted point signifies the
total average amount of deposits in the county, with more deposits signified by a larger plotted
point.
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APPENDIX A
VC financing and the entrepreneurship gender
gap:
Dataset Construction
In this section, I lay out the process used to build my dataset. As explained in
Section ??, the API access to CrunchBase prevents users from downloading detailed
information on all entrepreneurial firms, financing rounds, and VC firms at once.
Instead, I use VentureXpert data to find the sixteen VC firms with the greatest
number of financings as of late September 2014 and then find all entrepreneurial
firms in CrunchBase that ever received financing from these sixteen VC firms. This
approach solves two problems at once. First, it reduces the likelihood of including
organizations that are not true entrepreneurial firms in my dataset. As the definition
of early entrepreneurship is vague, many “firms” in CrunchBase may be nothing more
than a hobby of an “entrepreneur.” Focusing on firms that receive financing at some
point by a well-established VC firm removes such hobbyist projects from the sample.
Second, it provides a systematic rule, devoid of subjective biases, that I can reliably
use to collect data.
For each of the entrepreneurial firms in my sample, I apply the Python programs
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described earlier to download all data on the entrepreneurial firm object in Crunch-
Base and on all associated financing round and VC firm objects in CrunchBase. For
instance, to download all information for Cloudera, my programs download all infor-
mation for the entrepreneurial firm object for Cloudera, all financing round objects
associated with Cloudera (including its Series A through F financing rounds), and
all VC firm objects associated with it as well (including Accel Partners, Greylock
Partners, Ignition Partners, and so on). For an example of the data files provided by
CrunchBase, see Figure A.1.
Using the data from entrepreneurial firm and VC firm objects, I determine whether
each person associated with a given firm is important for my analysis. For en-
trepreneurial firms, founders are the important personnel, so I take the list of founders
provided for each entrepreneurial firm object as important personnel. For VC firms,
general partners are important personnel. I take all founders and associated people
whose roles signify that they are GPs as important personnel.1
Next, I classify all important personnel by gender. First, I categorize as many
personnel as possible using my own knowledge of female and male first names. For
names that I cannot categorize, I use Namepedia. Table A.1 provides a breakdown
of gender classification for entrepreneurs and GPs separately and together. From
that table, we can see that I manually classify 94.4% of entrepreneurs and 93.5%
of GPs who are successfully classified into gender groups. About 6% and 5% of
entrepreneurs and GPs, respectively, are not successfully classified either by me or by
Namepedia. To classify personnel into gender group, I submit a query to Namepedia
for each name and “webscrape” the gender from the response. Namepedia successfully
classifies many of the names I am unable to categorize. I ignore uncertain Namepedia
categorizations such as “More male, also female,” “More female, also male,” and
“Neutral” to ensure that my results are not driven by misclassifications.
1I take any personnel whose role descriptions include the phrases “general partner,” “principal,”
or “founder” to be a GP in the VC firm.
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I link each entrepreneurial firm to potential exit from VC financing via IPO or
acquisition. I use SEC’s EDGAR filings to link to IPO exits and Thomson One’s SDC
M&A database to link to acquisition exits. Given the lack of shared identifiers between
CrunchBase data and either SEC or SDC, I must match firms between CrunchBase
and the two exit data sources manually by firm name. I do this manual matching in
two parts. First, I pair observations between CrunchBase and the exits data that have
perfectly matching firm names. Next, I run a Levenshtein lexical distance algorithm
on all remaining pairwise combinations of CrunchBase-SEC and CrunchBase-SDC
observations. I then manually go through all pairs that fall below a normalized
Levenshtein distance threshold of 0.2, and find all Crunchbase-SEC and CrunchBase-
SDC pairs that refer to the same company. Finally, for potential IPO exits, I manually
check whether the firm filed a subsequent withdrawal (Form RW) and reversed its
decision to go public at that point. If so, I remove the CrunchBase-SEC pair. By this
method, I find all IPO and acquisition exits for entrepreneurial firms in my dataset.
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Appendix Tables and Figures
Entrepreneurs GPs All people
All 4,859 5,970 10,829
... Gender matches 4,568 5,672 10,240
... ... Manual gender match 4,313 5,306 9,619
... ... Namepedia gender match 255 366 621
Table A.1. Gender classification.
This table reports counts of gender classification of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists.
Gender is classified manually by the author or, if the author is unable to classify manually,
with the aid of Namepedia. The gender classification is provided for entrepreneurs and
GPs separately and for all important personnel together.
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{
...
"data": {
"uuid": "f267a617e1cefa6eb4409adb8ff09caf",
"type": "Organization",
"properties": {
"role_company": true,
...
"founded_on": "2008-10-13",
"founded_on_trust_code": 7,
"permalink": "cloudera",
...
"closed_on": null,
...
"founders": {
"items": [
{
"type": "Person",
"name": "Mike Olson",
"path": "person/mike-olson-2",
"created_at": 1410023922,
"updated_at": 1424979282
},
{
"type": "Person",
"name": "Christophe Bisciglia",
"path": "person/christophe-bisciglia",
"created_at": 1224039872,
"updated_at": 1424965495
},
{
"type": "Person",
"name": "Amr Awadallah",
"path": "person/amr-awadallah",
"created_at": 1218178635,
"updated_at": 1427790738
}
]
},
"investors": [
{
"type": "Organization",
"name": "EquityZen",
"path": "organization/equityzen"
},
...
]
},
"relationships": {
"past_team": {
"items": [
{
"first_name": "Eric",
"last_name": "Sammer",
"title": "Engineering Manager",
"started_on": null,
"started_on_trust_code": null,
"ended_on": null,
"ended_on_trust_code": null,
"path": "person/eric-sammer",
"created_at": 1402581479,
"updated_at": 1427886689
},
...
]
},
"board_members_and_advisors": {
"items": [
{
"first_name": "Frank",
"last_name": "Artale",
"title": "Advisor",
"started_on": "2009-01-01",
"started_on_trust_code": 4,
"path": "person/frank-artale",
"created_at": 1202470740,
"updated_at": 1424993700
},
...
]
},
"current_team": {
"items": [
{
"first_name": "Jeff",
"last_name": "Hammerbacher",
"title": "Chief Scientist",
"started_on": null,
"started_on_trust_code": null,
"path": "person/jeff-hammerbacher",
"created_at": 1224039873,
"updated_at": 1424964507
},
{
"first_name": "Amr",
"last_name": "Awadallah",
"title": "Founder & CTO",
"started_on": "2008-08-01",
"started_on_trust_code": 6,
"path": "person/amr-awadallah",
"created_at": 1218178635,
"updated_at": 1427790738
},
...
]
},
...
"funding_rounds": {
"items": [
{
"type": "FundingRound",
"name": "Cloudera Funding Round",
"path": "funding-round/948066bf45c4ea6984ee01fa54aa9676",
"created_at": 1415820046,
"updated_at": 1415820090
},
{
"type": "FundingRound",
"name": "Cloudera raises 0 in venture round",
"path": "funding-round/c47e8ad2f90fcd312af1e84d89c95b52",
"created_at": 1396448533,
"updated_at": 1427415033
},
...
]
},
}
}
}
Figure A.1. Cloudera (entrepreneurial firm) information on CrunchBase.
This figure provides an example of the JSON file provided by CrunchBase for an en-
trepreneurial firm query. The data are organized into subparts in the JSON file using
brackets and braces. Early stage firm data include entrepreneur and financing round
information.
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APPENDIX B
Ultimate ownership and bank competition:
Construction of RateWatch data
RateWatch provides deposit rates, loan rates, and fees data at regular intervals
for each “rate-setter.” A “rate-setter” is an entity within a bank that is responsible
for setting the rates and fees for one or more branches within the bank. Each bank
in the data has at least one rate-setter and there may be more than one rate-setter
per bank. Although not always the case, a rate-setter is generally responsible for
setting banking prices for all branches within that bank within a geographic region.
Additionally, the rate-setter for a given branch may change over time and the same
rate-setter may not set all rates and fees for a given branch.
For each of the bank rates and fees that we explore, we convert the rate-setter-
level data from RateWatch to branch-level data. We assemble these branch-level
data by matching the rate or fee data series provided for each rate-setter to the bank
branches for which it sets those rates and fees. This matching is possible with the use
of RateWatch data that links bank branches to their rate-setters for each data series.
In the panels in Figure 3.1A, we provide evidence of the geographical coverage
and dispersion for some deposit rates, loan rates, and fees. In particular, in Panel
A, we show coverage and dispersion for maintenance fees on money market accounts
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in 2013, in Panel B, for maintenance fee thresholds on money market accounts in
2013, in Panel C, for 12-month CD annual percent yields in 2013, and in Panel D,
for money market account interest rates in 2013.
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APPENDIX C
Ultimate ownership and bank competition:
Changes in prices and concentration over time
While our identification depends on cross-sectional variation in prices and concen-
tration, there are trends in the time series as well. Figure C.1A shows the average
maintenance fee charged for money market accounts, interest-bearing checking ac-
counts, and non-interest-bearing checking accounts across all branches in 2002-2013.
We see a clear upward trend over time in the cross-sectional average of maintenance
fees charged for the three deposit products. Money market maintenance fees rise from
just over $7.50 in 2002 to over $11 in 2013. Interest-bearing checking shows a remark-
able rise in these fees, going from around $8.50 to nearly $15 in that same period.
Non-interest bearing checking fees also increased over that period, from around $1.50
in 2002 to nearly $7 in 2013.1
We also observe that the average threshold below which maintenance fees are
charged rises over time. In Figure C.1B, we see that all three deposit products’
maintenance fee thresholds rise over time. The greatest rise occurs for interest-bearing
checking accounts, where the threshold increases more than ten-fold from around $650
1The average fees reported here and average thresholds reported in the next paragraph are in
constant 2013 USD, adjusted for inflation using CPI. The fees and thresholds used in the regressions
are nominal. Results are quantitatively similar using inflation-adjusted fees and thresholds.
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in 2002 to over $6,800 in 2013. The other thresholds in the figure increase over time
as well, with the money market account maintenance threshold rising from under
$400 to nearly $4,400 and non-interest-bearing checking maintenance threshold rising
from just over $400 in 2002 to nearly $1,200 in 2013. Based on these two figures, it is
clear that the amount of maintenance fees and the thresholds below which they are
charged have both been rising steadily over time.
Figure C.1C shows the average interest rates o↵ered for 12-month CDs, money
market accounts, and interest-bearing checking accounts as well as 10-year Treasury
Constant Maturity rate in 2002 through 2013. The figure implies that, there is consid-
erable variation over time in the spread between the Treasury rate and deposit rates
on CDs and money market amounts. This spread is a measure of the margin banks
charge their customers for the privilege of depositing their money with the institu-
tion. Compared to CD rates, there is less variation in the spread for interest-bearing
checking account rates.
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Appendix Figures
Figure C.1. Average Prices, 2002-2013
(A) Average Fees, 2002-2013. This figure shows the annual average fees charged by bank
branches, from 2002 through 2013, in 2013 USD (adjusted for inflation using CPI). The fees
in the figure are for money market account maintenance, interest-bearing checking account
maintenance, and non-interest-bearing checking account maintenance. We average the last
values for each of the above fees reported by each branch to RateWatch in a given year.
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(B) Average Fee Thresholds, 2002-2013. This figure shows the annual average thresh-
old below which maintenance fees are charged by bank branches, from 2002 through 2013, in
2013 USD (adjusted for inflation using CPI). The thresholds in this figure are for maintenance
fees charged for money market accounts, interest-bearing checking accounts, and non-interest-
bearing checking accounts. We average the last values for each of the above fee thresholds
reported by each branch to RateWatch in a given year.
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(C) Average Interest Rates, 2002-2013. This figure shows the quarterly average of the
interest rate for deposit products o↵ered by banks and the 10-year Treasury Constant Maturity
rate from 2002 through 2013. The bank interest rates in this figure are for 12-month CDs with
$10,000 minimum deposit, money market accounts, and interest-bearing checking accounts.
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APPENDIX D
Ultimate ownership and bank competition:
Panel IV first-stage regression tables
Table D.1. First stage of panel IV regressions instrumenting GHHI with index fund
ownership
(A) First stage of panel IV regressions of time deposit spreads instrumenting GHHI
with index fund ownership. This table shows the first stage of regressions of the e↵ect of
the GHHI instrumented with index fund ownership on time deposit spreads with 12-, 24-, and
36-month maturities. Spreads are calculated as the di↵erence between the 10-year Treasury
Constant Maturity rate and the deposit rate, expressed as a percent of the Treasury rate. The
sample includes all bank branches in RateWatch from the period 2003M1 to 2013M6. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. Variable definitions are provided in the appendix. While
throughout the paper the HHI and GHHI are expressed on a scale of 0 to 10,000, we use a scale
of 0 to 1 for the regressions.
Dependent Variable: GHHI
12-Month CD Spread 24-Month CD Spread 36-Month CD Spread
(1) (2) (3)
Index Fund Ownership 0.0472*** 0.0474*** 0.0478***
(0.00235) (0.00236) (0.00236)
Log Income -0.0433 -0.0432 -0.0449
(0.0306) (0.0306) (0.0315)
Log Population -0.0606 -0.0601 -0.0580
(0.0429) (0.0434) (0.0434)
Log(1+Market Cap) 0.000673*** 0.000664*** 0.000672***
(8.44e-05) (8.59e-05) (8.32e-05)
Year FE X X X
Branch FE X X X
Observations 947,052 927,727 902,540
R-squared 0.911 0.911 0.912
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(B) First stage of panel IV regressions of money market account maintenance fees,
thresholds, and spreads on index fund ownership and panel IV regressions instru-
menting GHHI with index fund ownership. This table shows the first stage of regressions
of the e↵ect of the GHHI instrumented with index fund ownership on money market account
maintenance fees, maintenance fee thresholds, and interest rate spreads. Spreads are calculated
as the di↵erence between the 10-year Treasury Constant Maturity rate and the deposit rate,
expressed as a percent of the Treasury rate. The sample includes all bank branches in Rate-
Watch from the period 2003M1 to 2013M6. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
Variable definitions are provided in the appendix. While throughout the paper the HHI and
GHHI are expressed on a scale of 0 to 10,000, we use a scale of 0 to 1 for the regressions.
Dependent Variable: GHHI
Maintenance Fee Maintenance Fee Threshold Spread
(1) (2) (3)
Index Fund Ownership 0.0531*** 0.0539*** 0.0473***
(0.00277) (0.00280) (0.00239)
Log Income -0.0798*** -0.0766*** -0.0438
(0.0298) (0.0279) (0.0300)
Log Population -0.0365 -0.0252 -0.0626
(0.0592) (0.0610) (0.0431)
Log(1+Market Cap) 0.000668*** 0.000674*** 0.000658***
(8.78e-05) (8.82e-05) (8.50e-05)
Year FE X X X
Branch FE X X X
Observations 533,815 488,666 911,361
R-squared 0.923 0.924 0.911
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(C) First stage of panel IV regressions of interest checking account maintenance
fees, thresholds, and spreads instrumenting GHHI with index fund ownership. This
table shows the first stage of regressions of the e↵ect of the GHHI instrumented with index
fund ownership on interest checking account maintenance fees, maintenance fee thresholds, and
interest rate spreads. Spreads are calculated as the di↵erence between the 10-year Treasury
Constant Maturity rate and the deposit rate, expressed as a percent of the Treasury rate. The
sample includes all bank branches in RateWatch from the period 2003M1 to 2013M6. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level. Variable definitions are provided in the appendix. While
throughout the paper the HHI and GHHI are expressed on a scale of 0 to 10,000, we use a scale
of 0 to 1 for the regressions.
Dependent Variable: GHHI
Maintenance Fee Maintenance Fee Threshold Spread
(1) (2) (3)
Index Fund Ownership 0.0535*** 0.0531*** 0.0473***
(0.00283) (0.00282) (0.00236)
Log Income -0.0761** -0.0824*** -0.0425
(0.0313) (0.0310) (0.0309)
Log Population -0.0431 -0.0360 -0.0595
(0.0623) (0.0637) (0.0437)
Log(1+Market Cap) 0.000708*** 0.000698*** 0.000668***
(9.18e-05) (8.37e-05) (8.50e-05)
Year FE X X X
Branch FE X X X
Observations 532,634 490,230 913,328
R-squared 0.924 0.926 0.911
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX E
Ultimate ownership and bank competition:
Construction of the GHHI index
For each retail banking market, we quantify the increase in market concentration
from common ownership and cross-ownership using the Generalized HHI (GHHI)
delta. Because some of the bank shareholders are also banks themselves, our first
step in calculating the GHHI delta is solving for the ultimate financial interest and
ultimate control shares of the di↵erent shareholders.1
We solve for ultimate financial interest as follows. Call ⇡j the operating profit of
firm j. The overall profit of firm j, including the profit from the shares it holds in
other firms is
⇧j = ⇡j +
X
k 6=j
d⇤jk⇧k,
where d⇤jk is the financial interest of firm j in firm k. In matrix form, the vector of
overall profits is
⇧ = ⇡ +D⇤⇧,
1Our derivation of ultimate ownership and control is inspired by the work of Leontief (1941),
Leontief (1966), Ellerman (1991), Gilo et al. (2006), Brito et al. (2013) and Brito et al. (2015). The
main di↵erence between our derivation and that of Brito et al. (2015) is that our methodology for
calculating ultimate control shares makes the ultimate control shares add up to one for every firm,
while the ultimate control shares implied by their methodology do not necessarily add up to one,
and can in some cases be negative.
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where D⇤ is the matrix of cross-financial interests of the industry firms. Solving for
overall profits yields the equation
⇧ = (I  D⇤) 1⇡.
We define the objective function of external shareholder i as
Ui =
X
k
dij⇧j,
where dij is the direct financial interests of external shareholder in the (overall) prof-
its industry firm j. Calling D the matrix of direct financial interests of external
shareholders in the industry firms, the vector U of objective functions of external
shareholders is
U = D⇧ = D(I  D⇤) 1⇡.
Thus, we define the ultimate financial interest matrix B as
B = D(I  D⇤) 1.
The element bij captures the ultimate financial interest of external shareholder i in
the operating profits of firm j.
We solve for ultimate control in a similar way. The objective function of manager
j can be written as
!j =
X
k 6=j
c⇤kj!k +
X
i
cijUi
where c⇤kj is the control share of firm k in firm j, cij is the control share of external
shareholder i in firm j, and Ui is the objective function of external shareholder i. We
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can write this in matrix form as
⌦ = C 0⇤⌦+ C 0U,
where ⌦ is the vector of firm objective functions, C⇤ is the matrix of cross-control
shares by other industry firms, C is the matrix of control shares of external share-
holders.
Solving the system for ⌦ yields
⌦ = (I   C 0⇤) 1C 0U.
Thus, the ultimate control shares   are given by
  = C(I   C⇤) 1.
The element  ij captures the ultimate control share of external shareholder i in the
objective function of firm j.
Note that the ultimate control shares for each firm add up to one. To see this,
start from the initial control shares, which add up to one by definition:
C 0 N + C 0⇤ K = K
where N is a column vector of ones with number of rows equal to the number of
external shareholders N , and K is a column vector of ones with number of rows
equal to the number of industry firms. One can rewrite this as
C 0 N = (I   C 0⇤) K
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and then pre-multiply on both sides by (I   C 0⇤) 1 to obtain
(I   C 0⇤) 1C 0 N = K
 0 N = K .
That is, the sum of each row of the ultimate control shares matrix   equals one. A
similar derivation shows that ultimate financial interest shares for each firm add up
to one as well.
Once we have solved for the ultimate ownership, we can apply the O’Brien and
Salop (2000) formula directly to obtain the GHHI:
GHHI = s0Ws
where
W = diag( 0B) 1 0B
is the matrix of weights that firms put in the profits of competitors’ profits in their
objective function, relative to their own profits. This formula can also be written in
non-matrix form as
GHHI =
X
j
X
k
P
i  ij ikP
i  ij ij
sjsk,
where  ij is the ultimate control share by shareholder i in firm j, and  ij is the
ultimate financial interest by shareholder i in firm j.
The GHHI delta, which measures the increase in market concentration due to
common and cross-ownership, is the di↵erence between the GHHI and the standard
HHI:
GHHI delta = GHHI - HHI.
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